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Preliminary 
Editor’s Note: Special Issue on Romance 
 
This issue is dedicated to Victor Skretkowicz, who has been 
struggling bravely and with inspirational cheerfulness of spirit with 
the debilitating condition of ALS. The essays in this issue are 
drawn from a conference entitled “Romance” given in his honor 
and sponsored by the University of Dundee on October 5-6, 2007. 
We thank Chris Murray, Marion Wynne-Davies, and others for 
their role in putting on that conference. At that time, Helen Vincent 
presented Victor with the Jean Robertson Achievement Award for 
Sidney Studies. It seems only fitting to introduce this issue with 
Helen’s eloquent remarks.  
 
 
HELEN VINCENT 
A Tribute to Victor Skretkowicz:  The Jean Robertson Lifetime 
Achievement Award for Sidney Studies.  
 
It is highly appropriate that the first recipient of an award named 
after the editor of the Old Arcadia should be the editor of the New 
Arcadia. 
 
It is impossible to condense a lifetime of achievement into a short 
speech, and it has indeed been a career which, in spite of such 
other activities as editing Florence Nightingale’s letters and co-
ordinating the Dictionary of the Scottish Tongue, has been devoted 
to promoting the Sidney cause. Victor is one of a generation of 
scholars whose dedication saw the establishment of a Sidney 
Society and a Sidney Journal, and a regular programme of 
conference sessions, so that Philip Sidney’s place in the 
Renaissance literary canon has been assured and the other 
members of his family will be given due attention.  
 
Rather than list all his achievements in chronological order – 
which would take too long – I’m going to talk about the different 
ways in which Victor has so greatly enhanced our understanding of 
the field. First, through his commitment to the texts: his 1987 
edition of the New Arcadia is a monumental achievement which 
people like me, who have never known Sidney studies without it, 
almost cannot appreciate. To take this complex text, of which no 
holograph survives, subject to so much control by such concerned 
friends as the Countess of Pembroke and Fulke Greville, and to 
steer through the additions and deletions of the earliest surviving 
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versions and deal with it according to the rigorous standards of 
textual criticism established by William Ringler and Jean 
Robertson – to cut through all of this and produce a clear text 
which has become the bedrock of so much modern criticism and 
research is a great work.  
 
But Victor’s commitment is not just to Philip Sidney: it extends to 
the other members of this remarkable family. In particular, the 
Sidney family contained some of the most notable women writers 
of the early modern period – Mary Sidney and Mary Wroth. Our 
own age has seen the increasing rediscovery of early modern 
women writers, and Victor has constantly supported the 
development of this field, treating women authors as writers on 
equal terms with men. So in terms of his commitment to the texts 
and to the authors, Victor deserves this award. But what he has 
done for Sidney studies transcends this in a way which no 
Research Assessment Exercise will ever capture.  
 
Victor was one of the early enthusiasts in the formation of the 
Sidney Society, and international relations in the field were 
immeasurably helped by his great personal friendship with Gerry 
Rubio, an early editor of the Sidney Journal, which ensured that 
there was a regular transatlantic Sidneian dialogue.  
 
Victor has been a keen participant in the conferences through 
which networks of Sidney scholars have developed, and his role as 
eager questioner, respondent, and critic, honestly disagreeing when 
necessary, and – a far more rare quality – kindly and constructively 
critical – has helped to advance Sidney studies over many years. 
Here I must acknowledge my own personal debt: it was at a 
conference on the Sidney family organised by Victor here at 
Dundee in 1996 that I gave my very first presentation at an 
academic conference, and both then and at other gatherings I have 
been inspired and enlightened by Victor’s interest and advice, and 
watched him extend the same help to other new scholars.  
 
And it is these qualities of encouragement and enthusiasm with 
which I would like to end. Victor’s passionate commitment to 
Sidney studies has benefited us all – as an academic community, as 
individual scholars, and last but not least, as friends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Poetics of Romance 
 
ARTHUR F. KINNEY 
University of Massachusetts-Amherst 
 
 
The last extant poem of John Skelton, loyal Catholic priest and 
poet laureate under Henry VIII, was written in 1528.  Entitled “A 
Replycacion,” it was an attack on two Cambridge students, 
Thomas Bilney and Thomas Arthur, who had recently been 
declared guilty of Lutheran heresy and required to abjure publicly 
and then to bear faggots to Paul’s Cross on the Feast of the 
Conception, 8 December 1527, as a visible sign of their 
recantation. Both had been members of an active circle in 
Cambridge dubbed “Little Germany.”  Bilney, their leader, had in 
fact been licensed to preach throughout the whole diocese of Ely, 
neighboring Cambridgeshire, in 1525; by 1527, he was also 
preaching in and around London, this time neighboring Skelton 
who was then living in sanctuary in Westminster.  Bilney opposed 
two beliefs Skelton especially cherished—the veneration of saints 
(including the Blessed Virgin) and the practice of pilgrimages, 
both central to Skelton’s poetry as well.  The two young men were 
tried by an ecclesiastical tribunal that sat from 27 November to 7 
December 1527 in the chapter house at Westminster and at the 
London residence of the Bishop of Norwich, Bishop Nikke. The 
punning title of Skelton’s poem, “A Replycacion,” holds five 
possible meanings: it is the reply of the plaintiff to the plea of the 
defendant; the rejoinder to the heretics on the behalf of the poet 
(and the faith he embodied); a repetition of the poet’s defense of 
beliefs he had proclaimed in a lifetime of writing poems; 
reverberations of Church doctrine; and a bringing together, a 
summing up, of the place of the sacraments and the work of the 
poet in the service of faith, justice, and truth. For Skelton the 
adherents of “Little Germany” had gathered frequently at the Three 
Cranes in the Vintry, Cambridge, to discuss ideas and to drink in 
ways that mocked the sacrament of the Eucharist, Bilney in 
particular sitting in his chair as a mockery of the bishop sitting on 
his throne, but without robes or mitre.   
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 True to his lifelong practice of grounding all his poems in 
liturgical forms and scriptural references—poetry as figural art—
Skelton noted in disgust “Howe yong scholers now-a-dayes 
embalmed with the flyblowen blast of the moche vayneglorious 
pipplyng wynde,” the phrase “flyblowen blast” taking his audience 
directly to Psalm 77 as the poem’s foundation: 
 
Attend, O my people, to the law: incline your ears to the 
words of my mouth. 
  I will open my mouth in parables: I will utter propositions 
from the beginning. 
How great things have we heard and know, and our 
fathers have told us…. 
  That they may put their hope in God and may not forget 
the works of God: and may seek his commandments. 
  That they may not become like their fathers, a perverse 
and exasperating generation. 
A generation that set not their heart aright: and whose 
spirit was not faithful to God…. 
And they turned back and tempted God: and he grieved 
the holy one of Israel. 
  They remembered not his hand, in the day that he 
redeemed them from the hand of him that afflicted them: 
How he wrought his signs in Egypt, and his wonders in 
the field of Tanis. 
And he turned their rivers into blood, and their showers 
that they might not drink.  
  He sent amongst them divers sorts of flies, which 
devoured them: and frogs which destroyed them. 
And he gave up their fruits to the blast, and their labours 
to the locust.1  
 
The “flyblowen blast” of the Cambridge youth, then, embodied the 
Lord’s own retaliation according to the Psalmist and their failure to 
recognize this exposed their ignorance of the very scripture they 
meant to foreground.   
 This was a typical Skeltonic technique. But so were 
Skeltonics, those dimeters and trimeters cascading down the page 
that, filled with rhyme, were easy for parishioners and readers to 
remember even as their rhythms were an imitation of Gregorian 
 
1 Sarum Missal in English, trans. Frederick E. Warren (Oxford: A.R.Mowbray and 
Co., Ltd., 1913), 1-3, 7-8, 41-6.  
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chant, long a staple of worship in Holy Mother Church. When 
Skelton turns to this form of verse in “A Replycacion,” that part 
meant as mnemonic and so unforgettable, he changes to a more 
positive statement that can serve as his own poetics: 
 
 … there is a spyrituall, 
 And a mysteriall, 
 And a mysticall 
 Effecte energiall, 
 As Grekes do it call, 
 Of suche an industry, 
 And suche a pregnancy 
 Of hevenly inspyracion 
 In laureate creacyon, 
 Of poetes commendation, 
 That of divyne myseracion 
 God maketh his habytaction 
 In poetes whiche excelles, 
 And sojourns with them and dwelles. 
 By whose inflammacion 
 Of spyrituall instygacion 
 And divine inspyracion 
 We are kindled in suche facyon 
 With hete of the Holy Gost, 
 Which is God of myghtes most, 
 That he our penne doth lede, 
 And maketh in us such spede 
 That forthwith we must nede 
 With penne and ynke procede.2  
 
In her recent study of the poet, John Skelton and Poetic Authority, 
Jane Griffiths reminds us that inspiration—what inspires the 
poet—“shares an etymological root with both ‘spirit’ and ‘spirare,’ 
to breathe: to be inspired [therefore] is to be filled with the breath 
of God and in turn to breathe forth his word.”3 In Skelton’s lines 
here, “hevenly inspyracion” becomes “divine inspyracion,” the 
only word repeated in this passage, and meant to overpass 
“laureate creacyon” and “poetes commendation.”  Skelton thus 
elevates both poetry and the poet—deliberately giving himself 
 
2 The Works of John Skelton, ed. Robert S. Kinsman, ll. 3655-88.  I worked from his 
MS; he died before he could publish his text. 
3 Jane Griffiths, John Skelton and Poetic Authority: Defining the Liberty to Speak 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 156. 
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(because of the inspiration of the Holy Ghost) more authority even 
than the abbot or bishop who tried the two young heretics. From 
Skelton’s elevated perspective, he is interceding in the lives of 
Thomas Bilney and Thomas Arthur much as the Virgin Mary acts 
as intercessor for those who have remained faithful to her. In fact, 
this is the lesson of the Feast of the Conception, and Skelton draws 
on the Sequence for the Mass of that feast day to underscore the 
purpose of his poem: 
 
 O how happy, O how fair; 
 sweet to us, to God how dear, 
  hath this conception been! 
 Misery now is at an end, 
 mercy doth on earth descend, 
  for sorrow joy is seen.   
 A mother her new offspring bears, 
 from a new star new sun appears, 
  new grace doth all inspire; 
 The mother bears the generator, 
 the creature brings for the creator, 
  the daughter bears the sire.  
 
And by denying the act of God that saved mankind, Bilney and 
Arthur deny not only the Blessed Virgin but Christ (and God’s 
power) as well. Heresy, Skelton warns, is inseparable from 
damnation, while the intercession of the poets mirrors the 
possibility of heavenly intercession. Poetry, then, can be 
salvational, too, for Skelton. 
 Skelton, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, was a 
fiercely loyal Catholic whose faith consistently put him at odds 
with the Bishop, the Archbishop, and finally Cardinal Thomas 
Wolsey whose immorality and betrayal of Holy Mother Church 
was equally heretical: hence Skelton’s refuge in the sanctuary of 
Westminster.  At the other end of the sixteenth century, an avowed 
recusant poet wrote a pamphlet-length tribute to the Virgin Mary in 
1596: Prosopopeia Containing the Teares of the holy, blessed, and 
sanctified Marie, the Mother of GOD, “an intense religious 
rhapsody,”4 according to N. Burton Paradise, on Luke 2:35: “And 
moreouer, the swords shall pearce thy soule, that the thoughts of 
many hearts may be opened” (A2) in which he promises that:  
 
4 N. Burton Paradise, Thomas Lodge: The History of an Elizabethan (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1931), 125. 
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In meditating with Marie, you shall finde Iesus: in 
knowing Christs sufferance, you shall be inflamed in 
his loue: in bearing his wordes, you shal partake his 
wisdome, which who inioineth, leaueth the world as 
transitorie, and seeketh after heauen for immortalitie.  
Heereon Augustine exclaimeth, Vnhappie is he that 
knoweth all things, & knoweth thee not: blessed is he 
that knoweth thee to despise all things. (A6v-A7) 
 
We do not know precisely when or why Thomas Lodge, the son of 
two very devout Protestant parents, converted to Catholicism 
during the reign of Elizabeth I, but it seems likely to have been in 
the heavily Catholic atmosphere of Trinity College, Oxford.  What 
is clear is that it was religion, as Edward Tenney has it, that 
“excited his imagination, and moved him to compose much of his 
best prose and poetry.”5 The conversion was probably sometime 
before 1582, however, when Stephen Gosson, in replying to 
Lodge’s defense of plays in Playes Confuted in Fiue Actions in 
1582 argues, according to the title-page, “that they are not to be 
suffred in a Christian common weale, by the waye both the Cauils 
of Thomas Lodge, and the Play of Playes” and dedicating this 
fulsome response to Lodge to Sir Francis Walsingham, the 
Queen’s chief intelligencer and prosecutor of Catholics. To the 
contrary, Lodge dedicated his own books throughout his career to 
possible patrons who were known Catholics: the Countess of 
Derby, the Countess of Cumberland, the Hare family; and he 
published books with his Catholic brother-in-law Edward White.  
On a voyage to the New World with Sir Thomas Cavendish, he 
stayed in a Jesuit monastery from 26 December 1591 to 3 February 
1592, reading many of the books there; his own library contained a 
number of Catholic books including The Flowers of Lodowicke of 
Granada, a volume he brought back from Brazil and eventually 
translated and published in 1601.  In addition, the Bodleian Library 
now has a manuscript of Doctrina Christaāna linguoa Brosilica, 
an elementary textbook of Catholic doctrine designed for 
missionaries that is signed “Ex dono Thomae Lodge D. M. 
Oxoniensis qui sua manu e Brasilia deduxit.” His Catholic faith 
hounded him. In 1597, he left England for Avignon, where he 
studied medicine in a school located near the papal palace. He 
received his diploma the next year but stayed abroad to practice 
 
5 Edward Andrews Tenney, Thomas Lodge. Cornell Studies in English (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1935), 104. 
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until 1600. He returned to England for a few months, and married 
Jane Aldred, a Catholic who had formerly married a double agent 
for Walsingham and the pope. He went into exile again. In 1602 he 
returned to England and tended to the sick and dying of the plague 
of 1603, risking his own life daily; but in the wake of the 
Gunpowder Plot of 1605, after which Catholics were prohibited 
from practicing medicine, he went abroad again, this time to doctor 
Irish troops fighting in the service of Spain. Once again he returned 
to England in 1609, the Royal College of Physicians granting him 
the right to practice in 1610. Lodge’s life was, therefore, much less 
settled than Skelton’s, but both shared an enduring loyalty to Holy 
Mother Church that was instrumental to their poetry and their 
poetics.   
 Just as scripture was the allusive subtext behind Skelton’s 
“Replycacion,” Catholicism is the subtext too at the conclusion of 
Rosalynde (1590) where the protagonist’s rebirth turns her magical 
promise into a miraculous presence, and metamorphoses a holiday 
into a holy day. Tying this Elizabethan romance to the pastoral 
mode and allowing the Reformation to have colored our 
expectations, we have lost sight of Lodge’s language which 
carefully insists on a religious orientation in the poetics of a 
recusant author whose presentation must nevertheless be 
considerably subdued. In Lodge’s hands, events are figural, 
leaning towards a Catholic view (and values) of iconicity. Thus, 
Rosalynde, he writes, is a figure of “grace,” and the effect of her 
reappearance on others is likened to conversion. 
 
Garismond seeing his daughter, rose from his seat & fel 
vpon her necke, vuttering the passions of his ioy in 
watry plaints driuen into such an extasie of content, that 
hee could not vtter one word. At this sight … Rosader 
was both amazed and ioyfull.6 
 
“An extasie of content”; “both amazed and ioyfull”: these are 
conventional religious paradoxes of the time. Rosalynde’s 
relinquishment, too, is constructed to position itself as a rebirth: 
she unites father and daughter (and so family) and three pairs of 
lovers (and so marriages) to start, as it were, new lives.  As with 
the more holy Resurrection, this renews by healing ruptures.  But it 
is not Christ whom Lodge names. Wishing instead to show the 
 
6 Thomas Lodge, Rosalynde (London, 1590), R3v. All citations from this work 
taken from this edition.  
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power of those capable of belief and faith to transform themselves 
so as to be reborn, Lodge introduces the pagan figure of Christ in 
the phoenix. This is choric: Sir John was the first “Phenix” for 
Lodge (Blv); Montanus is recast as the “Phoenix” (E4-F1) and 
now, at the last, the word is applied to Rosalynde (H3).  Her ability 
to transform herself allows her to transform them in turn, and 
beyond that to teach others by example how to transform 
themselves. All dichotomies disappear—the familial, political, 
social, and class conflicts; the antitheses between court and 
country, envy and love, ambition and sacrifice, art and nature, idea 
and act.  The multiple and divisive are unified, made One.   
 Taught by Rosalynde to look beyond and behind events, 
we can see how carefully Lodge has alluded to the Old Testament, 
as Skelton did, and the events they anticipate for the New 
Testament. The opening story of Saladyne and Rosader, the 
conflict that set the romance in motion, hews closely to the 
paradigmatic subtext in Cain and Abel. 
 
But vnto Kain and his offring he had no regarde: 
wherefore Kain was exceeding wroth, & and his countenance 
fel downe. 
  Then the Lord said vnto Kain, Why art thou wroth? and 
why is thy countenance cast downe? 
If thou do wel, shalt thou not be accepted?  and if thou 
doest not well, sinne lieth at the dore: also vnto thee his desire 
shal be subiect, and thou shalt rule ouer him.  
Then Kain spake to Habel his brother. And when they 
were in the field, Kain rose vp against Habel his brother, and 
slewe him. 
  Then the Lord said vnto Kain, Where is Habel thy 
brother?  Who answered, I cā not tel.  Am I my brothers 
keper? 
  Againe he said, What hast thou done?  the voice of thy 
brothers blood cryeth vnto me from the grounde. 
  Now therefore thou art cursed from the earth, which hath 
opened her mouth to receiue thy brothers blood from thine 
hand.7 
 
 
7 Geneva Bible: A Facsimile of the 1560 Edition, ed. Lloyd E. Berry (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 2v, Genesis 4: 5-11. All citations will be from 
this edition.  
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An annotation to the seventh verse, the verse in which Cain slays 
Abel, refers specifically to the issue of primogeniture, one which 
affects Rosader (as in life, in fact, it affected Thomas Lodge, the 
youngest son of his family): “The dignitie of ye first borne is giuen 
to Kain ouer Habel.” This rupture of brotherhood lays the 
foundation for Christ’s great commandment which is redeemed in 
the spiritual fraternity urged in Galatians 5:13-16: 
 
For brethren, ye haue bene called vnto libertie: onely vse 
not your libertie as an occasion vnto the flesh, but by loue 
serue one another. 
For all the Law is fulfilled in one worde, which is this, 
Thou shalt loue thy neighbor as thy self. 
If ye byte and deuoure one another, take hede lest ye be 
consumed one of another. 
Then I say, walk in the Spirit, and ye shal not fulfill the 
lustes of the flesh. 
 
This alignment of romance with scriptural text shows how a deep 
impulse of Lodge’s art was anagogic: the story of Rosader’s 
struggle with Saladyne, his conventional courtship with Ganimede, 
and his final union suggest likewise Augustine’s three Catholic 
ages of history—ante legem, sub lege, and sub gratia, the states of 
nature, law, and grace.8  
 Lodge’s continuation, if not culmination, of a Catholic 
poetics for romance in Rosalynde that is akin to the Catholic 
poetics Skelton forged in Henrician poetry was deliberate and 
consistent. As early as 1578, Lodge had written in his youthful 
“Defence of Poetry” that if anyone should  
 
enquire of Cassiodorus, he will say that all the 
beginning of Poetrye proceeded from the Scripture.  
Paulinus, tho the Byshop of Nelanum, yet voutsafe[th] 
the name of a Poet; and Ambrose, tho he be a patriarke 
in Mediolanum, loueth versifing. … Reade ouer 
Lactantius, his proofe is by poetry; and Paul voutsafeth 
to ouerlooke Epimenides: let the Apostle preach at 
Athens, he disdaineth not of Aratus authorite.  It is a 
pretye sentence, yet not so pretty as pithy, Poeta 
nascibur, Orator fit: as who should say, Poetrye 
 
8 Augustine, “Of the Holy Trinity,” Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip 
Schaff (Peabody, Mass.: Henrickson Publishers, Inc., 1999), III, 4-5. 
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commeth from aboue, from the heauenly seate of a 
glorious God, vnto an excellent creature man; an Orator 
is but made by exercise.9   
 
Further on, he says still more conclusively, “I reson not that al 
poets are holy, but I affirme that poetry is a heauenly gift, a perfit 
gift, then which I know not greater plesure.”10 This philosophical 
confluence with Skelton gives to both Sidney and Skelton a figural 
poetics that can be further aligned to the poetics that Lodge uses, 
throughout the 1590’s, as the basis for writing romance.   
 Skelton and Lodge can speak the same language, and a 
language commonly in use among writers of the sixteenth century, 
because the two trajectories they insist upon—inspiration coming 
down from above, transcendence rising up from the earthly—fit so 
neatly into other schemes made popular by the humanists; it does, 
as we shall see, nicely predict the dissimilar Protestant poetics of 
an author such as Sidney. George Puttenham, in his Arte of English 
Poesie (1589) thus begins by defining poetry as an “art not only of 
making, but also of imitation.  And this science in his perfection 
can not grow but by some diuine instinct—the Platonicks call it 
furor” before explaining later at greater length, “arte is not only an 
aide and coaduitor to nature in all her actions but an alterer of 
them, and in some sort of surmounter of her skill, so as by meanes 
of it her owne effects shall appeare more beautifull or straunge and 
miraculous.”11 Three years earlier, in 1586, William Webbe had 
argued in A Discourse of English Poetrie that “the beginning of it, 
as appeareth by Plato, was of a virtuous and most deuout purpose,” 
but then broadens and flattens out the “beginning” of a poetics that 
includes romance by acknowledging that 
 
This opinion shall you finde confirmed throughout 
the whole workes of Plato and Aristotle: and that 
such was the estimation of this Poetry at those times, 
that they supposed all wisdome and knowledge to be 
included mystically in that diuine instinction 
wherewith they thought their Vates to be inspired.  
Wherevpon, throughout the noble workes of those 
most excellent Philosophers before named, are the 
 
9 Thomas Lodge, “Defence of Poetry,” in Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G.W. 
Smith.  2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1904), I, 71. 
10 Lodge, “Defense,” in Elizabethan, I, 75. 
11 George Puttenham, “The Arte of English Poesie,” in Elizabethan Critical Essays, 
II, 3, 188. 
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authorities of Poets very often alledged.  And Cicero 
in his Tusculane questions is of that minde, that a 
Poet cannot expresse verses aboundantly, 
sufficiently, and fully, neither his eloquence can 
flowe pleasauntly, or his wordes sounde well and 
plenteously, without celestiall instinction: which 
Poets themselues doo very often and gladlie witnes of 
themselues, as namely Ouid in 6 Fasto: Est deus in 
nobis; agitante calescimus illo, etc. Wherevnto I 
doubt not equally to adioyne the authoritye of our late 
famous English Poet who wrote the Sheepheards 
Calender, where, lamenting the decay of Poetry at 
these dayes, saith most sweetly to the same:   
      Then make thee winges of thine aspiring wytt, 
       And, whence thou camest, flye back to heauen 
 apace, etc.12   
 
The reference is to the advice given to Cuddy in the October 
eclogue.  Here Piers suggest the divine status of poetry as a means 
of fending off criticism; E.K. adds in the argument that 
 
In Cuddy is set out the perfect pattern of a poet 
which, finding no maintenance of his state and 
studies, complaineth of the contempt of poetry and 
the causes thereof: specially having been in all ages 
… of singular account and honour, and being indeed 
so worthy and commendable an art—or, rather, no art 
but a divine gift and heavenly instinct not to be 
gotten by labour and learning, but adorned with both, 
and poured into the wit by a certain enthousiasmos 
and celestial inspiration.13 
 
Indeed, the configurations of shepherd and sheep common in 
Spenser’s Calendar and pastoral generally was especially 
conducive to—and strongly suggestive of—what Skelton had first 
introduced as both inspiration and transcendence, a kind of 
religious poetics that could easily—and did easily—accommodate 
romance.  Robert Greene’s contemporary romances, often ending 
 
12 William Webbe, “A Discourse of English Poetrie,” in Elizabethan Critical 
Essays, I, 231-2. 
13 Edmund Spenser, “The Shepheardes Calendar,” “October,” in Selected Shorter 
Poems, ed. Douglas Brooks-Davies (London: Longman, 1995), 159. Quoted in 
Griffiths, John Skelton, 145. 
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in surprising turns of events, themselves seemingly miraculous in 
nature, while drawing on Greek works such as the Aethiopian 
Historie of Helidorus (translated in English by Thomas 
Underdowne in 1577) goes back to its own classical source 
rediscovered by the humanist: a first-century essay dubbed “on the 
sublime” and attributed to Longinus.  The “effect of genius,” this 
treatise maintains, 
 
is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport 
them out of themselves. Invariably what inspires 
wonder casts a spell upon us and is always superior 
to what is merely convincing and pleasing.  For our 
convictions are usually under our own control, while 
such passages exercise an irresistible power of 
mastery and get the upper hand with every ember of 
the audience.  
Again inventive skill and the due disposal 
and marshalling of facts do not show themselves in 
one or two touches: they gradually emerge from the 
whole tissue of the composition, while, on the other 
hand, a well-timed flash of sublimity scatters 
everything before it like a bolt of lightning and 
reveals the full power of the speaker at a single 
stroke.14 
 
This is the true meaning of the Feast of the Conception, of 
intercession; the restoration of Rosalynde; as well as Greene’s 
Pandosto recognizing in the face of his daughter Fawnia the 
resurrection of his own lost wife. The point I am making, then, is 
not just that a poetics of romance depends upon a double trajectory 
of inspiration and transcendence, crossing at a creative if abstract 
chiasmus, but that at the moment in which these lines intersect 
there is a dazzling flash of recognition.  Built on as a preparation of 
faith and a willingness to believe and accept, the kind of Catholic 
poetics which Skelton employs helps us to see more clearly, and 
not through the glass darkly, that split second when romance is 
realized.  It is a distinctly Renaissance form of romance, too, quite 
distinct from the chivalric romance that had characterized a 
substantially different medieval poetics of romance. 
 
14 Longinus, On the Sublime, 1.4, as trans. W. Hamilton Fyfe for the Loeb Classical 
Library (New York, 1927), 125. 
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 It is that transcendent, momentary flash, that abrupt 
illumination, that, for all of the anthology of sources pasted 
together in his Apology for Poetry, Sidney is missing.  On the face 
of it, that hardly seems to be so.  Early on he writes: 
 
Neyther let it be deemed too sawcie a comparison to 
ballance the highest poynt of mans wit with the 
efficacie of Nature: but rather give right honor to the 
heauenly Maker of that maker, who, hauing made 
man to his owne likenes, set him beyond and ouer all 
the workes of that second nature, which in nothing 
hee sheweth so much as in Poetrie, when with the 
force of a diuine breath he bringeth things forth far 
surpassing her dooings, with no small argument to 
the incredulous of that first accursed fall of Adam: 
sith our erected wit maketh vs know what perfection 
is, and yet our infected will keepeth vs from reaching 
vnto it.15 
 
If wit were translated into spirit, then this would sound like 
Skelton.  Sidney comes ever closer to Skelton when he adds: 
 
The chiefe both in antiquitie and excellencie were 
they that did imitate the inconceiuable excellencies of 
GOD.  Such were Dauid in his Psalmes, Salomon in 
his song of Songs, in his Ecclesiastes, and Prouerbs, 
Moses and Debora in theyr Hymnes, and the writer 
of Iob; which, beside other, the learned Emanuell 
Tremelius and Franciscus Iunius doe entitle the 
poeticall part of the Scripture. Against these none 
will speake that hath the holie Ghost in due holy 
reuerence. (I, 158) 
 
Sidney may sound like Skelton because, while he traces such ideas 
from secular sources, the ideas are like Holy Mother Church, 
Roman for him in their origin.  
  
Among the Romans a Poet was called Vates, which is 
as much a Diuiner, a Fore-seer, or Prophet, as by his 
conioyned words Vaticinium and Caticinari is 
 
15 Sir Philip Sidney, “An Apologie for Poetrie,” in Elizabethan Critical Essays, I, 
157. All quotations from this work will be taken from this edition.  
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manifest; so heauenly a title did that excellent people 
bestow vpon this hart-rauishing knowledge….and 
may not I presume a little further, to shew the 
reasonableness of this worde Vates?  And say that the 
holy Dauids Psalmes are a diuine Poem? If I doo, I 
shall not do it without the testimonie of great learned 
men, bout auncient and moderne: but euen the name 
Psalmes will speake for mee, which, being 
interpreted, is nothing but songes. Then that it is fully 
written in meeter, as all Hebricians agree, although 
the rules be not yet fully found. Lastly and 
principally, his handeling his prophecy, which is 
meerely poeticall.  For what els is the awaking his 
musicall instruments; the often and free changing of 
persons; his notable Prosopopeias, when he maketh 
you, as it were, see God comming in his Maiestie. 
(I, 154-5) 
  
Sidney’s mind is wonderfully knowledgeable and fertile and 
perhaps anxiously inclusive and synthetic, for he would fuse a 
Platonic sense of the immaterial and transcendent—“God 
comming in his Maiestie”—with the concrete and local. He would 
fuse Platonic conceptions with Aristotelian mimesis, bringing God 
not only clambering down to earth but under the direction of the 
poet.  Thus the poet is for Sidney, again, and again, not a seer but a 
maker, not a prophet but one who feigns, who makes by making 
up. The poet for Sidney is not Skelton’s idea of an outlet for 
heavenly inspiration but, rather, one who creates by imitation.  The 
poet is not only one who acts as a conduit but one who ranges 
freely through the zodiac of his own wit. That is why he is easily 
led into a digression on poets like Chaucer and examples like 
Gorboduc where, in the course of his Apology, human 
accomplishments displace holy transmissions.  The plain truth, that 
Sidney comes to realize but does not tell us, is that Plato and 
Aristotle do not make fully companionate bedfellows. And faced 
with this dilemma that fundamentally disjoins his Apology and 
threatens to undermine it, for Skelton would never be content with 
Aristotelian mimesis nor would Lodge, his conclusion, or more 
properly his peroratio, is witty and self-mocking: 
 
I coniure you all that haue had the euill lucke to reade 
this incke-wasting toy of mine, euen in the name of 
the nyne Muses. … To beleeue, with me, that there 
are many misteries contained in Poetrie, which of 
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purpose were written darkely, least by prophane wits 
it should bee abused. To beleeue, with Landin[o], 
that they are so beloued of the Gods that whatsoeuer 
they write proceeds of a diuine fury. Lastly, to 
beleeue themselves, when they tell you they will 
make you immortall by their verses.   
 Thus doing, your name shal florish in the 
Printers shoppes; thus doing, you shall bee of kinne 
to many a poeticall Preface; thus doing, you shall be 
most fayre, most ritch, most wise, most all; you shall 
dwell vpon Superlatiues. (I, 205-6) 
 
Rather than provide that sudden shock of disclosure, Sidney’s 
Apology circles back to its beginning where “the fertilnes of the 
Italian wit” of John Pietro Pugliano at the court of the Holy Roman 
Emperor  
 
sought to enrich our mindes with the contemplations 
therein which hee thought most precious….Hee sayd, 
Souldiours were the noblest estate of mankinde, and 
horsemen the noblest of the Souldiours. Hee sayde 
they were the Maisters of warre, and ornaments of 
peace; speedy goers, and strong abiders; triumphers 
both in Camps and Courts. … Skill of gouernment 
was but a Pedanteria in comparison. (I, 150) 
 
Sidney adds that if he had not been careful, “I think he would have 
perswaded mee to haue wished my selfe a horse,” even punning on 
his own name Philip. The mockery is meant to distract us, to paste 
over a fundamental fracture in his theory which even the likes of 
Gosson had avoided. Calling in the end on morality rather than 
inspiration or imitation, Sidney’s apology falters into compromise.   
 This is, in a way, unexpected from someone who can be 
wise as well as merely clever. Perhaps he was at some level 
unconscious of what he had said: the Apology, written in response 
to Gosson in 1579 or 1580, came at a time when his own strong 
Puritan leanings caused him to write a letter of protest to the Queen 
lest she marry a Catholic and make him a close ally of his uncle, 
Leicester, the leader of the right on the Queen’s Privy Council.  If 
so, battling the sacraments and liturgies of a discredited Holy 
Mother Church, he held even the Roman sense of vates, at some 
deep level, with a degree of suspicion. If so, he recovered quickly 
enough, in the Old Arcadia which may (or may not) have been 
resurrected itself to conclude The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia 
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of 1593. There the cousins Pyrocles and Musidorus live through a 
dark night of the soul after Pyrocles’ father Euarchus condemns 
them and repudiates their excuse of love in the death of Basilius.  
That night in prison—presumably their final night in their vale of 
tears—they have that inspired moment of hope for themselves and 
for each other. “Voide of sensible memory, or memoratiue 
passion,” Sidney writes, speaking for them, “we shall not see the 
colours, but lifes of all things that haue bene or can be: and shall 
(as I hope) knowe our friendship, though exempt from the earthly 
cares of friendship, hauing both vnited it, and our selues, in that 
high and heauenly loue of the vnquenchable light,”16 embodied 
conduits of just that heavenly inspiration Skelton and Lodge 
assigned to their art.  The next morning   
 
Euarchus that felt his owne miserie more then they, 
and yet loued goodnesse more than himselfe, with 
such a sad assured behauior as Cato killed himselfe 
withal, when he had heard of the vttermost of that 
their speech tended vnto: he commaunded againe 
they should be caried away, rising vp from the seate 
(which he would much rather haue wished should 
haue bene his graue) and looking who would take the 
charge, whereto euerie one was exceeding backward 
(Rr1v). 
 
And then comes the flash of illumination. 
 
But as this pitifull matter was entring into, those that 
were next the Dukes bodie, might heare from vnder 
the veluet wherewith he was couered, a great voice of 
groning. Whereat euerie man astonished (and their 
spirits appalled with these former miseries, apt to 
take any strange conceit) when they might perfectly 
perceiue the bodie stirre. Then some began to feare 
spirits, some to looke for a miracle, most to imagine 
they knew not what. But Philanax and Kalander, 
whose eyes honest loue (though to diuerse parties) 
held most attentiue, leapt to the table, and putting off 
the veluet couer, might plainly discerne, with as 
 
16 The Countess of Pembrokes Arcadia (London, 1598), PP1r. All quotations from 
this work will be taken from this edition and inserted parenthetically in the text. 
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much wonder as gladness, that the Duke had lived. 
(Rr1v). 
 
By relying entirely on human law and human reason, both 
Euarchus and Philanax put all their trust and belief into what their 
senses have told them, to the limitations of human knowledge. But 
in their dark night in the prison, Pyrocles and Musidorus have gone 
beyond human knowledge and are prepared now, as Euarchus and 
Philanax are not, for the wondrous miracle of Basilius’ recovery, a 
resurrection that shatters mere case-hardened law. Euarchus, 
locating constancy in self-certainty and human understanding only, 
has no capacity for such wonders whereas Pyrocles and Musidorus, 
transcending human limitations through love (as Gynecia, Pamela, 
and Philoclea transcend actuality through prayer and Basilius 
transcends it through prophecy) are prepared. The Puritan Sidney’s 
Basilius is exacting in his analogy to the Catholic Lodge’s 
Rosalynde.  The extraordinary gift of the genre of romance, then, is 
that it can accommodate both classical and Christian resources and 
abide Catholics and Protestants alike. No other genre of the 
Renaissance was so adept (unless we think of Spenserian lyric) and 
none, including that lyric, so ranging, so penetrating, and so 
provocative. 
 In A Fig for Momus (1595), Thomas Lodge establishes as 
his theme, “To trauell on to true felicitie.”17 Epistle 5 is addressed 
to a fellow Protestant poet, Michael Drayton, and goes like this: 
 
 Oh let that holy flame, that heauenly light, 
 That led old Abrahams race in darkesome night: 
 Oh let that star, which shining neuer ceast 
 To guide the Sages of balme-breathing East, 
 Conduct they Muse vnto that loftie pitch, 
 Which may thy style with praises more enritch. (H3) 
 
That is the poetics of romance.
 
17 Thomas Lodge, A Fig for Momus (London, 1595), E4.  
 
 
 
 
Philip Sidney and the Idea of Romance 
 
ROBERT E. STILLMAN 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
 
 Romance (the making of golden-world fictions) is what 
Philip Sidney liberates from history by waging “a civil war among 
the Muses.”1  That war is waged within the core arguments of his 
Defence of Poesy in characteristic Sidneian style, ironically and 
irenically.  Controversy among disciplines—rival muses contend 
for the prize of best targeting the scope of learning—is dispelled 
by the near-magical transmutation of difference. Philosophy and 
history are not so much defeated by their rival poetry as they are 
absorbed and transformed. Seizing upon the “Idea” from the one 
and the “example” from the other, and mending each as he melds 
both, Sidney pronounces poetry, in its cosmopolitan inclusiveness, 
monarch over all the muses.2  Not a corpse in sight: Sidneian irony 
in the service of irenicism. My argument, briefly put, is that the 
inclusiveness of Sidney’s resolution to this disciplinary warfare is 
crucial to comprehending the romance of his romance—both his 
poetics in the Defence and his practice in the Arcadias.  It is crucial 
because that irenic resolution (silly war among mere muses as it 
seems) reflects as it enables the principled inclusiveness of his 
public commitments, pious and political.  
 History might help to turn this quick byplay with critical 
abstractions into a point with a purpose. In November of 1579, 
there was an exchange of correspondence between two of Philip 
Sidney’s most intimate intellectual companions. That exchange 
took shape most importantly in a letter written to Hubert Languet 
                                
1 An Apology for Poetry or The Defence of Poesy, ed. Geoffrey Shepherd 
(Edinburgh: Nelson and Sons, 1965), 96.  All further quotations from the Defence 
will be cited parenthetically in the text by page number. I hasten to identify 
“romance” (in this argument) as the making of golden-world fictions in order to 
clarify a generic marker foreign to Sidney’s critical vocabulary in terms that are 
intelligible from his poetics. 
2 I capitalize Sidney’s word “Idea[s]” here and elsewhere in relation to the Defence 
because it is a term of art, whose precise meaning is subject to definition as the 
argument proceeds.  Ideas are exemplified–made substantial in poetry–as notable 
images of virtue and vice. For an extended study of Sidney’s “Idea,” see my essay, 
“The Scope of Sidney’s Defence of Poesy: The New Hermeneutics and Early 
Modern Poetics,” English Literary Renaissance 32 (2002): 355-85. 
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(Sidney’s paternally and passionately devoted mentor during his 
years of travel on the Continent) by Philippe Duplessis-Mornay 
(Sidney’s brilliantly accomplished role model and friend).3 
Mornay’s letter has elicited few remarks from Sidney scholars, in 
spite of its telling commentary on the dicey business of Francis, the 
Duke of Anjou’s wooing of Queen Elizabeth I and poor John 
Stubbs’s reduction to a pun—he lost his hand for having publicly 
opposed the marriage—and in spite of the letter’s still more telling 
reflections about what Sidney calls in the Defence the war among 
the muses: his prosecution of hermeneutic combat against the 
disciplinary claims of history and philosophy as serving sciences, 
rivals among species of knowledge more and less fit for service to 
the cause.4 My argument begins, then, by redressing that 
inattention. 
 Languet and Mornay are names readily familiar to Sidney 
scholars—Languet as the counselor chiefly responsible for 
Sidney’s political training in the cause of Reformed Christianity, 
and Mornay as the probable exponent of the century’s most famous 
(and infamous) defense of tyrannomachy, his Vindiciae contra 
tyrannos, with its legitimation of violence against what Reformers 
generally regarded as the chief threat to their cause, sovereigns 
seduced by Tridentine Catholicism.5 Beyond those familiar 
portraits, the letter affords an instructive reminder about what is 
less frequently recalled by Sidney scholars: the pair’s distinctive 
intellectual identities as humanists, scholars trained in the studia 
humanitatis.6  By the late 1570s, as the author of the 
Remonstrance and the Traicté de l’Eglise, Mornay had already 
 
3 Lettre... à M. Languet, 15 November, 1579, Mémoires et correspondance de 
Duplessis-Mornay (Paris: Treuttel and Wurtz, 1824-25), II, 80-8. 
4 For a concise account of the complex political events surrounding the publication 
of Stubbs’s work and the circulation of Sidney’s letter, see Peter Beal, “Philip 
Sidney’s Letter to Queen Elizabeth and that ‘False Knave’ Alexander Dicsone,” 
English Manuscript Studies, 1100-1700 11 (January 2002), 1-51.  
5 For scholarly introductions to both, see Beatrice Nicollier-de Weck, Hubert 
Languet (1518-1581), un réseau politique international de Melanchthon à 
Guillaume d’Orange (Geneva: Droz, 1995) and Roger Kuin, “Sir Philip Sidney’s 
Model of the Statesman,” Reformation 4 (1999), 93-117.  
6 I use the term “humanist” in the specific sense recovered by Paul Oskar Kristeller 
in reference to the studia humanitatis, the study of grammar, rhetoric, history, 
poetry, and moral philosophy–especially in Latin and Greek: “Renaissance 
humanism was not as such a philosophical tendency or system, but rather a cultural 
and educational program,” Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic and 
Humanist Strains (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 10. See also Ton 
Hoenselaars’s introduction to Challenging Humanism: Essays in Honor of Dominic 
Baker-Smith, ed. Ton Hoenselaars and Arthur F. Kinney (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 2005).  
Sidney Journal  26.2 (2008) 19
 
nd they mattered especially to Philip Sidney. 
                               
established himself as one of the Huguenots’ most adept 
polemicists and most philosophically astute apologists. By 
contrast,  Languet never published a book under his own name, but 
as Beatrice Nicollier-de Weck’s still-too-neglected biography 
makes clear, he was widely regarded as among the most 
distinguished humanists of his day, partly because of his expertise 
in history (in his early years he labored on the Magdeburg 
Centuries), and partly because of his extraordinary service as a 
facilitator of correspondence among the elites of the Reformed 
north and his close companionship with several of the Reformers’ 
most influential printers, including Andreas Wechel. In turn, 
Languet was responsible for the publication of a variety of books 
absolutely central to Sidney’s career. It was Languet who guided 
through Wechel’s publishing house Joachim Camerarius’s 
translation of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, with its celebration of that 
hero Cyrus, idealized prince and godly liberator, who became the 
single most frequently cited exemplar of virtuous action in 
Sidney’s Defence.7 It was Languet, too, who urged the Latin 
translation and republication of Mornay’s De la verité as the De 
veritate religionis Christianae, the single most comprehensive 
expression of those religious beliefs central to Sidney’s 
ecumenically inclusive piety; and it was Languet to whom the 
Latin text was dedicated after his death in 1581.8 And whether or 
not he had a hand in the book’s authorship (and that authorship is 
still a matter of dispute), it was from Languet that the anti-
tyrannical, natural law politics of the Vindiciae descended as a 
conceptual inheritance to the twin Philips, Mornay and Sidney.9 
Languet’s labors as a humanist mattered to a wide network 
(Nicollier de Weck’s “réseau”) among the educated elite of 
northern Europe, a
 Within this correspondence of November 1579, then,  
Languet and Mornay write not only as politically minded 
proponents devoted to the success of the Reformed cause, but also 
 
7 Xenophontis Atheniensis de Cyri Regis Persarum Vita atque Disciplina, Libri VIII 
(Paris: Andreas Wechel, 1572). For a study of Wechel’s publishing house, see R. J. 
W. Evans’s The Wechel Presses: Humanism and Calvinism in Central Europe, 
1572-1627 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
8 De veritate religionis Christianae liber...Gallice primum conscriptus, Latine 
versus, nunc autem ab eodem accuratissime correctus (Lugduni Batavorum: 
Christopher Plantin, 1587; 1st publ., 1581). 
9 See Hugues Daussy’s recent political biography, Les Huguenots et Le Roi: Le 
combat politique de Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 1572-1600 (Geneva: Droz, 2002). 
For Languet’s shaping power over the young Mornay, see 52-6, and 149, where 
Daussy summarizes their shared political principles.  
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as humanists committed (each with his own distinctive preference) 
to the muse of history and philosophy as vehicles for the success of 
that cause.  It would be easy to mistake the letter’s commentary on 
Stubbs’s fate as a digression, appearing late in the letter as it does, 
almost as an afterthought.  Stubbs was clearly one of “les nôtres,” 
one of our own, to use Languet’s frequent locution. His fate in 
opposing Elizabeth’s  marriage by publishing the Gaping Gulph, a 
rant fulminating against the impiety of the proposal, was (just as 
clearly) horrifying to his co-religionists on the Continent. Sidney 
himself had also written to oppose the marriage to Anjou, but he 
did so in safer, more private, chaste and chastening prose.10  
Stubbs was clearly allied to the common cause, then. Yet, most 
clearly of all, the publication of Stubbs’s text was something that 
Mornay and Languet regarded as undesirable, even as an 
embarrassment: “car les libelles fameux ne se doibvent pas ainsi 
mettre a tous les jours” (because notorious pamplets should not in 
this manner be spread abroad).11 It is the rhetorical excess of 
Stubbs’s polemical discourse that troubled Mornay, and that he 
could readily assume  Languet would abhor in turn. The Gaping 
Gulph dedicates itself to the incendiary proposition that Elizabeth’s 
marriage to a French Catholic is a sin, and that “the high sin of a 
highest magistrate, done and avowed in open sun, [shall] kindle the 
wrath of God and set fire on church and commonweal.”12 Stubbs’s 
xenophobia played badly for the Burgundian Languet and the 
Frenchman Mornay, as did what had become, quite literally, the 
out-of-court biblicism of his over-heated rhetorical fu
 When Mornay turns late in his letter to Languet to 
comment upon Stubbs’s Gaping Gulph, the shift in topics is 
apparent rather than real. The point of mentioning Stubbs is to 
illustrate the perils of partisanship, the mismanagement of ideas in 
a culture where polemicism could only exacerbate the very 
confessional divisions whose proliferation militated against the 
 
10 Sidney’s  moment of indulgence in his “Letter to the Queen” as he sneers at that 
Jezebel of France, Catherine de Medici, highlights by contrast the chaste—
rhetorically restrained—natural law argumentation of the prose at large.  
11 Lettre ... à M. Languet, Mémoires, II, 83. Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue: 
Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1996), 114 notes the opposition to Stubbs’s tract (as “an 
imprudent act of provocation”) within Languet’s circle, but does not question the 
reasons for it.  
12 John Stubbs’s Gaping Gulf with Letters and Other Relevant Documents, ed. 
Lloyd E. Berry (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1968), 20. 
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triumph of the church.13 The matter of Stubbs’s partisanship is no 
digression, then—and attention to his fate not a simple piece of 
noteworthy news to report.  Read from beginning to end, Mornay’s 
letter to Languet has one principal issue to explore:  how to devise 
a pragmatic—an eloquent and politically serviceable—means of 
writing that might enable the restoration of the true church, and his 
commentary about Stubbs is a fully apt illustration of the argument 
at large. 
 Mornay’s criticisms of the Gaping Gulf exemplify the 
awareness among Sidney’s closest friends of a public domain 
inside which the circulation of texts—in manuscript as in print—
carries a persuasive, even a determinative power to influence 
events in the larger realm of international politics. Ideas matter in 
an ideological world and correspondingly, how one chooses among 
modes and methods for articulating ideas became a subject of 
considered reflection within this body of politically active, 
rhetorically astute intellectuals.  Mornay’s letter itself begins as a 
response to a letter from Languet urging him to write a history of 
the Christian religion that would have “pour principale matiere et 
per se la restauration de la vraie relligion en nos temps, apres tant 
de confusions dont l’ignorance des siecles precedens l’avoit 
remplie” (for its principal matter and purpose the restoration of the 
true religion in our times, after such great confusions with which 
ignorance had so filled the preceding ages).14 What the mentor 
Languet wanted from his pupil Mornay—as a reflection of his own 
politics of intellectualism, his epistemic optimism about the power 
of ideas to shape minds, and therefore events—was a more 
comprehensive version of Johann Sleidan’s phenomenally popular 
history of the wars of the Smalkaldan League.15  Mornay, 
however, refused to write that history, as he explains in detail, 
because (he argues) of the impossibility while narrating events and 
their causes of appearing both truthful and unbiased. Captive to the 
truth of a foolish world (as Sidney would say), imprisoned by mere 
contingency, the historian-like Sleidan is dismissable as the 
 
13 R. Po-Chia Hsia, Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550-
1750 (New York: Routledge, 1989) is a useful introduction to the politics of the  
“Confessional Age.” For the question of a “public domain” in Elizabethan England, 
see Peter Lake and Michael Questier, “Puritans, Papists, and the ‘Public Sphere’ in 
Early Modern England: The Edmund Campion Affair in Context,” The Journal of 
Modern History 72 (September 2000), 587-627, esp. 589-90, 623-5.   
14 Lettre de M. Duplessis à M. Languet, 15 November 1579 in Mémoires, II, 81.  
15  On Sleidan’s  politics and popularity, see Thomas A. Brady,  The Politics of the 
Reformation in Germany: Jacob Sturm (1489-1553) of Strasbourg (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997). 
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polemical partisan “par plusieurs de passion” (by an excess of 
passion). Historians fare no better than polemical hacks like 
Stubbs, Mornay replies in polite, but pointedly oppositional prose.  
To bring about “the restoration of the true religion,” Mornay 
writes, one must remedy passion by speaking the truth without 
blazoning one’s own colors—without waving the flag of one’s 
own confessional identity.16 Amidst a crisis of cultural warfare, 
contaminating the body politic by impassioned books, against the 
historian Languet, Mornay argues by example for the chaste and 
chastening superiority of philosophy—an argument embodied in 
the philosophically reasoned piety of the De veritate and the 
conceptually sophisticated politics of the Vindiciae contra 
tyrannos. Once more that piety and those politics mirror the logic 
of Sidneian poetics, as a species of philosophical argument, which 
at the very moment that it enables the logic of romance (as I will 
show) finds its own philosophical power subsumed by a muse 
claiming superior authority.  But to make that point about poetry’s 
triumph over philosophy in the Defence is to race too quickly to 
the end of a war whose beginnings require more attention still.  
Mornay’s philosophy was so enabling to the romance logic of 
Sidney’s poetics because both have in common a perception of 
cultural crisis as a crisis of discourse, and because both have 
recourse to what might be termed (seriously and playfully) a dual-
directioned, retro-Platonic, textual machine—a discursive  
trampoline of the piously political, if you like, whose design to 
leap from history to Ideas is calculated from the first to enable a 
leap back into history.17 This is an argument that requires some 
clarification. 
 The pseudononymous Cono Superantius prefaces the 
Vindiciae’s account of those duties that bind prince and people by 
locating the source of those reciprocal duties, as the twin constants 
of the argument’s unfolding, in “God and nature.”18 From these 
 
16  Lettre ... à M. Languet, Mémoires, II, 81. 
17 For Sidney as a “retro-Platonist,” see William Craft, The Labyrinth of Desire: 
Invention and Culture in the Work of Sir Philip Sidney (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1994). I would argue that a 
“retro-Platonist”—a Platonist determined to put the Idea into historical service—is 
no true Platonist at all.  For Sidney’s transformation of Plato’s mimesis into a 
different poetics, see John C. Ulreich’s “‘The Poets Only Deliver’: Sidney’s 
Conception of Mimesis,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 15 (1982): 67-84. 
18 Vindiciae, contra tyrannos: or concerning the legitimate power of a prince over 
the people, and of the people over a prince, trans. George Garrett (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 11. All citations to this work will be included 
parenthetically within the text. The best introduction to political philosophy in the 
northern Renaissance is Quentin Skinner’s The Foundations of Modern Political 
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constants, Mornay derives his twofold analysis of the origins of 
kingship. Kingship is considered both as a covenant and as a 
contract, in relation to divine law and to natural law, depending on 
the summa, the main aim or scope of those questions raised about 
it. Mornay’s proceeding, then, is that of the philosopher, not the 
historian. His analysis of origins is logical, not factual. First, 
kingship is analyzed as a covenant established among God, prince, 
and people, which delimits popular obedience in respect to 
princely abrogations of divine law; and second, he analyzes 
kingship as that contract established between the prince and the 
people, which fixes the conditions under which tyrants can be 
resisted and the duty of foreign princes to intervene on behalf of 
“pure religion” and the oppressed. The logical connection that 
binds covenant to contract—that demands a necessary connection 
between the divine and the human—is the philosophical 
interpretation of natural law that informs Mornay’s argumentative 
matter.  In his Christian Aristotelianism, “law is a mind, or rather, 
a gathered multitude of minds.  For the mind is a particle of the 
divine breath, and he who obeys the law is seen to obey God and, 
in a certain way, to make God his judge” (98). Scriptural 
arguments about the covenant among God, prince and people 
(Questions One and Two) are underwritten consistently by 
reference to classical moral philosophy and contemporary history.  
In turn, political arguments about the contract between prince and 
people (Questions Three and Four) are persistently supported by 
biblical interpretations and by patristic and scholastic authorities.   
As the Preface proclaims, Mornay’s double “method of teaching,” 
by proceeding from “causes and major propositions” to “effects 
and consequences,” renders kingship  
 
visible and comprehensible, as if ascending through 
certain degrees to the peak (ad summa) so that in the 
manner of geometricians—whom he seems to have 
wanted to imitate in this matter—from a point he draws 
a line, from the line a plane, and from the plane he 
constitutes a solid. (10)  
 
This is the mathematics of monarchy, a visual hermeneutics of 
kingly law and duty. 
 
Thought, Volume Two: The Age of the Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978).  
Sidney Journal  26.2 (2008) 24
 
 Mornay’s philosophical sophistication in applying natural 
law theory against tyranny is best displayed in a core passage from 
his third quaestio’s analysis of “What the Purpose of Kings Is.”  
He layers text upon text in characteristic humanist fashion, moving 
from a brief citation of Aesop’s fable about the horse who allows 
himself to be mounted for defense against a boar;  to Augustine’s 
reflections on the charitable economy of the natural household, in 
which husbands command wives, and parents children, not with 
“arrogance,” but “with compassion in providing”; to Seneca’s 
description of the golden age, which featured “wise men” acting as 
kings to protect the weak from the strong and to rule “out of duty 
[officium], not … regality [regnum]”; to Cicero’s account about 
the genesis of kingship from “conflicts ... about the ownership of 
things [among] citizens”; to the demand of “the people of God” in 
I Samuel viii for a king who would insure “that indeed right should 
be done to all equitably” (92-4). Sacred and secular, philosophical 
and poetic, erudite and popular literature are assembled in a highly 
allusive, compact fashion accommodating traditional authorities 
for a presentist political purpose. All these assembled authorities 
authorize the destruction of tyrants who defy that single natural 
law illustrated comprehensively: “the one purpose of command is 
the people’s welfare” (93).  
 When Mornay considers “the purpose of kings,” he does 
so without reference to contemporary political debates or political 
disasters—no St. Bartholomew’s Day massacres are brought into 
view—and he writes, too, without reference to theological or 
religious differences. Law, divine and natural, chastens the tyranny 
of self-love and self-loving sovereigns, as the “perfect image of the 
governance of kingdoms ... a legitimate, chaste, and blameless 
matron without ... excessive adornment” (8). The perfect kingdom, 
then, is a Lucretia purged of the ravages of Tarquinius Superbus, 
and the perfect political hero, Lucius Junius Brutus—Tarquin’s 
nemesis and the chief tyrannicidal namesake of the Vindiciae’s 
pseudnonymous author, Stephanus Junius Brutus. 
 Liberated from history and from those passions that 
contaminate the realm of events, Mornay is set free amidst the 
golden age speculations of Senecan philosophy and the 
Augustinian vision of a natural economy to render true 
“kingship”—the Idea of kingship as it should be, not as it is—
“visible and comprehensible” to the reader.  (Intimations of the 
Defence!)  It hardly needs arguing, of course, that this chaste 
retreat from history, party-political controversy, and confessional 
wrangling is driven by a desire to engage with history.  Mornay’s 
Vindiciae is a vehicle for liberating the oppressed, both a call to 
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arms to the faithful and an appeal to moderates on both sides of the 
confessional divide for the toleration that would obviate the 
necessity of that call. It is a calculated, strategic, and brilliant 
response to the new politics of confessionalism that dominated 
Europe—interventionist discourse (romantic philosophy, if you 
will) rescuing Ideas from mere ideology. The trampoline leap from 
history is sprung from the particulars of his historical place, and 
designed from the start to intervene against the tyranny ravaging 
that very history from which it springs. 
 Place matters to Sidney’s poetic ruminations on 
romancing.  Placement matters in Sidney’s location of Lucretia as 
the Defence’s first illustration of Sidney’s complex argument about 
imitation, poetry’s chastening of history’s tyrants, and its chaste 
undoing of the tyranny of history. The placement of that exemplary 
history, then, is rhetorically significant just as its conjunction of 
historical event and poetic-making appears characteristically 
purposeful.  As the rape of Lucretia marked the genesis of Rome’s 
freedom from tyranny—it was the historical occasion motivating 
Brutus to extinguish the line of Tarquin—that rape secures in 
Sidney’s text the foundation for a detailed account of how the 
“right poet” writes.  While historically Lucretia’s story marks the 
beginning of the Roman republic, here poetically in the Defence 
her story marks the moment of genesis for an argumentatively 
telling illustration of how mimesis operates.19  
 Adopting as an analogy the practice of “the more 
excellent” painter who avoids merely counterfeiting “such faces as 
are set before” him, Sidney illustrates how mimesis ought to work 
by asking his readers to extrapolate an ideal poetic practice from 
the example of the painter (102). Set free from history (unlike 
those historical and philosophical poets confined “within the fold 
of the proposed subject”), the right poet ranges with “no law but 
wit ... into the divine consideration of what may be and should be,” 
portraying a Lucretia similarly free from historical constraint 
(102). She is represented not as she appeared in life, but as the 
“outward beauty” of her chastity (102).  Her chastity is the “Idea” 
from which the speaking picture is made, a universal whose reality 
is guaranteed by the access of the erected wit to truths that 
transcend the always corrupt, always mutable world of historical 
events. In Sidney’s version of the story, Lucretia is liberated twice, 
 
19 For a more detailed study of Sidney’s use of the Lucretia story in the Defence and 
its relationship to his anti-tyrannical politics, see my essay “The Truths of a 
Slippery World: Poetry and History in Sidney’s Defence,” Renaissance Quarterly 
55 (2002), 1287-1319.  
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both times by the agency of her own virtue. In one instance, her 
chastity frees her from the tyranny of Tarquin (“when she punished 
in herself another’s fault”) and in a second instance, that chastity 
frees her from the tyranny of historical verisimilitude (when the 
speaking picture declines to copy her body in order to imitate her 
virtue)  [102]. So often when Sidney writes about poetic action in 
idealizing terms, he does so with figures of the chaste body: in the 
portrait of Lucretia, in the repetition of Agrippa’s tale about the 
divided body politic, and in the complementary stories of David’s 
lust for Bathsheba’s body and Nathan’s healing fiction. The 
chastening of the body—its government, its discipline, and its 
purgation—goes hand-in-hand with Sidney’s desire to liberate 
history from tyranny.20 It joins hands too with Sidney’s desire to 
chasten the discourse of the public domain, to free Ideas from 
contamination by tyrannical passions. 
 Placement matters, too—to move from poetics to 
poetry—in that first of the Arcadias, where Lalus’s chaste 
marriage to Kala (poet-boy Lalus wins beauty-girl Kala from 
history-chump Histor), as the matter of third book’s Eclogues, 
placed right at the heart of the romance’s five books. And at the 
heart of the heart of those Eclogues is Philisides’s own beast fable, 
with its “highest notes” to godliness raised, its jump concord 
between wit and will in the mind, emblematizing (Sidney style) 
what Mornay would script as quaesti—a politics of intellectualism 
indeed.  Sidney’s fictive double Philisides recounts a musical fable 
that he reports to have learned from “old Languet,” whom he calls 
affectionately “the shepherd best swift Ister knew.” As fictions 
multiply inside fictions, with Sidney writing about Philisides 
performing a song remembered from the teacher of his youth, 
paradoxically the poem moves closer to the world of actual events.  
 
20 Chastity is always a political issue, and lends itself to various interpretations. 
From the perspective of Stephanie H. Jed, Chaste Thinking: The Rape of Lucrece 
and the Birth of Humanism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), 
Sidney’s grounding of his poetics upon the rape of Lucrece illustrates the 
oppressive desire of partriarchal culture to control women’s bodies. By contrast,  
Debora Shuger, “Castigating Livy: The Rape of Lucretia and The Old Arcadia,” 
Renaissance Quarterly 51 (1998), 526-48 has argued that the story highlights 
greater contemporary fears about the control of male bodies, specifically the 
dangerous bodily desires of young aristocrats. Shuger’s larger point—that Sidney 
elevates poetry (and his poetic heroes) above the law—complements my own 
argument concerning the operation of providential law at the romance’s conclusion, 
Sidney’s Poetic Justice: The Old Arcadia, Its Eclogues, and Renaissance Pastoral 
Traditions (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press; London, 1986), 175-228. 
Sidney’s Cupid seems not very discriminating about gender distinctions. 
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Philisides attributes to him both his piety and his moral 
education:21 
 
 He said the music best thilke powers pleased 
 Was jump concord between our wit and will,  
 Where highest notes to godliness are raised, 
 And lowest sink not down to jot of ill. 
 With old true tales he wont mine ears to fill: 
 How shepherds did of yore, how now, they thrive, 
Spoiling their flock, or while twixt them they strive. 
 
Principles of faculty psychology secure the foundation of 
Philisides’ political fable about the origins of monarchy: the 
concord between wit and will that Languet praises as a tenet of 
natural law (and he is “shepherd best” because he best knows the 
laws of nature) corresponds exactly to the balance celebrated 
between sovereign and subjects in the state. When that concord is 
violated with the emergence of self-loving sovereigns who “think 
all things ... made them to please,” golden-world harmony is 
untuned by brazen-world tyranny. The same division between wit 
and will that motivates Sidney’s aggressively optimistic poetics in 
the Defence achieves in his beast fable an explicitly political focus: 
Philisides ends by counseling his “poor beasts” either “in patience 
[to] bide your hell, Or know your strengths, and then you shall do 
well” (257, 259). There is no real mystery about Philisides’ advice 
or Sidney’s meaning.  His Arcadias take for granted, as readily as 
his Defence, the necessity and virtue of tyrannicide. What matters 
here to the present argument is the clarification that the beast fable 
supplies about the relationship among those rival humanists at the 
center of Sidney’s intellectual circle.  
 Sidney scholars frequently remember the beast fable’s 
explicit tribute to Languet, that singer of history’s old true tales, 
and for good reason: one purpose of the tale is to render an 
authorial tribute from the student to the teacher as a unique event.  
Languet is the only contemporary ever explictly named in Sidney’s 
fiction.  The fable itself, however—for all of its deeply meaningful 
debts to the this teller of old true tales—reads like a poetic revision 
of Mornay’s philosophical “On the purpose of kings.” Philisides’s 
song is a fable about the creation of man, elected as king by a 
commonwealth of beasts against the advice of Jove, and his 
 
21 The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The Old Arcadia), ed. Jean Robertson 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 255. All citations from this edition will be 
included parenthetically in the text. 
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subsequent descent into tyranny.  As Mornay layers text upon text 
to explain the origins of kingship as philosophical prelude to 
sanctioning tyrannicide, so Sidney’s song narrates a tale about the 
birth of kingly man as poetic justification for the same.  Mornay 
begins his exposition with Aesop’s tale of the horse and the bull, 
and ends with I Samuel viii.  Sidney draws upon a different fable 
out of Aesop—the parliament of frogs—but chooses as his chief 
narrative vehicle the identical story from I Samuel viii.  
 At its very center, then, The Old Arcadia signals its 
commitment to concord in the mind, in the state, and among the 
muses—a syncresis of history and philosophy at the heart of 
Sidneian romance-making. And not a corpse in sight. While  
Languet’s “true tales” provide the high notes—history in the 
service of godliness—philosophy supplies Sidneian romance with 
its liberating potential. As Mornay is set free amidst his 
philosophical ruminations upon Seneca and Augustine to render 
true “kingship”—the Idea of kingship as it should be—visible and 
comprehensible” to the reader, so Sidney labors to give that Idea of 
kingship substance in the poetic character of his fiction.  In history, 
the Idea is always conditioned by the contaminating circumstances 
of an imperfect world of events. Phalaris dies quietly in bed, 
tyranny goes unchastened, and the brazen bull howls with the 
screams of the saints. In philosophy, Ideas remain abstractions, too 
remote and insubstantial either to achieve clarity or to carry 
affective force. Inside this same circle, it was that hot-Scot 
tyrannomachist, George Buchanan, who came closest to 
articulating explicitly the political problem motivating Sidney’s 
image-making labors.  Buchanan both insists philosophically upon 
the mimetic potency of the “Idea” of true kingship as it achieves 
conceptual representation (“in whose image so great a force is 
presented to the minds of his subjects”), and despairs historically 
about its realization (“in these corrupt times of ours; it is hard to 
find this magnanimity”).22 
  Placement matters to Sidneian romancing—and places: 
the commonplaces or loci communes that fuel the making of 
golden worlds and flame into being as notable images of virtue and 
vice. For Sidney, epistemology is romance, and romance 
epistemology. With the eye of Ulysses, the cosmopolitan Sidney of 
the Defence travels everywhere, between human and sacred, 
classical and contemporary, English and continental letters, 
 
22 De jure regni apud Scotos, trans. anon. (Philadelphia: 1766), 48-9. For a modern 
translation, see Charles Flinn Arrowood, George Buchanan on the Powers of the 
Crown of Scotland (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1949). 
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between the refined Virgilian labors of pious Aeneas and the 
unrefined blind crowder singing the tale of Percy and Douglas; 
between poetic worthies who are Catholic and those who are 
Reformed, between Lutherans and Calvinists, and among those 
who resisted any confessional identification whatsoever, like the 
Emperor Maximilian II in whose Vienna the Defence is located or 
Michel de l’Hospital, chief among those worthies whom Sidney 
cites as a champion of poetry.23 In matter as in manner, Sidney’s 
cosmopolitanism refuses partisanship—the partisanship of a quirky 
self-pleasing English provinciality in literary style; the partisanship 
of theological debate among confessions; and the tyranny of self-
loving sovereigns in the public domain.24 There is freedom in 
scope because noting inclusively, freedom in the zodiac of the 
mind, is very much his point.  Like a tour guide, Sidney constantly 
points our attention to what’s “notable”: whether that is Plato’s 
“notable fable” of the Atlantic Island—good poet, that Plato, 
Sidney wryly notes—or David’s “notable prosopopeias” of the 
divine—speaking pictures of God’s majesty; or Plutarch’s “notable 
testimonie of the abominable tyrant Pheraeus,” his heart moved by 
poetry; or “notable examples” of moral painting, “as Abraham 
sacrificing” his son Isaac.  The word “notable” occurs eleven times 
in the Defence. 
 There is a point to all this noting of all that is notable. 
When Sidney agrees with those “learned men who have so 
learnedly thought” that “in Nature we know it is well to doe well, 
and what is well and what is evil,” he does so by appealing to a 
pious notion of natural law written in the heart of each human 
being that teaches, as a body of innate knowledge, truths that 
extend from basic tenets of moral philosophy to the recognition of 
the soul’s immortality and the providence of God (113). This is 
precisely the sort of recognition that Sidney grants to his pagan 
princes in the fourth book of The Old Arcadia, as they contemplate 
their impending deaths.  Such truths are called “notitiae,” and they 
 
23 For an extended discussion of Sidney’s anti-confessional piety, see my essay 
“‘Deadly Stinging Adders’: Sidney’s Piety, Philippism, and The Defence of Poesy,” 
Spenser Studies 16 (2002): 231-69. Paula Sutter Fichtner writes extensively about 
Maximilian’s ecumenical Christianity in her biography, Emperor Maximilian II 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001). 
24 For a study of Sidney’s triumph over the first of the Defence’s partisans—the 
parodically pretentious Pugliano—see Anne Lake Prescott, “Tracing Astrophil’s 
‘Coltish Gyres’: Sidney and the Horses of Desire,” Renaissance Papers (2005): 25-
42. As Roger Kuin has commented in a private conversation, such cosmopolitanism 
meant also substituting for the provincialism of the secretary hand the reasonably 
elegant and international italic.  
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find expression in “notable images of virtues [and] vices,”  
oratorical “loci,” the powerful commonplaces of rhetorical practice 
inscribed within the mind (103). Sidney assumes a sort of 
Chomsky-like “deep grammar” of Ideas both animating in their 
innate potential and reanimated through the agency of fictions, or 
(to switch metaphors) an internet of the wit, hard wired, expansive, 
zodiacal in scope, whose pathways become traceable as notable 
images—the forcibleness of the poet’s fictions—lead us home, 
Ulysses-wise, to discover our own natures—to discover why and 
how that Maker made us. This is romance epistemology for the 
making of romance, a poetic rescuing of Ideas from ideology that 
must work, if only because philosophy and history cannot. The 
future, otherwise, belongs to Cecropia. 
 At the conclusion of a crucial consideration of the value 
of poetry relative to the value of history and philosophy, Sidney 
sounds a note of triumph by attributing to the poet “perfect 
picture[s],” whose perfection consists in their coupling of the 
philosopher’s “general notion” with the historian’s “particular 
example” (107).  His purpose is transparent.  Obviously, he is 
setting his opponents up for the argumentative kill, as he prepares 
to declare the syncretic superiority of poets who (beyond their 
rivals) can both teach and move. However, the rhetorical 
preparations are also revealing about the epistemological 
assumptions at work.   
 Proceeding to illustrate his point about how pictures teach 
more effectively than “wordish description,” Sidney cites as 
examples the superiority of paintings to instruct “a man that had 
never seen an elephant or rhinoceros” and visual models to clarify 
the architecture “of a gorgeous palace” (107). The emphasis falls 
squarely on the liveliness of visual presentation.25 But Sidney’s 
language makes just as clear that the issue at hand is complicated 
by issues that supersede presentation.  Philosophy “replenisheth” 
the memory “with many infallible grounds of wisdom”—
concerning “virtue, vices, matters of public policy or private 
government,” he concedes [emphasis mine].  But the replenishing 
of memory is not sufficient for obtaining wisdom, Sidney adds; for 
wisdom is apt to lie “dark before the imaginative and judging 
power” unless “illuminated or figured forth by the speaking picture 
of poetry” (107). Knowledge is better understood as representation 
than presentation—hence the vocabulary of replenishment, the 
 
25 For a still useful account of Sidney’s visual epistemology, see Forrest G. 
Robinson, The Shape of Things Known: Sidney’s Apology in its Philosophical 
Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
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recourse to a language of concealment (wisdom lies dark) and 
disclosure (poetry illumines and figures forth).26 Hence, too, the 
frequent recourse inside the Defence to the vocabulary of the “fore-
conceit,” and its distinctive identification with the “Idea.” The 
“fore-conceit” of Sidney’s poetics comes be-fore, has priority in a 
double sense. The fore-conceit has priority both as the model that 
is prior to the poet’s figuring forth—the Idea of chastity that 
becomes Lucretia as she achieves visual embodiment,  and also as 
the notion of chastity that is prior to the reader’s consciousness, as 
the natural seat upon which active virtue is built when the mind is 
instructed and moved by the Lucretia it sees—“all virtues, vices, 
and passions so in their own natural seats laid to the view, that we 
seem not to hear of them, but clearly to see through them” (108).  
When Sidney writes about “notions” of virtue and vice, he treats 
them as notitiae (innate ideas), which poetic images are best able 
to bring to consciousness. Meaning is not something separable 
from the poem—lodged in some transcendental order of Ideas 
veiled by textual symbols that require allegorical decoding. 
Meaning happens in the verbal dynamics of the poem itself, as 
sparks of truth are fanned into flames of knowledge, as speaking 
pictures give substance to Ideas innately unknowable apart from 
their exemplification. Beyond the historical circumstances that 
determine the necessity of its work—tyrannus occidendus est (the 
tyrant must be destroyed)—Sidneian romance can do its work 
because its epistemological foundations have a natural concord 
with the very nature of the mind. 
 I am in some danger here of seeming to argue for a truth 
scholars already know: that in Sidney’s romance-style, golden-
world poetics triumphs in the wars of the muses, ironically and 
irenically, by reconciling the competing claims of its rivals, history 
and philosophy. This is also to admit that I am in some peril of 
justifying such a poor pitiful cause, without acknowledging my 
own long habit of underestimating the significance of those wars 
and why and how they matter to the triumph of Sidney’s muse—of 
 
26 Sidney’s allegorizers misunderstand the place of concealment inside the 
dynamics of disclosure because of misunderstandings about the epistemological 
assumptions at play. Annabel Patterson, “‘Under Pretty Tales’: Intention in 
Sidney’s Arcadia,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 15.1 (Spring 1982), 6-14 
claims that fears about censorship inspired the intentionally devised obscurity of the 
romance’s political expression. S.K.Heninger’s distinction between Spenser’s 
allegorical and Sidney’s exemplary poetics makes better sense; in the former, truth 
lies “behind the veil of words”; in the latter, it “inheres in the verbal system itself ... 
meaning is inseparable from the poem, integral to it,” Sidney and Spenser: The Poet 
as Maker (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 274-5. 
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golden-world fiction-making celebrated as his culture’s preeminent 
science, knowledge crucial to the government of the public 
domain. As scholars, we turn properly to Sidney’s critically 
capacious readings in the history of romance to understand much 
of what matters to his Arcadias—to the steamy elegance of 
Sannazaro and Montemajor, to the savvy intelligence of a Gil Polo, 
or to the theatrical optics of that Greek romance tradition so crucial 
to its substantiation and whose importance for understanding 
Sidney, Victor Skretkowicz (among others) has labored so 
brilliantly to disclose.27 For the genesis of Sidneian romance, 
however, for an intelligible estimation of its motive for being, the 
urgency of its design and the stylishly ludic engagement of its 
making, it is necessary also to remember places: the 
“commonplaces” of Sidney’s rhetorical inheritance from his 
Philippist mentors—those “loci” of “notable” virtues and vices 
making epistemology romance and romance epistemology; and the 
place of its making amidst the conversations of his most intimate 
compatriots in the cause—Languet and Mornay, historian and 
philosopher—for whom (as for Sidney) confessional crisis 
signaled a crisis of public discourse, and disciplinary dispute, an 
argument among the piously and politically committed about how 
best—how most chastely—to remedy the body politic. Poetry 
comes from the arguments we have with ourselves—or so Yeats 
that Irishman thought. Poetics, in Sidney’s case, derives from 
arguments that he had with his friends (actual or imaginary), 
arguments about mere wars among the muses, pursued urbanely 
but urgently, against the backdrop of real wars among confessions.  
There are no Tridentine Catholics in Arcadia, and neither are there 
Calvinists or Lutherans, much less English longbows or Spanish 
pikes. In the golden world of romance, partisan particulars are 
transformed to “notable images” of virtue and vice, historical 
actors to fictive exemplars, and mere ideology to Ideas of universal 
import. Poetry’s inclusive, cosmopolitan mode of discourse 
complements as it enables the politics of Sidney’s anti-
confessional piety, and leaves at the triumphant climax of this war 
among the muses, ironically and irenically, not a corpse in sight. 
  
 
27 See Victor Skretkowicz’s forthcoming book, now in preparation at Manchester 
University Press, European Erotic Romance: Philhellenic Protestantism, 
Renaissance Translation, and English Literary Politics. 
                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘If an excellent man should err’: Philip Sidney and 
Stoical Virtue1 
 
RICHARD WOOD 
Sheffield Hallam University  
 
In a letter written to Philip Sidney in 1574, Hubert Languet, Philip 
Sidney’s forward Protestant mentor, defends Guy du Faur de 
Pibrac’s public defence of the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre.  
In doing so, Languet rejects the harsh, apparently stoical, 
judgements of those who would brand Pibrac “among the 
wickedest of men” for this one error, preferring to reserve 
judgement.2 He sets himself apart from those harsher judges who 
would choose martyrdom over living with the shame of defending 
such acts. Victor Skretkowicz has suggested that this shows a 
moral distinction between the senior Huguenot, Languet, and a 
“younger, more idealistic” group of Huguenots.3 Building on 
Skretkowicz’s work, this article will address the question of 
whether it is possible to discern such a moral distinction in the later 
works of Philip Sidney himself. I argue that the New Arcadia in 
particular explores the tension between the positions adopted by 
Languet and the putative, “more idealistic” group. Sidney, through 
the character of Amphialus, stages a defeat of “an excellent man” 
who has erred (to paraphrase the author’s mentor). Nevertheless, I 
contend, Amphialus’s fall is attended by sufficient signs of his 
corrigibility to suggest that Languet’s influence persists.  I also 
 
1 This article is based on a paper given at the conference, “Romance: A Conference 
in honour of Victor Skretkowicz,” at the University of Dundee, October 5th-6th, 
2007.  It was a pleasure to honour Dr. Skretkowicz, and I wish to acknowledge the 
generous and helpful comments I received from Dr. Skretkowicz and my fellow 
participants. I would also like to thank the anonymous readers of the Sidney Journal 
for their useful suggestions for revision of an earlier version of this article. 
2 James M. Osborn, Young Philip Sidney: 1572-1577 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1972), 228; this is Osborn's translation from Latin of Languet's letter to 
Sidney. 
3 Victor Skretkowicz, “Mary Sidney Herbert's Antonius, English Philhellenism and 
the Protestant Cause,” Women's Writing 6.1 (March 1999): 11. 
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suggest that by reading the New Arcadia through the lens of 
Languet’s anti-stoical ethos it is possible to unify other apparently 
distinct scholarly interpretations of Sidney’s philosophical 
inheritance. 
Victor Skretkowicz’s essay discusses Mary Sidney 
Herbert’s Antonius with reference to her other work, A Discourse 
of Life and Death.  These translations of works by Robert Garnier 
and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay respectively were published 
together in 1592. For Skretkowicz, Mary’s publication of such 
apparently divergent texts espouses a “Huguenot doctrine” which 
includes both Mornay’s ethos (which is seen as exemplifying the 
“younger, more idealist” group) and the philosophy of her 
brother’s older mentor.  Skretkowicz emphasizes the differences 
between the two: Mornay’s stoical philosophy “inspires a selfless 
flight to the end of life,” an unwillingness to compromise to save 
oneself from martyrdom, while Languet “identifies a very practical 
need in the world of politics to tolerate personal failings,” and is 
even prepared to excuse those who eschew martyrdom.4 More 
broadly, despite their apparently diverging outlooks, the two men 
shared a great deal in terms of their philosophical and theological 
inheritances. Indeed, like Sidney, Mornay was a protégé of 
Languet, and although Skretkowicz notes that Mornay “was very 
much a Huguenot political reformer who led from the front” 
whereas Languet favoured “a politically realistic sense of tolerance 
and forgiveness,” they both may be said to have been 
“Politiques.”5 
Whether fairly attributed or not, the moral distinction 
highlighted by Skretkowicz is exemplified by Languet’s 
observations communicated to Philip Sidney in the letter of 1574.  
In the letter, Languet defends Guy du Faur de Pibrac’s defence of 
the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre on the grounds that “he 
[Pibrac] was compelled to ransom his life” with a letter defending 
the massacre. Languet goes on to quote a strongly stoical passage 
from Juvenal, in which one must “consider it the greatest sin to put 
breath before shame,” before declaring: 
 
 
4 Skretkowicz, “Mary Sidney Herbert's Antonius,” 13-14. 
5 Skretkowicz, “Mary Sidney Herbert's Antonius,” 10-11. Roger Kuin, “Sir Philip 
Sidney's Model of the Statesman,” Reformation 4 (1999): 93-117 highlights 
parallels between the lives of Sidney and Mornay, not least their similar educations 
under the guidance of Hubert Languet. Kuin attributes these parallels to “this 
mutual relation to Languet” and, in turn, as will also become apparent below, 
Languet's relation to Philip Melanchthon (102). 
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I am not a Stoic, and I do not believe that all faults 
are the same. Our party has this failing, that if an 
excellent man should err even in the smallest 
matter, they immediately class him among the 
wickedest of men. I am by nature and principle 
averse to judgements of this sort, and I know that 
many people criticize me for this.6 
 
By 1590, when Mary Sidney Herbert came to translate the works 
of Garnier and Mornay, the “party” of French Huguenots and their 
English supporters to which Languet refers had endured, though it 
was missing several central characters such as Languet and Sidney 
themselves. Nevertheless, as Skretkowicz’s article attests, the 
moderate philosophy of Hubert Languet was still influential with 
Mary and her brother. 
 Hubert Languet died on 30 September 1581. Katherine 
Duncan-Jones observes, in her biography of Philip Sidney, that, 
prior to this date, Languet and Sidney “seem to have drifted 
apart.”7 It is, however, as Duncan-Jones admits, difficult to gauge 
from their surviving correspondence whether this was indeed the 
case, and the apparent lack of correspondence during Languet’s 
last year may be explained by the loss of one letter-book rather 
than a waning of their friendship. Languet was in the habit of 
admonishing his protégé, not least during the period of Sidney’s 
relative retirement, when he was writing the first Arcadia.  
Nevertheless, such differences appear to have been in the nature of 
their bantering relationship and, as Richard C. McCoy notes, “the 
stance Sidney assumes in his letters … is clearly designed to 
provoke such urgent and importunate moralizing.”8 When Sidney 
came to revise the Arcadia (which might have been “as early as 
1582” according to Skretkowicz), he, like his sister several years 
later, still retained many of the ideas expressed to him by his one-
time tutor in letters and in person.9 There is, however, plenty of 
room for debate as to what extent such ideas influenced Sidney’s 
literary works. 
 
6 Osborn, Young Philip Sidney, 228. 
7 Katherine Duncan-Jones, Sir Philip Sidney: Courtier Poet (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1991), 217. 
8 Richard C. McCoy, Sir Philip Sidney: Rebellion in Arcadia (Hassocks: Harvester 
Press, 1979), 55. 
9 Victor Skretkowicz, “General Introduction” in Sir Philip Sidney, The Countess of 
Pembroke’s Arcadia (The New Arcadia), ed. Victor Skretkowicz (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), xvii. 
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 In addressing this issue, it is useful to note that Hubert 
Languet’s moderate philosophy was itself an inheritance from his 
own tutor, Philip Melanchthon. Melanchthon was a key figure in 
the Lutheran Reformation, noted for his moderation and 
ecumenical inclusivity, whose works, as Robert Stillman notes, 
“were more often owned than those of any other reformed 
theologian.”10 Indeed, in his letter to Sidney, Languet 
acknowledges Melanchthon as the source of his moderate views 
and refuses to compromise them: 
 
Thus far I regret neither my teacher nor my 
principles, and shall not be led away from either by 
the criticisms of those who are naturally more 
captious or severe than I am.11 
 
Stillman has elucidated the Melanchthonian nature of Sidney’s 
Defence, wresting it from the problematic context of English 
Calvinism preferred in earlier accounts of Sidney’s Protestant 
commitment.12 Sidney’s contact with Languet and other 
Melanchthonians among his mentor’s circle exposed him to a 
peculiarly pragmatic form of Protestant piety.13 As an apposite 
example of Philippist piety, Stillman’s essay cites the funeral 
oration composed by Joannes Crato, another pupil of Melanchthon, 
following the death of the emperor Maximilian II.  The oration, as 
Stillman attests, celebrates a ruler who is “the very embodiment of 
Philippist virtue, a Euarchus incarnate”; he is “the image of 
moderation ... who learned what imperial power is by 
understanding what human weakness is,” and “who wished to 
manage political life by counsel rather than by force.” In the terms 
of the Defence of Poesy, Maximilian may be said to be “a Cyrus by 
which to create many Cyruses.”14 
 
10 Robert E. Stillman, “Deadly Stinging Adders: Sidney’s Piety, Philippism, and the 
Defence of Poesy,” Spenser Studies 16 (2002): 231. See also Stillman, Philip Sidney 
and the Poetics of Renaissance Cosmopolitanism (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2008). I am indebted to Stillman's work on Sidney's Defence of Poesy for 
guiding my research in this area. 
11 Osborn, Young Philip Sidney, 228. 
12 Stillman, “Deadly Stinging Adders” and Philip Sidney. Stillman’s essay, 235-6 
and 261n14, refers specifically to two earlier accounts: Andrew D. Weiner, Sir 
Philip Sidney and the Poetics of Protestantism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1978) and Alan Sinfield, “Protestantism: Questions of 
Subjectivity and Control” in Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of 
Dissident Reading (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).  
13 These beliefs may be referred to as either “Melanchthonian” or “Philippist.” 
14 Stillman, “Deadly Stinging Adders,” 247-8. 
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 Stillman’s case, more specifically, for reading the 
Defence of Poesy as a text informed by Philippism rests on the 
correlation between a Sidneian poetics and a Melanchthonian piety 
that share a commitment to the “cooperative power of the [human] 
will.”15 Unlike the harsh limitation placed on human agency by 
Calvinist theology, Philippist belief allows the individual will 
greater freedom to “cooperate with God in securing salvation.” 
This is reflected in the Defence’s category of the “right poet,” 
whose poetry has the power to move, to bridge the gap between 
“our erected wit” and our post-lapsarian “infected will.” As 
Stillman notes, this movement is achieved, in part, through the 
poet’s “power to impart (contemplatively) real self-knowledge—
the enjoyment of our own divine essence.” Ultimately, inspired to 
acts of virtue by the product of the poet’s wit, the “infected will” 
may be restored to a “condition of goodness.” This is, as Sidney 
writes, predicated on the condition that the readers of poetry “learn 
aright why and how that maker made him.”16 Despite this 
qualification, there remains the potential for human agency in the 
quest for liberation from sin.  Clearly, a link has been established, 
by Stillman, between the Philippist philosophy of Hubert Languet 
and Philip Sidney’s critical work, the Defence of Poesy.  
Moreover, Skretkowicz has identified the different strands of 
Huguenot thought at play in the work of Mary Sidney Herbert.  In 
view of these precedents, the relationship between such ideas and 
Sidney’s literary works, specifically the New Arcadia, appears to 
be worth examining. The potential attributed to the human will in 
Sidney’s Defence also informs Hubert Languet’s moderate, 
Philippist attitude to Pibrac’s defence of the St. Bartholomew’s 
Day Massacre. I contend that the portrayal of Amphialus in the 
New Arcadia is similarly informed. 
 Amphialus is usually labelled the “anti-hero” of the New 
Arcadia. He is, as Skretkowicz notes, “relentlessly pilloried” with 
the use of “the formulaic epithet,” “the courteous Amphialus.”17  
The comparison with the pious Aeneas of Virgil’s epic is made 
explicit, and is most often seen as ironic. While A. C. Hamilton 
writes that Amphialus’s “actions outrage courtesy,” he also betrays 
a degree of sympathy for the character when he adds, “Nothing 
 
15 This and the following quotations are taken from Stillman, “Deadly Stinging 
Adders,” 257, 245, 255. 
16 Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry or The Defence of Poesy, ed. Geoffrey 
Shepherd (London and Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1965; reprint, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973), 101. 
17 Skretkowicz, “General Introduction,” xxxvi. 
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turns out right for him.”18 This sympathy, I argue, is not misplaced: 
there is plenty of textual evidence to suggest that Amphialus is not 
a wholly wicked character. Indeed, to believe that he may be 
considered “an excellent man,” a reader has only to turn to the 
testimony of Helen of Corinth in Book I of the revised romance: 
 
Who is courteous, noble, liberal, but he that hath 
the example before his eyes of Amphialus?  Where 
are all heroical parts, but in Amphialus? O 
Amphialus, I would thou were not so excellent; or 
I would I thought thee not so excellent; and yet 
would I not, that I would so.19 
 
Helen clearly loves Amphialus, and it is, therefore, arguable that 
her opinion of him is unreliable. About to recount the history of 
their relationship to Musidorus, Helen is herself equivocal about 
her feelings for Amphialus. There is, however, much in 
Amphialus’s story to corroborate Helen’s judgement. His fight 
with his friend, Philoxenus, who is jealous of Helen’s love for him, 
ends in Philoxenus’s death, but it was a contest which Amphialus 
did not seek, and the mortal blow was an “unlucky” accident (64).  
Amphialus’s grief (made worse by the subsequent death of 
Timotheus) leads him to cast off his armour and run “into the 
thickest of woods, lamenting,” vowing hatred for Helen, “the cause 
of all this mischief” (65).  Nevertheless, Helen’s knowledge of his 
antipathy towards her does not dampen her ardour, and her 
continued belief in his excellence reflects the contingent nature of 
the events that caused the enmity between them. 
 When, in Book II, Amphialus is led to see his cousin, 
Philoclea, bathing, he immediately falls in love himself, and a new 
sequence of unfortunate episodes is set in motion which occupies 
most of the incomplete third book of the New Arcadia. The book 
begins with the imprisonment of Philoclea, as well as her sister, 
Pamela, and Zelmane, by Cecropia, Amphialus’s mother.  
Cecropia intends to force either Philoclea or her sister to marry her 
son.  She does not mind which one of his cousins her son marries, 
as her aim is to win control of her brother-in-law’s dukedom.  
Cecropia, unlike her son, is irredeemably wicked and, to reinforce 
 
18 A. C. Hamilton, Sir Philip Sidney: A Study of His Life and Works (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 139. 
19 Sir Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The New Arcadia), ed. 
Victor Skretkowicz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 61. All citations to this text 
will be from this edition and are parenthetically inserted in the text.  
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this, Sidney has her resort ultimately to torture and the use of 
profoundly atheistic arguments in her persuasion of the sisters.  
However, as Richard McCoy has observed, “Sidney ... takes pains 
to mitigate his male protagonist’s guilt by assigning much of the 
blame to a bad parent.”20  From the outset of the captivity episode, 
Amphialus is portrayed as innocent in comparison with his mother: 
 
Amphialus was but even then returned from far 
countries ... so as he was utterly ignorant of all his 
mother’s wicked devices—to which he would 
never have consented, being, like a rose out of a 
briar, an excellent son of an evil mother. (317) 
 
Under Cecropia’s malign influence, but also motivated by the love 
first kindled at Philoclea’s bathing-place, Amphialus embarks on a 
violent rebellion against Philoclea’s father, who besieges the castle 
where both his daughters are held captive. 
 The name Amphialus, as A. C. Hamilton records, 
“signifies ‘between two seas’.”  In accordance with this translation, 
Hamilton regards Amphialus as a divided character.21 This is 
certainly reflected in the contrast between his reputed virtue and 
the mischief that befalls him. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that 
Amphialus is subject to the passive influence of Philoclea, and that 
he carries this into the martial combat that dominates Book III of 
the New Arcadia.22 On such occasions, particularly before his 
contest with Musidorus disguised as the Forsaken Knight (403-5), 
Amphialus is divided between his love for Philoclea and his own 
self-defence. This echoes the internal conflict that hampered him 
when he unwillingly fought his friend, Philoxenus. Amphialus is 
repeatedly faced with similarly thorny choices, and he repeatedly 
puts breath before shame, much as Pibrac did over the St. 
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. In doing so, he rejects the “selfless 
flight to the end of life,” which disqualifies him as a figure 
representing a strictly stoical doctrine. This might be seen, 
particularly from the perspective of Languet’s putative opponents, 
as marking Amphialus’s story as a thoroughly negative exemplum, 
much like that of his mother. I, on the contrary, contend that he 
ought to be seen exactly as the narrative voice of the New Arcadia 
 
20 McCoy, Sir Philip Sidney, 172-3. 
21 Hamilton, Sir Philip Sidney, 139. 
22 Richard Wood, “‘The representing of so strange a power in love’: Philip Sidney's 
Legacy of Anti-factionalism,” Early Modern Literary Studies Special Issue 16.4 
(October, 2007) 1-20 <URL: http://purl.oclc.org/emls/si-16/woodsidn.htm>. 
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describes him, “an excellent son of an evil mother.” This is to read 
Amphialus ‘aright,’ to be no more captious or severe than Hubert 
Languet. Such a conclusion, already sustained by the textual 
evidence presented above, is further reinforced by the scene in 
which Cecropia falls to her death.  Here, Cecropia, 
 
fearing [her son] would have stricken her ... went 
back so far till ere she were aware she overthrew 
herself from over the leads to receive her death’s 
kiss at the ground.  (440) 
 
Cecropia misreads her son’s intentions, as the narrative makes 
clear in parentheses: “though indeed he meant it not, but only 
intended to kill himself in her presence” (440).  When the wicked 
Cecropia judges Amphialus to be “the wickedest of men,” the 
readers are challenged to use their own moderate, arguably 
Philippist, tendency and judge him differently. The less “captious 
or severe” judgement advocated by Languet stems from the 
potential within humanity to cooperate with God and achieve 
freedom from sin, as articulated in Melanchthon’s works. In the 
section of the Loci communes of 1555 (originally published in 
1521) where Melanchthon discusses original sin, there is a clear 
emphasis on the light placed in man by God at creation and God’s 
renewal in humanity—after the Fall and the intercession of “the 
eternal Son of God”—of “his image and likeness.” For 
Melanchthon, 
 
because nothing higher can be given than himself and this 
likeness of his characteristics, it is very clear that his love 
toward us was not a cold, indolent thought, as a Stoic 
might argue, but a genuine, earnest, burning love.23 
 
 The narrative of the New Arcadia, though incomplete, 
includes the fall of Amphialus. After his mother’s death, already 
severely wounded from combat, he bewails his miserable condition 
and catalogues his crimes, before stabbing himself with Philoclea’s 
knives. Beyond the help of ordinary surgeons, he is eventually 
carried away by Helen to the accompaniment of a song of 
lamentation from his people.24  His fall certainly has the trappings 
 
23 Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, trans. Clyde L. 
Manschreck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 72-3. 
24 This is termed the “fall,” not the “death,” of Amphialus since Helen of Corinth 
intends to test the ability of her surgeon to revive him.  This surgeon’s extraordinary 
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of that of an epic hero, and he also, in his final words, betrays a 
deep self-awareness.25 His condemnation of himself, prefaced with 
a cry of “Wretched Amphialus!” surpasses any reproof previously 
directed at the apparently “courteous” knight (441).  It would be an 
overstatement to suggest that Amphialus has, through the 
contemplation of his own experiences, achieved the kind of “self-
knowledge” necessary for him to be restored to a “condition of 
goodness.” Nevertheless, he may be seen to be beginning to 
cooperate with God in securing his own salvation. Certainly, in the 
figure of Amphialus, Sidney, the “right poet,” creates a corrigible 
character with the power to inspire such cooperation in his readers. 
 To accept such an interpretation of the character of 
Amphialus does not, however, preclude readers’ finding the 
influence of other, possibly contradictory, philosophies at play in 
the New Arcadia. Sidney’s romance is not a work conceived 
merely as a means of propagating Melanchthonian theology, nor 
any other system of beliefs.  As Stillman puts it with reference to 
the Old Arcadia, Sidney is not “transmuting morally and 
religiously approved doctrines into sugar-coated fictions.”26 In 
spite of Amphialus’s refusal of the path of a true Stoic, it is still 
possible that Sidney was inspired by Stoicism, as was his sister.  
Indeed, stoical philosophy is found elsewhere in the New Arcadia, 
particularly associated with Pamela and Philoclea during their 
captivity.  Blair Worden, in The Sound of Virtue, identifies a neo-
Stoic doctrine of fortitude as the dominant creed of the later books 
of the Old Arcadia, where Musidorus and Pyrocles are imprisoned 
and await their trial. This is seen, by Worden, to be a development 
from the romance’s earlier espousal of a “creed of action,” in 
which, according to Ciceronian principles, “virtue consists in 
 
skill is demonstrated in his transformation of Parthenia’s appearance (45). 
Amphialus’s “fall” and likely recovery echoes the language of injury (as opposed to 
that of devastation found in Calvin) applied to the Fall of Man in Melanchthon’s 
Loci and Sidney's letters to Languet. See Stillman, “Deadly Stinging Adders,” 266, 
n.43 and The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney and Hubert Languet, trans. 
Steuart A. Pears (London: William Pickering, 1845), 143-6. 
25 At the moment of his “death,” Amphialus is honoured by his people, “some 
throwing themselves upon the ground, some tearing their clothes and casting dust 
upon their heads, and some even wounding themselves and sprinkling their own 
blood in the air” (New Arcadia, 446). This is comparable with the lamentation for 
the death of Patrocus in the Iliad, trans. Richard Lattimore (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1951), xviii, 23-31.  
26 Robert E. Stillman, Sidney’s Poetic Justice: The Old Arcadia, Its Eclogues, and 
Renaissance Pastoral Traditions (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press; 
London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1986), 74. 
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action.”27 Indeed, drawing on Fulke Greville’s “account of 
Sidney’s fiction,” he characterises the New Arcadia as even more 
wholeheartedly stoical in its ethos than the Old Arcadia, describing 
the sisters’ fidelity while imprisoned by Cecropia as “a feat of 
Stoic heroism.” More specifically, Pamela’s fortitude in the face of 
Cecropia’s persecution is the point “where Sidney’s narrative 
breaks wholly free of the earlier version,” and this passive form of 
Stoicism reaches its peak.28 
 This argument is persuasive, but also problematic if the 
New Arcadia were to be seen as dominated by a passive Stoicism.  
It is difficult to reconcile a passive ethos with the philosophy of 
Sidney’s party, including Mornay, a “political reformer who led 
from the front,” and Languet, who counselled Sidney against the 
hazards of inactivity.29 Of course, the stoical strand of Sidney’s 
thought need not reside exclusively in the passive virtue of the 
New Arcadia’s female characters, and it ought to be remembered 
that Sidney was well capable of drawing such ideas from his own 
reading, unmediated by thinkers like Mornay and Languet.30 An 
examination of the active or passive expression of virtue and the 
relationship of such virtue to stoical philosophy in the Arcadias 
reveals Sidney’s philosophical eclecticism. Several scholarly 
interpretations of Sidney’s romances are testament to this.  I wish 
to suggest that by reading the New Arcadia through the lens of 
Languet’s anti-stoical ethos it is possible to unify these apparently 
distinct scholarly interpretations of Sidney’s philosophical 
inheritance. 
 
27 Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and Elizabethan 
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 33, 25. 
28 Worden, Sound of Virtue, 309, 364-5. 
29 Languet comments on Sidney’s “retirement” in a letter dated September 24, 
1580; see Osborn, Young Philip Sidney, 504-5. 
30 Sidney’s education would have included extensive instruction in classical authors 
(see Malcolm William Wallace, The Life of Sir Philip Sidney [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1915], 35-111). There is no shortage of stoical 
arguments among such texts, particularly in Seneca’s moral sententiae and Cicero’s 
De Officiis. Sidney recommended Tacitus to his brother Robert in a letter written in 
1580 (Prose Works of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Albert Feuillerat, vol. 3 [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962], 130-3), and the historian was a source of 
inspiration for another of Sidney’s correspondents, Justus Lipsius, whose De 
Constantia (1584) is a landmark work of early modern Neostoicism. For 
discussions of the importance of Stoicism to Sidney and the “Sidney circle,” see 
Joel B. Davis’s unpublished dissertation, “Renaissance Neostoicism and the Sidney 
Family Literary Discourse,” University of Oregon, 1999, and his article, “Multiple 
Arcadias and the Literary Quarrel between Fulke Greville and the Countess of 
Pembroke,” Studies in Philology 101.4 (Fall 2004): 401-30. 
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 The contrast between the virtuous example offered by the 
character of Amphialus and that represented by Pyrocles and 
Musidorus together is examined by Nancy Lindheim. In what 
Lindheim terms the “Asia Minor paideia” of the New Arcadia, the 
princes undergo an “education in virtue.”31  Their adventures are a 
portrait of virtue in action and, as such, approach the view of virtue 
implicit in the Aristotelian definition of Justice, also invoked by 
Lindheim in her discussion of the trial scene of the Old Arcadia: 
“complete virtue in the fullest sense, because it is the actual 
exercise of complete virtue.”32 Nevertheless, this high ideal is 
brought into question through its association with the character of 
Euarchus, whose actual justice (in the Old Arcadia) is pitiless and, 
as Lindheim notes, he is “too much the Stoic sage.”33 The text 
makes plain his stoical command over his passions, and that “his 
mind ... hated evil in what colours soever he found it,”34 but, as a 
consequence of such apparent virtues, he judges Gynecia wrongly.  
For Lindheim, Euarchus lacks Aristotelian “equity.” Defined by 
Aristotle in the Rhetoric, the concept of equity sounds distinctly 
Melanchthonian in tone: 
 
It is equity to pardon human failings, and to look to 
the lawgiver and not to the law; to the spirit and not to 
the letter; to the intention and not the action; to the 
whole and not to the part; to the character of the actor 
in the long run and not in the present moment.35 
 
On these terms, Lindheim concludes that the Arcadias articulate “a 
view of experience” founded on an acute “sense of the limitations 
of reason, law, and virtue measured in a purely human context”; 
and the active pursuit of virtue by Sidney’s princes in Asia Minor 
and “the character of Amphialus as it is developed in the Captivity 
sequence” suggest the very same conclusion.36 No matter how 
corrigible Amphialus may be, his actions do not amount to the 
exercise of virtue, but the Arcadia, it may be argued, encourages 
 
31 Nancy Lindheim, The Structures of Sidney’s Arcadia (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1982), 161. 
32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, V.i.1129b30; cited in 
Lindheim, 161. 
33 Lindheim, Structures, 159; Lindheim's emphasis. 
34 Sir Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The Old Arcadia), ed. 
Jean Robertson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 382-3. 
35 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.13.1374b; cited in Lindheim, Structures, 159. 
36 Lindheim, Structures, 161; the emphasis is mine. 
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its readers to judge him with equity and not with the apparent 
sagacity of the Stoic.37 
 Lindheim’s broader project includes an elucidation of 
what she terms Sidney’s “rhetoricism,” which involves an 
emphasis on the Sophistic elements of Aristotelian thought 
represented in Renaissance humanism generally and the 
“structures” of Sidney’s prose romance in particular.38 She 
postulates a “revision [in the New Arcadia] towards Aristotle’s 
ideas of what the good rhetorician will know.” Such knowledge is 
related to the peculiarly Aristotelian concept of experience which 
informs Sidney’s understanding of “education in virtue” outlined 
above. This is exemplified (in a negative fashion), for Lindheim, 
by the inadequacies of “knowledge of oneself and of others” 
demonstrated by Amphialus, Helen of Corinth and Cecropia.39 
Such a reading, though persuasive, leaves out the equity and “sense 
of the limitations of reason, law, and virtue,” as well as any 
acknowledgement of the importance of “human context,” that 
informs Lindheim’s readings elsewhere in her thesis.  Moreover, 
this is a denial of the peculiarly Sophistical aspects of the 
Aristotelian rhetoricism which Lindheim views as important to the 
reading of Sidney’s New Arcadia and English Renaissance 
literature in general: an emphasis on “human will and choice, 
insisting on the way action is conditioned by circumstances and 
capable of ambiguous and conflicting interpretations.”40 I contend 
that such ideas are more compatible with a Philippist philosophy 
that also assigns an unusual freedom to the individual human will.  
Advocates of such a philosophy may also view Amphialus, Helen 
of Corinth and Cecropia as characters with varying degrees of self-
knowledge and knowledge of others that could serve as instructive 
examples in the education in virtue of Sidney’s readers. 
Stillman, on the other hand, engages with Sidney’s 
philosophical inheritance and argues that the Old Arcadia be 
 
37 Like Lindheim, Arthur F. Kinney, “Sir Philip Sidney and the Uses of History,” in 
The Historical Renaissance: New Essays on Tudor and Stuart Literature and 
Culture, ed. Heather Dubrow and Richard Strier (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988), 310-11 refers to Aristotle's definition of equity when he argues for “a 
kind of humanity that might instruct Euarchus if he could only know it.” 
38 Lindheim draws on Nancy S. Struever’s The Language of History in the 
Renaissance: Rhetoric and Historical Consciousness in Florentine Humanism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
39 Lindheim, Structures, 60. 
40 Lindheim, Structures, 7; these ideas flow from a Sophistic epistemology that 
insists, contrary to the Idealism of Plato and Aristotle, that “only a world of flux and 
impurity exists” (Struever, The Language of History, 10). 
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termed a “Stoic pastoral.” Stillman’s case is based on Sidney’s 
adoption of “the principle that it is man’s nature, and therefore his 
moral duty, to follow the dictates of reason and virtue” derived 
from classical authors such as Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, and, as 
Stillman observes, “can appropriately be called ‘Stoic,’ since it is 
framed upon a concept that has been inextricably associated with 
the Stoics since the time of Cicero.” However, Stillman is keen to 
emphasize that Sidney is not a “philosophical Stoic.” That would 
involve the belief in, among other philosophical commitments, 
“the equal viciousness of all crimes,” which would, as I have 
shown above, go against the tenor of a Philippist ethos.41  It is 
noteworthy that Sidney distanced himself from the school of Stoics 
in a letter to Hubert Languet of 1 March 1578 (at the time when 
Languet was counselling Sidney against passivity), in which he 
asks, “Do you not see that I am cleverly playing the stoic?”42  
Stillman sees Sidney employing (while not adhering to) 
philosophical stoicism as a “defense of retirement in a corrupt 
age.”43 It is also possible to see Sidney “cleverly playing the stoic” 
in the philosophical (or, perhaps, more accurately termed 
“theological”) arguments of the New Arcadia. 
 During the captivity episode, in the face of Cecropia’s 
argument to persuade the princess to marry Amphialus (in which 
Cecropia expounds a peculiarly godless epistemology), Pamela 
produces a sustained case in refutation of her aunt’s atheism. Her 
method involves undermining the philosophical bases of 
Cecropia’s argument one by one. Early in her speech, Pamela 
challenges the notion that belief in God arose from human 
ignorance of the “causes of things”: 
 
Nay, because we know that each effect hath a 
cause, that hath engendered a true and lively 
devotion; for this goodly work of which we are, 
and in which we live, hath not his being by chance 
(on which opinion it is beyond marvel by what 
chance any brain could stumble!)—for it be eternal 
 
41 Stillman, Sidney’s Poetic Justice, 71. Stillman cites Cicero's De Officiis: “quod 
summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere, id habet hanc, ut 
opinor sententiam: cum virtute congruere semper.” See Cicero, De Officiis, trans. 
Walter Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William 
Heinemann, 1913, 1961), 3.3.13; trans. 281. 
42 The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney and Hubert Languet, 143. 
43 Stillman, Sidney’s Poetic Justice, 73. 
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as you would seem to conceive of it, eternity and 
chance are things insufferable together. (359-60) 
 
This is an articulation of the cosmological (or “first cause”) 
argument for the existence of God, which is expressed most 
famously in the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas.  It also 
appears in Aristotle, whose philosophy Aquinas sought to 
reconcile with Christian theology.44 This leads onto a denial of 
chance, which “could never make all things of nothing,” or give 
rise to “perfect order, perfect beauty, perfect constancy” (360). To 
the suggestion of a haphazard “nature” as the origin of such things, 
Pamela retorts that “there must needs have been a wisdom which 
made them concur” (360-1) and that, in turn, any resort to an 
“universal nature” must include the qualities of “wisdom, goodness 
and providence,” or else be a further blasphemy (361).  Essentially, 
this is the argument for the existence of God “from design” (the 
teleological argument), in which a divine wisdom can be inferred 
from the orderliness and beauty of the natural world, and has a 
long history including arguments from Aristotle.45 
 In an article discussing the philosophical and theological 
background to Pamela’s refutation, D. P. Walker asserts that 
Pamela, in resorting to the argument from design and its 
concomitant association of faith with nature, tackles her atheistic 
foe on the only common ground they have, that of “natural 
reason.”46  Walker describes her “arguments against chance” as “a 
bewildering display of sophistry, achieved by sometimes using 
‘chance’ as the opposite of intelligent purpose, and sometimes as 
the opposite of necessary order.”  In so doing, “she is thus able to 
switch rapidly from chance—lack of purpose, which includes 
necessary order, to chance—randomness, which is a contrary of 
necessary order as well as of purpose.” Although he cites a partial 
precedent for such “sophistry” in the “Stoic ... part” of Cicero’s De 
 
44 Ted Honderich, ed., Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 43-7. 
45 This argument also begins Philippe Duplessis-Mornay's De la Verité de la 
Religion Chrestienne, the English translation of which has been partly attributed to 
Sidney. In the English version, the orderliness of the natural world “ought in all 
reason to make us all to understand, that in this great universall masse, there is a 
soveraine Spirite which maketh, moveth, and governeth all that wee see there.” See 
A woorke concerning the trewnesse of the Christian religion ... Begunne to be 
translated into English by Sir Philip Sidney Knight, and at his request finished by 
Arthur Golding (London, 1587), 2. 
46 D. P. Walker, “Ways of Dealing with Atheists: A Background to Pamela’s 
Refutation of Cecropia,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 17.2 (1955): 
269. 
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Natura Deorum, Walker sees no other purpose to the princess’s 
stance than theological expediency.47 Pamela is pragmatically 
opposing the irredeemable Cecropia with a defensive brand of 
theology, one that obviates Cecropia’s response, but is not 
necessarily sincerely held. Walker identifies two groups of 
Christians: one group (including Philippe Duplessis-Mornay) that 
“have some hope of converting atheists,” and another that “have 
purely protective aims.” Pamela’s refutation of Cecropia is 
characterized by Walker as belonging to the latter, “less liberal” 
theology, held by Montaigne among others, that “emphasize[s] 
grace at the expense of free will.”48 This contrasts starkly with my 
“liberal” reading of the “fall” of Cecropia’s son, Amphialus.  
Nevertheless, Walker’s case that Pamela belongs to the second 
group of Christians rests on Pamela’s confession to Cecropia that 
“I speak to you without any hope of fruit in so rotten a heart” 
(359), and it is perhaps a step too far to align her refutation of 
Cecropia with the less liberal party. It is possible to argue that 
Pamela’s arguments are not merely a result of theological 
pragmatism, but a resort to nature in which nature is equated with 
reason and virtue as part of a stoic pastoral philosophy akin to that 
identified by Stillman in the Old Arcadia. Walker’s sourcing of the 
ideas in a stoic text and Pamela’s “display of sophistry” provide 
strong clues to their shared origin in Sidney’s rhetoricism.  
Moreover, through Pamela’s defensive arguments in this passage, 
Sidney is again demonstrating his knowledge of philosophical 
stoicism without advocating it.  
 To conclude, Victor Skretkowicz has shown that Mary 
Sidney Herbert was influenced by the Huguenot thinkers, Hubert 
Languet and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay. In doing so, he has drawn 
attention to a moral distinction, based on Languet’s (and 
Mornay’s) humanistic and theological inheritance from Philip 
Melanchthon that, I contend, is of significance for reading Philip 
Sidney’s New Arcadia. This thesis, that of a Philippist Arcadia, has 
the potential to unify several apparently distinct readings. It may 
also resolve the problematic association of Sidney with a passive 
stoicism in the work of critics like Blair Worden. Through the 
 
47 Walker, “Ways of Dealing,” 271-2. 
48 Walker, “Ways of Dealing,” 265-7. Justus Lipsius, in his classic work of 
sixteenth-century Neostoicism, De Constantia (available in Latin from 1584), 
emphasises God’s will with little, if any, suggestion of human cooperation, but 
retains the possibility of the conversion of God’s foes. Sidney differs from Lipsius 
in allowing greater scope for human will; see Justus Lipsius, Two Bookes of 
Constancie, trans. Sir John Stradling (1594), II, vii, 76.  
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passive virtue of Pamela and the less-than virtuous actions of 
Amphialus, Sidney is able to use his familiarity with stoical 
thought to advocate a liberal philosophy that incorporates the 
Philippism of Languet, the rhetoricism of Aristotle and his own 
“stoic pastoral.” 
                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
“THE WEB OF HIS STORY”: 
 NARRATING MISO’S POEM AND MOPSA’S TALE IN 
BOOK 2 OF THE NEW ARCADIA 
 
ALEX DAVIS 
University of St. Andrews  
 
Even more than most stories are, the second book of Sir Philip 
Sidney’s revised “New” Arcadia is a story composed of other 
stories.1 Although it ends in violent scenes dealing with the 
Arcadian rebellion, for the greater part of the book the main line of 
Sidney’s plot is set aside in favour of a rich texture of inset tales 
and reminiscence devoted to bringing the reader up to date with the 
pre-history of the princes Pyrocles and Musidorus. Accounts by 
Musidorus, by Philoclea, by Pamela, Pyrocles and Basilus in turn 
present episodes from the princes’ travels through Asia Minor, and 
much of the pleasure of the narrative comes from the structural 
ingenuity with which each thread is first spun out and then cut off 
as another takes its place, the movement between these different 
strands maintaining suspense and interest whilst they slowly knit 
together and Sidney’s intricately detailed backstory takes its 
gradual shape in the reader’s mind. The tone is courtly, the subject 
matter elevated, and the language, on the whole, elaborately 
ornamental.  
At the very heart of this narrative tapestry, though—at the 
virtual dead centre of book 2—there lies a flaw, or an anomaly; at 
any rate a narrative section wildly dissimilar in character to those 
that surround it. When the Arcadian women and Pyrocles 
(disguised as the Amazon Zelmane) go to bathe in the river Ladon, 
 
1 The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The New Arcadia), ed. Victor Skretkowicz 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1987). Further references appear in the main body of 
the text. This article was originally presented as a paper at the conference on 
“Romance” held in Dr Skretkowicz’s honour at the University of Dundee, October 
2007, and I should like to take this opportunity to record my gratitude for the 
extraordinary scholarship embodied in his edition. My opening sentence is itself an 
adaptation, from John Crowley’s Ægypt (London: Victor Gollancz, 1987), 
“Author’s Note.” 
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the scene seems set for further tale-telling along the lines already 
established, as Philoclea relates the life of the Lydian Queen 
Erona. But she is interrupted—and not, this time, in favour of a 
new courtly voice. Instead, we get two contributions from the 
lower-class women: firstly a diatribe against love offered by the 
uncouth Miso, and then a tale of romance told by Mopsa. These 
two narratives stand alone. They are intimately linked to each 
other, but differ from the other inset tales in book 2 in neither 
picking up previously established narrative threads, nor in having 
theirs so picked up. Their content may echo themes canvassed in 
other sections of the Arcadia, but at the level of plot they are 
utterly isolated from the rest of Sidney’s text. They are shorter 
than, and stylistically distinct from, the graceful, literary tales that 
surround them, just as Mopsa and Miso are understood to be 
socially and morally distinct from their aristocratic charges. 
Finally, and uniquely among Sidney’s inset narratives in this book, 
Mopsa’s story is understood to be fictional within the world of 
Sidney’s fiction, rather than dealing with notionally real events that 
happened to notionally real characters at some time in the past.2 
Both tales and tellers seem to stand as things apart. 
And yet they necessarily cannot exist completely 
independent of the larger verbal texture of which they are a part. 
The question then is: what relationship do these episodes bear to 
the Arcadia as a whole? In one of the few detailed accounts of 
them, Clare Kinney has suggested they may have an interrogatory 
character. “Miso and Mopsa’s parodic fictions,” she writes, 
“subvert the more canonical narratives of desire that frame them, 
and suggest that Sidney’s revisions of his original manuscript have 
engendered within the exfoliating New Arcadia a self-reflexive 
counter-plot.”3 Without taking anything away from Kinney’s 
analysis, my interest here lies in pursuing this question of self-
 
2 See Mary Ellen Lamb, “Old Wives’ Tales, George Peele, and Narrative 
Abjection,” Critical Survey 14:1 (2002): 39.  
3 Clare Kinney, “On the Margins of Romance, at the Heart of the Matter: 
Revisionary Fabulation in Sidney’s New Arcadia,” Journal of Narrative Technique 
21:2 (1991): 143. Other, brief, discussions include: Walter R. Davis, A Map of 
Arcadia: Sidney’s Romance in its Tradition (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1965), 123; Thelma Greenfield, The Eye of Judgement: Reading 
the New Arcadia (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1982), 60; Norman K. 
Farmer, Poetry and the Visual Arts in Renaissance England (Austin: The University 
of Texas, Austin, 1984), 15-16; and Julie A. Eckerle, “Urania’s Example: The 
Female Storyteller in Early Modern Romance,” in Oral Traditions and Gender in 
Early Modern Literary Texts, ed. Mary Ellen Lamb and Karen Bamford (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008): 27; Elizabeth Porges Watson, “Folklore in Arcadia: Mopsa’s ‘Tale 
of the old cut’ re-cut and set,” Sidney Journal 16:2 (1998), 3-15.  
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reflexivity a little further than she does. I will be arguing that 
Miso’s narration and Mopsa’s tale possess a curiously self-
referential force in relation to Sidney’s work, offering the basis for 
a meditation on, and sometimes a model for, the Arcadia’s 
treatment of popular culture; its mediation of issues of class and 
gender; its distinctive narrative style; and its peculiar presentation 
of history. In so doing, I will argue, these episodes also reflect their 
creator’s image back to himself as if in a distorting mirror, in a 
uniquely disobliging and even grotesque form. 
The storytelling at Ladon starts with the tale of Erona, 
which Miso interrupts. Provoked by the youngsters’ incessant 
“tittle-tattling of Cupid,” she decides to tell them “what a good old 
woman told me, what an old wise man told her, what a great 
learned clerk told him, and gave it him in writing”—and which 
she, Miso, in turn has written down in her “prayer book.” It is the 
book that is of particular interest here, as Miso goes on to explain 
how she came by it. She was a girl of twenty-seven, when that 
“good old woman” called her into her house. “I see a number of 
lads love you,” she notes, and so the time has come to warn Miso 
off love: 
 
She brought me into a corner, where there was painted 
a foul fiend, I trow, for he had a pair of horns like a 
bull, his feet cloven, as many eyes upon his body as my 
grey mare hath dapples, and for all the world so placed. 
This monster sat like a hangman on a pair of gallows. In 
his right hand he was painted holding a crown of laurel, 
in his left hand a purse of money; and out of his mouth 
hung a lace, of two fair pictures of a man and a woman; 
and such a countenance he showed, as if he would 
persuade folks by those allurements to come thither and 
be hanged. (211) 
 
This is Cupid. “Therefore,” the old woman warns, “do what thou 
list with all those fellows, one after another … But, upon my 
charge, never love none of them.” The young Miso is incredulous: 
“Could such a thing come from the belly of fair Venus?” Maybe 
not; but the world is mistaken about Love’s parentage. In fact, “his 
mother was a cow, and the false Argus his father,” and the old 
woman has a book to prove it: the prayer-book. And this time we 
get what seems to be a slightly different account of its provenance: 
“a great maker of ballets had given [it] to an old painter, who (for a 
little pleasure) had bestowed both book and picture on her”—that 
is, on the old woman, who then hands the book on to Miso (211). 
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The book itself offers verses in dispraise of Cupid, beginning 
“Poor Painters oft with silly poets join / To fill the world with 
strange but vain conceits” (212). Poets and painters represent 
Cupid as “A naked god, young, blind, with arrows two,” but in fact 
he is the son of Argus and Io: 
 
… an old false knave he is, 
 By Argus got on Io, then a cow: 
 What time, for her, Juno her Jove did miss, 
 And charge of her to Argus did allow. 
  Mercury killed his false sire for this act, 
  His dam, a beast, was pardoned beastly fact. 
 
Furthermore, he doesn’t look anything like the artists 
imagine:   
   
Yet bears he still his parents’ stately gifts, 
 A horned head, cloven feet, and thousand eyes, 
  Some gazing still, some winking wily shifts, 
  With long large ears, where never rumour dies. 
  His horned head doth seem the heav’n to spite: 
  His cloven foot doth never tread aright.  (212) 
 
The poem therefore offers essentially the same picture as that 
displayed in the corner of the old woman’s house.4  
This is a slightly confusing episode even when not being 
abridged for summary, mainly because everything it in appears 
twice. One might note in particular the complicated account of the 
provenance of the “prayer-book.” Has the text it contains been 
bequeathed from a great clerk to a wise old man, and from the wise 
old man to a “good” old woman, and from that good old woman to 
the arguably rather less good Miso; or was the book passed from 
the ballad maker to the painter and from the painter to the old 
woman? When we get Miso’s poem itself, it may be something of 
a surprise to discover that it has survived uncontaminated by the 
chain of multiple and ambiguous transmissions that landed it in her 
care. Given its elegant and finished quality, it may look far more 
like the product of a “great learned clerk” than of a “great maker of 
ballads,” although the chapter heading in the 1590 edition of the 
Arcadia, in which it first appeared, refers to “Miso. Her old-wiues 
 
4 This is a poem relocated from the Old Arcadia. See The Countess of Pembroke’s 
Arcadia (The Old Arcadia), ed. Jean Robertson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 
65-6. 
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tale, and ballad against Cupid.”5 The episode certainly displays an 
ambivalence reminiscent of other examples from the tradition of 
invoking “old wives’ tales” in early modern literature.6 But the 
dual character ascribed to the poem, compounded by the ambiguity 
about its history of ownership, serves to alert us to the larger point. 
This is an episode structured on a principle of almost obsessive 
internal repetition. We get the conjunction of painters and poets, 
twice: first the ballad-maker who bequeaths the book to the 
painter, and then the opening line of the poem within that book, 
“Poor Painters oft with silly poets join.” We get the pictorial 
description of Love, twice, first in the painting and then in the 
poem.  Even within the poem there are two descriptions of Love— 
first the inconographers’ version, and then the “real” one. And we 
get the account of the poem’s derivation, twice.  
But this is also an account that is threaded through with 
nagging, fractional differences, as with the poem’s multiple 
provenances. Although the episode seems to be organised in terms 
of a structure of repetition or reduplication, the copies it contains 
are not always perfect ones: one Love is not like another; this 
account of where the poem came from differs from that one; and so 
on. It is noticeable that the characteristic mode of thought in this 
narrative is, whether literally or analogically, genealogical; we read 
of Love’s ancestry, of the provenance of the book, of old and 
young women. We might therefore plausibly account for the 
episode’s repetitions-with-difference in terms of an idea of 
corruption, or that of the signal that decays over time. But, again, 
the genealogies invoked here are rarely totally straightforward or 
linear. Instead, what we have is often a doubling of temporalities, 
one folded over the other to slightly uncanny effect. We get two 
admonitory old women, the one telling the story and the one within 
it. We have the young woman in the story and the young women 
listening to it; also the old woman telling the story and the old 
women her audience will one day be: as Miso warns the 
princesses, “whatsoever you think of me, you will one day be as I 
am” (210). And, finally, there is the doubling of the then-young 
Miso onto her now-young and as-yet enthusiastic-for-love 
daughter, Mopsa, whose tale follows, and in which the themes of 
Miso’s narrative reappear in modified form. 
Following Miso’s intervention, Zelmane actually attempts 
to return to the earlier account of Erona. However, it has been 
 
5 The Covntess of Pembrokes Arcadia (London: William Ponsonbie, 1590), Y2v.  
6 Mary Ellen Lamb, The Popular Culture of Shakespeare, Spenser, and Jonson 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 45-62. 
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decided that the group should draw lots for the privilege of telling 
the next story. Mopsa wins, and begins without further ado: 
 
“In time past,” said she, “there was a king (the 
mightiest man in all his country), that had by his wife 
the fairest daughter that ever did eat pap. Now this 
king did keep a great house, that everybody might 
come and take their meat freely. So, one day, as his 
daughter was sitting in her window playing upon a 
harp, as sweet as any rose, and combing her head 
with a comb all of precious stones, there came in a 
knight into the court upon a goodly horse—one, hair 
of gold; and the other, of silver. And so, the knight, 
casting up his eyes to the window, did fall into such 
love with her that he grew not worth the bread he eat; 
till many a sorry day going over his head, with daily 
diligence and grisly groans he won her affection, so 
that they agreed to run away together. And so, in 
May, when all true hearts rejoice, they stale out of the 
castle without staying so much as for their breakfast. 
Now, forsooth, as they went together, often all to-
kissing one another, the knight told her he was 
brought up among the water-nymphs, who had so 
bewitched him that if he were ever asked his name he 
must presently vanish away; and therefore charged 
her upon his blessing that she never ask him what he 
was, nor whether he would. And so, a great while she 
kept his commandment; till once, passing through a 
cruel wilderness, as dark as pitch, her mouth so 
watered that she could not choose but ask him the 
question. And then he, making the grievousest 
complaints (that would have melted a tree to have 
heard them), vanished quite away; and she lay down, 
casting forth as pitiful cries as any scritch-owl. But 
having lain so, wet by the rain and burned by the sun, 
five days and five nights, she gat up and went over 
many a high hill and many a deep river, till she came 
to an aunt’s house of hers, and came and cried to her 
for help. And she, for pity, gave her a nut, and bade 
her never open her nut till she was come to the 
extremest misery that ever tongue could speak of. 
And so, she went, and she went, and never rested the 
evening where she went in the morning, till she came 
to a second aunt. And she gave her another nut.” 
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“Now good Mopsa,” said the sweet Philoclea, “I 
pray thee, at my request, keep this tale till my 
marriage-day, and I promise thee that the best gown I 
wear that day shall be thine.”7 (214) 
 
Perhaps the most immediately obvious aspect of Sidney’s 
presentation of this tale is its class prejudice. Mopsa condemns 
herself out of her own mouth, just as she always does in Sidney’s 
fiction. It is not just the occasional verbal redundancies (“there 
came in a knight into the court”); nor the contamination of her 
narrative with traces of an orality that Sidney generally took pains 
to erase from his rather more mannered writing (“now, forsooth”); 
nor even the vulgar atmosphere she manages to conjure up even 
whilst trying to be classy (talking about knights and gold and 
silver, but also about nuts and pap). Most fatal of all for Mopsa is 
the way in which she constantly manages to reduce her tale to the 
most basely appetitive of terms. Mopsa is possessed of the most 
compulsively gustatory sensibility of any of Sidney’s characters. 
For her there can be no more forceful expression of urgency than 
to say that her protagonists stole out “without staying for 
breakfast.” And the heroine’s curiosity? “Her mouth so watered 
that she could not choose but ask him the question.” This is not, it 
seems fair to say, a sentence that Sidney would ever have written 
about Pamela or Philoclea, or have permitted them to speak, ironic 
narrator though he may very well otherwise have been. At a 
slightly more indirect level, the seeds that conclude Mopsa’s tale 
further serve to underline the difference separating her narration 
from that of her creator. They conjure up a vision of temporality 
without causality, of a crassly aggregative fictive style that is 
utterly at odds with the much more involved poetics that govern 
the rest of Sidney’s fiction: first one nut, and then another, and 
another still … potentially ad infinitum.8 In the rest of the Arcadia, 
by way of contrast, it seems far more characteristic that we should 
be plunged into a situation in medias res, and only subsequently 
unravel the antecedent events that led up to it. The device—which 
governs the whole of book 2—seems designed to saturate the 
narrative with causality and connection, and it seems likely that 
 
7 In Anna Weamys’s continuation, Mopsa claims her gown, and finishes her tale 
(although she is again interrupted): A Continuation of Sir Philip Sidney’s 
“Arcadia,” ed. Patrick Colborn Cullen (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 166-9 (reprint edition). 
8 The phrase “temporality without causality” is from Lorna Hutson’s response to the 
original paper, with thanks. 
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Sidney would have regarded a plot that relied extensively on mere 
accident as inartistic.9 Mopsa, then, is an anti-Sidney: coarse 
where he is refined, oral where he is literary, naïve where he is 
artful, and female where he is male. This, plainly, is the most 
straightforward reading of her narration. The rest of this paper will 
be devoted to exploring the reasons why one might want to 
supplement it with a diametrically opposed account of how Miso 
and Mopsa’s contributions interact with Sidney’s text
The first fact that might suggest that there is more to 
Mopsa’s tale than meets the eye is its resemblance to a narrative of 
Cupid and Psyche: the young woman in love with a man with 
supernatural connections (the water-nymphs), who violates the 
prohibition he lays upon her and who must subsequently seek him 
out, encountering various assistants along the way. If we were in 
any doubt about the true nature of Mopsa’s story, the context might 
have alerted us. It appears within a series of other inset narratives, 
all with the same theme. Before Miso’s poem about Love, 
Philoclea had been telling the company that Erona’s troubles began 
when she rashly decided to “pull down and deface” (205) all the 
images of Cupid in Lydia. Mopsa’s is yet another such story, even 
if it is not openly identified as such.  
The tale of Cupid and Psyche is a classical one. It appears 
as—again—an inset narrative in Apuleius’ Latin novel The Golden 
Ass or Metamorphoses, composed some time in the second century 
AD and translated into English by William Adlington in 1566. 
Sidney refers to the text in his Apology for Poetry.10 There were 
 
9 Compare the account of Heliodorus and the Renaissance appreciation of the artful 
“disposition” of his narrative in Terence Cave, Recognitions: A Study in Poetics 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1998), 16-17. The ancient novel may have offered 
Sidney a narrative technology or repertoire of devices that emphasized the 
“causeful” nature of things. A classic example would be the shipwreck that opens 
Heliodorus’ Aethiopica, and one might wonder to what extent it represents a sly 
joke that this key motif should itself represent an apparent accident. The motif has 
been extensively discussed by Steve Mentz in Romance for Sale in Early Modern 
England: The Rise of Prose Fiction (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), but on the whole 
not in these terms. In his paper at the “Romance” conference, it was intriguing that 
Julian Lethbridge (“Discover the Secret”) should argue that the Arcadia was not 
romance, precisely because the events it depicted were relatively lacking in the 
arbitrary or mysterious quality characteristic of many medieval chivalric tales—and 
also that Tiffany Alkan (“‘What Happened to Pyrocles’ Magic Sword?’ The 
Reformation of Romance in Sidney’s The New Arcadia”) should read Mopsa’s nuts 
as the magical motifs of medieval romance that Sidney was proposing not to crack 
open in the course of his narrative. 
10 Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, ed. R.W. Maslen (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2002), 112. The tale of Cupid and Psyche also receives 
discussions in authorities such as Boccaccio and Frontinus: the tale was both 
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also folktale variants of the narrative, discussed by Elizabeth 
Porges Watson, that seem clearly relevant to his relocation of the 
narrative within a popular cultural context.11 I think it is the case 
though that we as readers are meant to perceive Mopsa’s tale as 
classical in origin, however subsequently distorted and 
transformed. When Cupid appears in monstrous form in Miso’s 
poem, we are perhaps being offered a modified reprise of the 
description of Psyche’s future husband in Apuleius as “A fierce 
barbaric, snake-like monster.”12 If valid, the allusion would seem 
to underline the fact that the two narratives function as companion 
pieces, as well as suggesting the relevance of the classical context 
to the Mopsa’s tale. And yet, Mopsa’s treatment of the story is not 
classicising. What we get instead is ancient material filtered 
through the narrative modes and linguistic mannerisms of later 
time periods. Mopsa’s tale is not just socially anomalous, when set 
against the courtly narratives that frame it; it is chronologically 
anomalous, when the matter of the tale is set against the manner of 
its telling. Our hero is described as a “knight” on horseback; he has 
been brought up by the fairies (or rather, the “water-nymphs”—a 
rare moment in which the diction swims against the prevailing 
chronological current, towards the ancient world); the heroine 
plays a harp; her father owns a castle and acts like a feudal lord, 
keeping an open house. We might also note the emphasis on the 
month of May, the Chaucerian context of storytelling in a group, 
and the Sir Thopas-like interruption of the romance narrative. In 
short, Mopsa’s tale seems less classical than medieval. Indeed, 
Katherine Duncan-Jones has suggested that some of its details may 
be even more up-to-date than that, since when Mopsa’s knight 
 
popular and much-discussed—see Malcolm Bull, The Mirror of the Gods: Classical 
Mythology in Renaissance Art (London: Allen Lane, 2005). Robert H.F. Carver, 
“’Sugared Invention’ or ‘Mongrel tragic-Comedy’: Sir Philip Sidney and the 
Ancient Novel,” Groningen Colloquia on the Novel 8 (1997), 197-226 argues that 
Apuleius’ influence on Sidney has been underestimated; since he also sees this 
influence as predominating in the Old Arcadia, with the New Arcadia being a 
revision modelled on Heliodorus’ Aethiopica, his argument is not entirely congruent 
with that set out here. 
11 Elizabeth Porges Watson, “Folklore in Arcadia,” 3-15. 
12 Apuleius, The Golden Ass, trans. P.G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 78. See also the description of the husband on pp. 89-90. I am indebted to 
Elizabeth Porges Watson for the suggestion of Apuleian influence in Miso’s 
narrative. It may or may not be relevant that Hugh Sanford’s address “To the 
Reader,” to be found in the 1593 composite Arcadia, alludes to Apuleius by way of 
attacking those dissatisfied with the text: “they are roses, not flowers, must do them 
good” (The New Arcadia, lxi). Apuleius’ protagonist Lucius was transformed into 
an ass and could only regain his human form by eating roses. 
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woos his lady with “daily diligence” he does so borrowing a phrase 
from a volume of George Turberville’s verse published in 1567, 
and dedicated to Sidney’s aunt.13 Read carefully, then, Mopsa’s 
tale reveals itself to have been composed in accordance with a 
principle of stratification. It is made up of layers: the classical 
base, however dimly perceived; then the medieval; and finally the 
relatively recent, although Turberville’s style had itself been 
rendered a thing of the past by poetic innovators like Sidney 
himself. It is a scene written in triplicate, at the very least. We can 
also see that these different strata are interleaved with zones of 
distortion, since the tale also presents us with two types of 
culturally elite material, the Latin novel and the medieval courtly 
romance, reconfigured within an idiom that is popular and folktale-
like. Like Lucius himself in Apuleius, the classical narrative has 
been assishly transformed.  
Yet one might also begin to see the sense in which 
outright hostility—to the female, to the lower-class and the 
popular—is only half the story here. We are familiar with the idea 
that the romance form might have had particularly feminine 
associations for Sidney. Helen Hackett writes of “the effeminacy 
of his narrative persona, and the fact that this is not necessarily 
resented or regarded as shameful.”14 We are also familiar with the 
notion that Sidney enjoys introducing semi-concealed author-
surrogates into his work. Still, it may require some effort to see 
Mopsa as belonging in the company of a Philisides, or even of an 
Astrophil. On the face of things, as we have seen, the very opposite 
seems to be the case. Nevertheless, for the time it takes her to tell 
her version of the myth of Cupid and Psyche at least, she has as 
much in common with her creator as any of his elite narrators. The 
connection lies in the mingling of temporally disparate materials 
discussed above; in the way both Sidney’s tale and the tale within 
 
13 Katherine Duncan-Jones, Sir Philip Sidney: Courtier Poet (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1991), 12, and George Turberville, Epitaphs, Epigrams, Songs and 
Sonets (London: Henry Denham, 1567), “To his Friende: P: of Courting, Trauailing, 
Dysing, and Tenys,” F8v. 
14 Helen Hackett, Women and Romance Fiction in the English Renaissance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 111. Even though the overt 
references to an audience of “ladies” that proliferate through the Old Arcadia are 
removed in Sidney’s revision of the text, one might still feel that his narrative is 
thoroughly implicated in the widely-understood, if often paradoxical, ascription of 
femininity of the romance genre—on which, see Hackett’s ‘“Yet Tell Me Some 
Such Fiction’: Lady Mary Wroth’s Urania and the ‘Femininity’ of Romance,” in 
Women, Texts and Histories, 1575-1760, ed. Clare Brant and Diane Purkiss 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 39-68. 
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it arrange their literary borrowings in order to produce certain 
textual effects.  
Almost every introduction to the Arcadia pauses to 
discuss the heterogeneous nature of Sidney’s source material. The 
critical trope was well established even in the sixteenth century, 
when John Hoskins commented on Sidney’s reading: “For the web, 
as it were, of his story, he followed three: Heliodorus in Greek, 
Sannazarius’ Arcadia in Italian and Diana [by] de Montemayor in 
Spanish.”15  Hoskins was calling attention to the textual—or, as we 
would say, intertextual—character of Sidney’s fiction, the fact that 
it is composed out of discrete strands woven together into a whole. 
In combination with the peculiar character of Miso’s preceding 
account, Mopsa’s tale suggests something about the arrangement 
of these threads, throwing light on the aesthetics of the text 
generally. Specifically, the chronological and genealogical themes 
of the mother’s narrative resonate with the peculiar chronological 
structuring of the daughter’s, in a way that suggests that the latter 
is entirely deliberate. The two accounts seem thematically 
continuous. The seeds that conclude Mopsa’s tale, for instance, 
introduce temporal motifs about genealogy, inheritance, and the 
passing of something on from old woman to young, that tie her 
account in with her mother’s, and permit the distinctive themes of 
the two to mingle productively. Mopsa’s tale declares that the 
Arcadia is the product of diverse elements woven together—as 
stylistically various, indeed, as Apuleius’ Golden Ass itself; Miso’s 
poem suggests that these elements are understood to be 
coordinated, in however ambiguous a way, chronologically. 
Mopsa’s tale descends to us from the classical world via a chain of 
intermediate steps, just like her mother’s prayer-book: from the 
Latin novel to the medieval romance, and from the medieval 
romance to the earlier Tudor. And the overlayerings, the uncanny 
chronological simultaneities, that characterise the earlier episode 
are particularly pertinent here, because when we get to Mopsa’s 
tale, we do not get the classical followed by the medieval and then 
the Tudor, in sequence. Instead hers is a narrative that presents 
chronologically distinct elements all at once, rather than in an 
orderly succession. It displays a disorienting historical 
simultaneity, in which the narrative techniques and literary idioms 
of different eras mingle promiscuously; but the point perhaps is 
that we are supposed to allocate to each their proper chronological 
 
15 John Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style, ed. Hoyt H. Hudson (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1935), 41. 
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provenance, even whilst we appreciate the juxtapositions created 
by their peculiar mode of presentation.  
We may be getting, therefore, an “inset” insight into the 
peculiar temporal structuring of the Arcadia as a whole. The 
Arcadia is set in the past, in classical Greece, and in that entirely 
minimal and neutral sense, it is therefore a historical fiction. At the 
same time, though, we might be cautious about any more 
substantial claim of this kind, because the classical Greece of the 
Arcadia doesn’t look anything very much like classical Greece as 
we understand it. A lot of the time, in fact, it looks suspiciously 
similar to Elizabethan England. This is an ancient Greece in which 
people seem to sleep in four-poster beds and travel round in 
coaches (142, 151). Nor is the Arcadia a historical fiction 
substantially influenced by a sense of the history of manners. With 
due allowance made for the exaggerations and intensities proper to 
the kind of hyper-intellectual but also perhaps rather sensational 
fictional narrative that is the Arcadia, and with the important 
exception of their paganism, Sidney’s ancient Greeks seem to 
behave—to converse and to reason and to woo one another—very 
much like men and women of the late sixteenth century. We do not 
find in the Arcadia that focus on local colour and aspiration 
towards authenticity that defines the modern historical novel; quite 
the contrary. And yet the text can never, quite, be assimilated to a 
pure contemporaneity. As an example of just how mixed the 
signals it sends can be, one might consider the question of 
clothing: one of the most obvious ways of seizing upon a sense of 
the difference of the past, but one where one might almost suspect 
Sidney of deliberately setting out to muddy the issue. When 
Pyrocles first disguises himself as Zelmane, we are treated to a 
long description of his new costume, including the detail that he 
wears “crimson velvet buskins, in some places open (as the ancient 
manner was) to show the fairness of the skin” (68-9). This 
approaches the sort of thing we might expect of a fiction set in 
ancient Greece. Elsewhere, though, Philoclea is described dressed 
in “a light taffeta garment, so cut as the wrought smock came 
through it in many places” (84), which sounds rather more like 
sixteenth-century dress; whilst Artesia’s maids wear “petticoats” 
(314). And at the conclusion of the narrative as Sidney originally 
conceived it—and as readers after 1593 would have consumed it—
Pyrocles attends his trial clothed, again, “after the Greek manner,” 
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but with his neck “not so much hidden with a ruff,” clearly 
implying that its absence is exceptional.16  
 This, then, is not so much narrative detail in “the ancient 
manner,” as it is the antique blended with the modern, with the 
fashions of later periods, just as in Mopsa’s tale. Of course, effects 
of this sort are scarcely unique to Sidney. On the contrary, they 
seem rather characteristic of English literary culture of the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. One immediately thinks 
of Shakespeare’s “doublet and toga” versions of the ancient world, 
in which the conspirators against Caesar disperse as the clock 
strikes three (2.1.193); Cleopatra plays at billiards (2.5.3); and the 
Gothic armies approach Rome via a “ruinous monastery” 
(5.1.21).17 The problem in attempting to assess such moments is 
that the inadvertent historical error looks identical, formally 
speaking, to the consciously deployed and entirely deliberate 
anachronism. One is obliged, then, to make a judgement from 
context. The value of Miso and Mopsa’s narratives is precisely to 
assist in this process. With their self-reflexive, inset character, they 
are parts that resemble, albeit in peculiar and twisted ways, the 
whole of which they are a part. Their analogical force is such as to 
suggest that anachronism may be a quite conscious part of 
Sidney’s aesthetic programme. Both the subsection and the work 
as a whole display a disorienting historical simultaneity, in which 
the narrative techniques and literary idioms and even (in the latter 
case) sartorial details of different eras mingle promiscuously. 
Understood properly, however, we might suspect that we are 
actually meant to be discriminating between these different 
phenomena and allocating to each of them their proper 
chronological provenance. It is one thing to produce a mess— 
historically distinct materials mixed together because one lacks the 
acumen to distinguish between them—and it is another thing to 
place these discontinuous materials side by side because their 
juxtaposition can produce a distinctive kind of aesthetic pleasure. 
But it is another thing still deliberately to place them side-by-side 
in the hope that part of that pleasure will come from the clash and 
 
16 See Robertson, ed. (1973), 376. When Pyrocles first disguises himself as 
Cleophilia in the Old Arcadia, we get a comment on his hair, “which the young men 
of Greece ware very long, accounting them most beautiful that had that in fairest 
quantity” (26). The detail might be primarily geographical (thus in Greece, as not in 
England), but when Sidney revised his text, he clarified the emphasis. When 
Pyrocles is first introduced in the New Arcadia, we read of “his hair, which the 
young men of Greece used to wear very long” (8, my italics). 
17 All references are to The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al (New 
York and London: W.W. Norton, 1997).  
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interplay of distinct historical idioms understood as such.18 For all 
its vigorous stylistic bricolage, the effect of Mopsa’s tale is 
actually to sharpen, rather than dissolve, our sense of period.19 
Generalising from the individual case, we might say that the 
Arcadia is paradoxically all the more historical for its 
anachronistic derangement and apparent neglect of historical 
sequence. Although it scarcely resembles a modern historical 
novel, therefore, it is nonetheless in an important sense a historical 
fiction, in that its juxtaposition of chronologically distinct literary 
effects seems to be a deliberate writerly effect.  
To read these episodes correctly would therefore be to see 
through their veneer of rustic idiocy and to understand how similar 
they are to Sidney’s narrative as a whole. Mopsa’s constant 
attendance on Pamela obliges Musidorus to take an indirect 
approach to wooing the princess. Correspondingly, her presence 
here may offer her creator the opportunity for some equally 
oblique self-presentation.20 Surprising though it may seem on the 
face of things, when Sidney writes the Arcadia, he behaves exactly 
like Mopsa when she relates the tale of Cupid and Psyche. Their 
literary principles are the same even as their performances are 
diametrically opposed, and however much the text might seem to 
want the very opposite, here as least it finds itself mired in, and 
unable completely to distinguish itself from, the popular, the 
feminine, the foolish.21 The inset character of the episodes gives 
them a self-referential, even hermeneutic, force, that in itself tells 
us something about the artfulness of the Arcadia’s design. Rather 
than spooling out into a pattern of resemblance and counterpoint in 
the fashion of the interlaced medieval romances that were one of 
 
18 Compare the account of Sidney’s anachronisms in Constance C. Relihan, 
Cosmographical Glasses: Geographic Discourse, Gender and Elizabethan Fiction 
(Kent and London: Kent State University Press, 2004), 45-68. 
19 The example of Samuel Wolff is telling. Wolff fails to identify the story as that of 
Cupid and Psyche, and as a result absolutely consistently describes the tale as 
medieval: Mopsa, he writes, tells “a clumsy fairy tale”; it is a “mediaeval” narrative; 
he compares its conclusion to the Host’s breaking into Chaucer’s tale of Sir Topas. 
As for Miso’s description of Love: “of course, this kind of thing is wholly 
mediaeval, not even touched by the Renaissance.” Greek Romances in Elizabethan 
Prose Fiction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1912), 265, 332-3, 337. 
20 Derek Alwes, Sons and Authors in Elizabethan England (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 2004), 98 takes Mopsa to be paradigmatic of the “incompetent 
audience” and therefore a device that establishes the Arcadia’s potential for indirect 
significance.  
21 Compare Porges Watson, “Folklore in Arcadia,” 5 on how Mopsa’s tale 
exemplifies an “interplay of association between vernacular and literary versions” 
of the narrative. 
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Sidney’s many models,22 the narrative can be seen drawing itself 
into a far tighter weave of analogy, of carefully contrived 
duplications, nested stories and frames within frames that 
constantly threaten to collapse in upon themselves and distort the 
text’s meticulously-established hierarchies of difference. Jeff 
Dolven has recently suggested that there is something methodically 
controlled about the New Arcadia’s self-organisation (its 
multifarious surface variety notwithstanding).23 I am suggesting a 
similar deep structure here, although I cannot agree with Dolven 
that it implies a reduction in the text’s complexity; quite the 
contrary. What we have here is a process of compression and 
doubling so extreme as to blur together, even if only temporarily, 
the images of Sir Philip Sidney, courtier, and Mopsa the ignorant 
peasant. Sidney chooses to have his own literary practice reflected 
back to him through the inanities of an uneducated countrywoman 
and her mother. All the differences that constitute historical change 
are mockingly reproduced as incessant fractional displacement, 
uncertainty, or inaccuracy; all its continuities summed up in the 
ghastly repetition: like mother, like daughter. The effect is playful, 
but also ambivalent—even rather scathingly self-disgusted: a self-
effeminization too far, perhaps. Once again one ends up reflecting 
that when Sidney called the Arcadia a “toyful” book, there was a 
part of him that meant more by the phrase than just routine courtly 
self-deprecation.24 These are episodes that proffer to us the ghostly 
outline of a Philip Sidney twisting, semi-humorously, in abjection, 
as he weaves for himself a phantasmagoria of his own lower-class 
femininity.  
There is one final point to draw out here. As we have 
seen, the history produced by this overlayering of Sidney’s 
authorial personae is itself a thing of simultaneities, of distinct time 
frames invoked all at once. But if Mopsa’s tale of Cupid and 
Psyche represents the product of a highly evolved historical 
consciousness—and I have argued that it does—what that 
consciousness is processing is not at all the sort of history one 
finds in history books. What we get is not a history of actual 
events, of real historical personages and their actions and their 
 
22 See Eugène Vinaver, The Rise of Romance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971),  68-
98. 
23 Jeff Dolven, Scenes of Instruction in Renaissance Romance (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), 173-205. 
24 The classic account here is Katherine Duncan-Jones, “Philip Sidney’s Toys” in 
Sir Philip Sidney: An Anthology of Modern Criticism, ed. Dennis Kay (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1987), 61-80. 
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suffering, however difficult or impossible that might be truly to 
apprehend in any final reckoning. These are all sidelined in favour 
of the activities of Sidney’s fictional personages, who in a sense 
feature, as I have suggested, as a gallery of proxies, projection 
spaces for the author and his readers. Sidney is not particularly 
interested here in life as it was lived in the past.25 The people, the 
events: these are excluded. But the slow unfurling of different 
narrative habits, linguistic forms and modes of expression that 
those people and events elaborated as they successively passed into 
non-existence: these are what the text concerns itself with. The 
Arcadia is the product of a historical vision that perceives the past 
primarily in terms of a history of styles, of textual effects, and it is 
in this maybe rather specialised sense that Sidney stands as one of 
the sixteenth century’s premier cultural historians.26  
 
25 It is notable that, although we can be sure that the Arcadia is set in the ancient 
world, it is impossible to be much more specific than that. So although we read that 
Macedonia is a kingdom “which in elder time had such a sovereignty over all the 
provinces of Greece that even particular kings therein did acknowledge” (159), 
possibly suggesting a time after the reign of Alexander the Great; the precise 
temporal setting is always left carefully vague.  
26 For a contemporary parallel, see Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London and New York: Verso, 1991): an 
insistent “pastness,” finding its expression in repeated attempts to connect the past 
and the present, accompanied by a tendency to focus in on only the most superficial 
aspects of that past; stylistic pastiche that is, arguably, unanchored in a 
comprehensive vision of history; and so forth. 
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I 
Mary Wroth was frequently the focus of praise in highly 
commendatory verses, perhaps most famously in Ben Jonson’s 
homage to her sonnets, “in your verse all Cupid’s armory.” It 
comes, therefore, as somewhat of a surprise to find her included by 
William Browne in the “Vale of Woe” sequence of his Britannia’s 
Pastorals (1613).1 The Vale occupies an ambivalent space that 
expands to encompass an array of different figures including 
pastoral characters from the main narrative, mythological figures, 
and individuals from Browne’s own era and the near-past. Hence, 
Aletheia, a fictional shepherdess, may enter the Vale of Woe where 
she meets the nymph Idya, who symbolises England and who 
mourns the death, in 1612, of the real Prince Henry, who is, in 
turn, compared to “our Heroë (honour’d ESSEX) ... [who] ‘dy’d’” 
in 1601. The deceased Earl of Essex is also figured as the “great 
man” who sits besides the “learnedst Maide,” a character who may 
be identified as Wroth through the poem’s reference to “an 
Anagram … Worth.”2  The common element that allows Browne 
 
1 Ben Jonson, “XXVIII A Sonnet, to the Nobel Lady, Lady Mary Wroth,” in Ben 
Jonson. The Complete Poems, ed. George Parfitt (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1975), 165. William Browne, Britannia’s Pastorals. A Scolar Press Facsimile 
(London: the Scolar Press, Ltd., 1969), 78-96. 
2 Browne, Britannia’s Pastorals, 92, 80, 82.  All further citations to this work will 
be taken from this edition and indicated parenthetically within the text. David 
Norbrook, Panegyric of the Monarch and Its Social Context under Elizabeth I and 
James I (D. Phil Oxford, 1978), 268 has identified this character as Arbella Stuart  
but, given the reference to anagram and the common anagrammatic use of her 
name—Worth—Browne must refer to Mary Wroth. For my argument that the 
character is Wroth see Marion Wynne-Davies, Women Writers and Familial 
Discourse in the English Renaissance (London: Palgrave, 2007), 98-103.  
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to hold together—albeit tenuously—these disparate characters is 
the political discourse of English Protestantism coupled with 
nostalgia for the Elizabethan age. As such, the poet is able to 
rewrite Essex’s disgrace and execution as Elizabeth I’s accidental 
wounding of the Earl’s “vndaunted heart,” and to situate him 
alongside Prince Henry, who died eleven years later, and Mary 
Wroth who was still very much alive (82). Browne traces a 
diachronic line of militant English Protestantism from Elizabeth 
and Essex to the resurrection of Elizabethan policy offered by 
Prince Henry, and bolsters this through a parallel familial 
investment by the Sidney/Herberts, which is represented in the 
poem via the dedication of the poem to William Herbert. This 
unwieldy combination of myth, fiction, history and contemporary 
political allegory is a commonplace of early modern pastoral and, 
together with Browne’s dependence upon the patronage of William 
Herbert, serves to explain the often tortuous conjunctions 
employed in the poem. However, what is particularly interesting 
about Wroth’s inclusion is that she appears in a space characterised 
by its lifelessness. In addition to Essex’s presence, the Vale of 
Woe is described in death-like terms; it is “husht and silent as the 
mid of night,” a “shady, sad, and solitarie ground” and there are no 
signs of “man nor beast” (78, 80). Mary Wroth is positioned at the 
intersection between life and death: through an interpretation of the 
anagram and, therefore, the contemporary allegory, she is 
associated with an existent reality, whereas through the fictional 
character of the “learnedst maid” she is transposed into a twilight 
world of death and mourning. Wroth’s occupancy of this liminal 
space acts within Browne’s poem as a means of uniting diverse 
elements of the political discourse, but for Wroth the role of the 
liminal woman has intriguing and far-reaching implications.   
 There can be no question that Wroth would have known 
of Britannia’s Pastorals, and her interest in the pastoral genre 
suggests that she would have read and interpreted the poem. This 
essay does not argue, however, for explicit influence; rather, it sets 
out to explore the way in which Wroth reworked the idea of the 
liminal woman through the representation of female characters 
who must appear to be simultaneously living and deceased. I focus 
on Wroth’s pastoral tragicomedy, Love’s Victory, with its 
provocative recovery sequence, in which the corpses of the two 
main characters, Musella and her lover Philisses, occupy a central 
space during the final scene of the play, before being miraculously 
revived. In order to evaluate the radical nature of this occurrence, 
the essay initially compares the play with earlier pastoral 
tragicomedies as well as with examples of the death recovery trope 
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in Wroth’s prose romance, Countess of Montgomery’s Urania. The 
next section explores the ways in which personal, familial and 
political allegory might be a means by which to excavate possible 
interpretations of this complex sequence. The concluding section 
focuses upon the way in which gender politics might provide an 
underlying thematic unity to the various allegorical significations, 
although the essay ends by questioning the possibility of locating 
any stable readings within a world that incorporates liminal 
identities.  
 
II 
Love’s Victory is classed as a pastoral tragicomedy; its characters 
are shepherds and shepherdesses, the main theme is love, and the 
play’s conclusion turns the tragic fate of the two main protagonists, 
Musella and Philisses, into comic resolution via a miraculous 
recovery from death. There are two versions of the play: the 
Penshurst Manuscript which is generally deemed to represent the 
full text, and the Huntington Manuscript which is often considered 
incomplete in that it omits material from the beginning and end of 
the play. Significantly, the Huntington Manuscript concludes at the 
point Musella and Philisses decide to commit suicide, containing 
neither their deaths by poison, nor the miraculous recovery. Here I 
will concentrate primarily on the material found in the Penshurst 
Manuscript; however, I wish to return at the end of this essay to the 
compelling question of the “unfinished” nature of the Huntington 
version.  
Although Musella and Philisses love one another, 
Musella’s mother, in accordance with her husband’s will, has 
arranged for Musella to marry the boorish but wealthy Rustic. In 
order to avoid this fate, the two lovers agree to commit suicide, an 
act that will be witnessed by their friend, the shepherdess Simeana. 
Towards the end of Act V they approach the Temple of Love 
addressing Venus and Cupid in verse; Philisses promises Venus, 
 
  Hers [Musella’s] I lived, hers now I die, 
  Crowned with fame’s eternity. 
  Thus your [Venus’] force shall glory have 
  By Philisses’ loving grave.3 
 
 
3 Mary Wroth, Love’s Victory, V.iv.19-22, in Renaissance Drama by Women: Texts 
and Documents, ed. S.P.Cerasano and Marion Wynne-Davies (London: Routledge, 
1996), 90-126. All subsequent quotations from the play are taken from this edition 
and references made parenthetically.  
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Correspondingly, Musella predicts, 
 
  Earth too mean for such a truth, 
  Shall in death have lasting youth; 
  No decay, no strife, no fate, 
  Shall disturb that ‘during state.  (V.iv. 27-30) 
   
But, just as Musella prepares to kill herself with a knife, the 
Amazonian shepherdess Silvesta intercedes and suggests that, 
rather than allowing their “hands [to] be spotted with … blood,” 
they drink a “sweet potion” that will offer an easier death (V.iv. 
59, 61). The lovers agree, drink the poisoned potion, die, and are 
placed on the Temple’s altar. Meeting with the other pastoral 
figures (including Rustic) Simeana describes how the lovers have 
“for a wedding-bed a tomb obtained,” and Silvesta confesses to the 
crime of providing the poison that “made their souls to meet, / 
Which in their clayey cages could not,” ordering the assembled 
shepherds and shepherdesses to “lay / This love-killed couple in 
their biding clay” (V.v.52, 91-2, 97-8). The deaths of Musella and 
Philisses have a number of narrative outcomes: her mother repents; 
Rustic relinquishes the marriage contract; and Silvesta is 
condemned to be burned, martyr-like, on a pyre, since “Death she 
procured, and for death, life shall give” (V. vii. 19). The group 
performs a requiem-like poem, in which they contrast mutable 
bodily passion with eternal spiritual love: 
 
  Only Death hath force to part 
  Lovers’ bodies by his dart; 
  But their spirits higher fly. 
  Death can never make them die. (V.vii.7-10) 
   
For all its invocation of Romeo and Juliet, however, Love’s Victory 
is not a tragedy, so Musella and Philisses rise from the altar 
brought back to life by Venus’ power, and their concluding union 
is mirrored by the pairing of the other shepherds and 
shepherdesses—Rustic even agrees to marry the fickle Dalina. At 
the end of the play, therefore, even though Silvesta points out that 
Venus “sent the drink” and the goddess acknowledges that the 
shepherdess was her “instrument,” there is no suggestion that the 
poison was a sleeping draught or that death was faked. In narrative 
terms Musella and Philisses must die so that they can be 
miraculously revived by Venus, a reading that is endorsed by a 
conventional decoding in which spiritual love must triumph over 
bodily passion before it can be blessed with survival. For Wroth, 
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this emphasis on spiritual union would have been underscored by 
her own family’s literary evocations of Christianised neoplatonic 
erotics, in particular her father’s sonnet sequences.4  
In recent criticism on Wroth, the identification of Love’s 
Victory as a pastoral tragicomedy was made initially by Josephine 
Roberts. She identified Wroth’s literary antecedents primarily as 
Torquato Tasso’s Aminta, Samuel Daniel’s The Queenes Arcadia 
and Hymen’s Triumph, and John Fletcher’s The Faithful 
Shepherdess.5 However, the most useful analysis of the generic 
inheritance of the play to date was made in 1991 by Barbara K. 
Lewalski, who provides detailed descriptions of narrative and 
motif similarities. In relation to the death recovery sequence, she 
makes two significant points: first, suggesting the instability of the 
characters’ deaths:  
 
Silvesta persuades them to die by poison instead of 
knives and offers them a potion which (apparently) 
causes their death … the potion wears off, the seeming 
dead are called forth by Venus and her priests.6  
 
Second, she goes on to note that Wroth changes the “generic 
convention … for the final resolutions … to be narrated … rather 
than represented” into “a more dramatic resolution scene [in 
which] the supposedly dead lovers arise” (italics mine).7 Although 
Lewalski does not go on to interrogate the impact of Wroth’s 
employment of the liminal subject, her use of the terms 
“apparently … seemingly … supposedly” all convey a sense of 
unease with the final sequence, in which we know, from earlier 
pastoral tragicomedies, that the characters should simply be 
unconscious, but which also demands, from the textual evidence, 
that two dead bodies must be “represented” and not “narrated.” 
 
4 Robert Sidney, Poems of Robert Sidney, ed. P.J.Croft (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1962).  
5 Josephine Roberts, “The Huntington Manuscript of Lady Mary Wroth’s Play, 
Loves Victorie,” Huntington Library Quarterly 46 (1983), 166. A further path-
breaking analysis was undertaken in Margaret Anne McLaren, “An Unknown 
Continent. Lady Mary Wroth’s Forgotten Pastoral Drama, ‘Loves Victorie’” in The 
Renaissance Englishwoman in Print: Counterbalancing the Canon, ed. Anne M. 
Haselkorn and Betty S. Travitsky (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1990), 276-94. 
6 Barbara K. Lewalski, “Mary Wroth’s Love’s Victory and Pastoral Tragicomedy” 
in Reading Mary Wroth. Representing Alternatives in Early Modern England, ed. 
Naomi J. Miller and Gary Waller (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 
96.  
7 Lewalski, “Mary Wroth’s,” 101. 
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Indeed, when Wroth’s influences are analysed in more detail, what 
is surprising is not the difference between representation and 
narration, but the lengths to which authors go in order to imbue a 
sense of realism into an otherwise unashamedly romance context.   
  Examples of the ingenious ways that pastoral 
tragicomedies transform corpses into living figures through 
(un)believable means include a range of medicinal and physical 
methods.8 Perhaps the most dramatic of the false death sequences 
occurs in Tasso’s Aminta: first, Silvia is assumed from the 
evidence of her bloody veil to have been killed by a wolf, but it 
turns out instead that her veil had caught in a tree and that she only 
tore some hairs while trying to free herself; and second, Amintas is 
seen flinging himself off a cliff to certain death, only later is it 
revealed that his fall was broken by the undergrowth and he was 
simply knocked out.9 In Daniel’s The Queenes Arcadia, Amyntas 
takes poison and is saved by Urania who has “great skill in 
hearbes” and he is brought round by his lover Chloris, who “rubb’d 
his face [and] Chafd his pale temples.10 Similarly, in Daniel’s 
Hymen’s Triumph Thyrsis, believing his beloved Silvia to be dead, 
tries to kill himself; both are revived by “the skilful Lamia” with 
“cordiall waters,” the revivals being completed with practical 
actions—the couple’s friends “chaff’d their temples” and “rubb’d  
& strok’d their Cheekes.”11 John Fletcher in The Faithful 
Shepherdess allows a certain degree of the supernatural into his 
play in that the River God saves Amoret, but the author is careful 
to point out that although she is simply wounded, “yet shee’s 
warme, her pulses beat” and therefore may be saved with a pure 
“drope.”12 Finally, the way in which Shakespeare reworks the false 
death sequence in order to stress the way reality can be 
transformed clearly links The Winter’s Tale to the English pastoral 
tragicomedy tradition. One of the most powerful moments of the 
play occurs when Leontes realises that Hermione is not dead and 
 
8 For a more detailed comparison of the potion death sequence in Wroth’s play with 
other pastoral tragicomedies, see Wynne-Davies, Women Writers, 90-8.  
9 Torquato Tasso, Amintas in Three Renaissance Pastorals, ed. Elizabeth Story 
Donno (Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1993). 
10 Samuel Daniel, The Queenes Arcadia in Three Renaissance Pastorals, 235-6.  
11 Samuel Daniel, Hymen’s Triumph (Oxford: Malone Society Reprints, 1994), 65.  
12 John Fletcher, The Faithful Shepherdess in The Dramatic Works in the Beaumont 
and Fletcher Canon, ed. Fredson Bowers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976), III, 543.  
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that, instead of seeing her statue, he embraces a living body: O, 
she’s warm! / If this be magic, let it be an art / Lawful as eating.13 
In each of Love’s Victory’s antecedents the texts stress the potency 
of remedy and/or mishap, proving that although the lovers appear 
dead, they have been alive all along. As Shakespeare expresses it, 
“magic” and “art” must always be revealed to be as realistic or 
“lawful as eating.”  
 Clearly Wroth chooses not to employ such devices in her 
play, so it is particularly intriguing when she does use such 
“lawful” narrative events to explain the false death sequences in 
her prose romance. Sheila T. Cavanagh examines the way in which 
Wroth presents death, locating the “primary boundary between the 
physical and spiritual realms, which a reader might expect to be 
absolute,” pointing out that these “sites of death remain remarkably 
untrustworthy.”14 Cavanagh refers to several key moments in the 
text: for example, how although Pamphila always desires death, 
even when she believes her beloved Amphilanthus to be dead, she 
cannot die, instead living as Wroth explains, “some years … like a 
religious,” about which Cavanagh notes, “ironically, therefore, 
when Amphilanthus actually appears to be dead, Pamphilia 
chooses a religious path rather than the death she demands when 
he breaks her heart.”15 Moreover, Cavanagh comments briefly in a 
footnote that “Wroth’s interest in the permeability of this boundary 
[between life and death] appears also in the ending of “Love’s 
Victory.”16 Like Lewalski, Cavanagh identifies the way in which 
characters in Wroth’s works occupy a liminal space, but there is a 
distinct line between the play in which art and magic is necessary 
to ensure the lovers’ recovery and the romance where “lawful” 
reality is clearly stated. Pamphilia might use numerous metaphors 
for death, swoons repeatedly and is forever asking to die, but she 
remains firmly alive.  
 Other examples of such trenchant reality recur throughout 
the text, for example in an Amintas-like plot where Limena’s 
blood-stained clothes are falsely interpreted as signifying her 
death, and when Polidorus’s widow is erroneously believed to be a 
 
13 William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, ed. J.H.P.Pafford (London: Routledge, 
1990), 159; V.iii.109-111. 
14 Sheila T Cavanagh, Cherished Torment. The Emotional Geography of Lady Mary 
Wroth’s Urania (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 164, 171. 
15 Mary Wroth, First Part of the Countess of Montgomery’s Urania, ed. Josephine 
A. Roberts (Binghampton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 
1995), 584; and Cavanagh, Cherished Torment, 170. All citations to this edition 
will be made parenthetically within the text, with I signifying “First Part.” 
16 Cavanagh, Cherished Torment, 255. 
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ghost before being discovered alive, “seeming so like a dead body, 
as they were afraid, they had but heard a voice which caused their 
search, but that she had beene dead, that spirit which shee once 
had, had guided them to her” (I.352-3). Perhaps the most 
remarkable of the false death sequences is, however, the 
decapitation of Meriana. The narrative is introduced as a tale told 
by Rosindy to his sister, Pamphila, in which he describes how his 
lady, Meriana, has been captured by a rival for her love, 
Clotorindus. In the battle to release her from captivity Clotorindus 
appears to be losing and so takes the drastic action of executing 
Meriana, afterwards displaying her head on the battlements: 
 
That peerelesse head was seene of him [Rosindy], being 
set upon a pillar, and that pillar being upon the top of the 
Pallace, the haire hanging in such length and delicacie, 
as although it somewhat covered with the thicknesse of 
it, part of the face, yet was that, too sure a knowledge to 
Rosindy of her losse, making it appeare unto him, that 
none but that excellent Queene was mistrisse of that 
excellent haire. (I.158) 
 
The reader alongside Rosindy is convinced of Meriana’s death, 
although Wroth has chosen her terminology carefully, and with 
hindsight it is possible to emphasise the lack of stability in this 
interpretation through the use of the word “appeare.” It turns out 
that Meriana is not dead at all, and one of Clotorindus’ servants 
explains to Rosindy how the “counterfeting” was performed: 
 
That pillar had bin made and set there by her Father, a 
man excellently graced in all arts, and especially in 
prospectives, to try his skill he made this, which though 
so big, as one might stand in it, yet so farr, it seemd but 
as a small piller, of purpose made to hold a head upon, 
and so had they rais’d her within it, as no more appeard 
above it then her chinne comming over it, it was as if 
stucke into her throat the just distance and art in the 
making being such and so excellent as none could but 
have thought it had beene her head cut off. (I. 160)  
 
The ingeniousness of this explanation confers on it an almost 
theatrical quality, for although Meriana’s father is said to be 
“graced in all arts,” there is nothing supernatural about the pillar; 
rather it resembles a conjuror’s trick. Wroth’s source for this 
illusion was most probably the description of how Philoclea 
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appears to be beheaded on a scaffold in Philip Sidney’s The 
Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia. Philoclea explains in precise 
detail how the effect has been achieved: 
 
By bringing me down under the scaffold and (making 
me thrust my head up through a hole they had made 
therein) they did put about my poor neck a dish of 
gold whereout they had beaten the bottom, so as 
having set blood in it, you saw how I played the part 
of death.17 
 
Although the two devices display some variance, the exposure of 
the beheading trick, linked to the false death sequence of romance 
texts, evidences Wroth’s immediate source, although she might 
have known of Reginald Scot’s The Discoverie of Witchcraft 
(1584) in which the scaffold trick is also described.18 The link to 
the supernatural and witchcraft is further underlined by the 
possibility that Meriana’s father may be identified with Henry 
Percy, Duke of Northumberland who was known to have 
experimented with “all arts.” Wroth clearly intends to debunk any 
magical or supernatural interpretations, mocking those credulous 
enough to believe in them and associating herself firmly with 
Sidney’s scepticism. In Urania, therefore, arts are distrusted and 
explanations that are offered align Wroth’s treatment of the false 
death sequence with pastoral tragicomedy. She might dally with 
the liminal, but reverts to the “lawful” as Pamphila lives, 
Polidorus’ widow is proved to be no ghost, and Meriana’s death is 
revealed to be a mere conjuring trick. Why, then, does Love’s 
Victory allow the liminal woman to remain unchallenged?    
 
III 
Critical convention has consistently interpreted Love’s Victory, 
along with Wroth’s other writing, in terms of familial allegory, 
aligning Musella with Wroth, Philisses with her cousin William 
Herbert, and Rustic with Wroth’s husband Robert Wroth. Gary 
Waller provides an incisive and comprehensive analysis of the 
ways in which Wroth and Herbert inform and engage with the way 
 
17 Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, ed. Maurice Evans 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), 569. 
18 Reginald Scot, Discoverie of Witchcraft (London: 1584). Although it is possible 
that Sidney knew of Scot’s work, it is unlikely that Wroth would have read the text 
since it was banned at the accession of James I in 1603 and most copies were 
burned.  
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gender is represented.19 The plot of Wroth’s play may thus be 
interpreted as depicting the mutual affection of the young Wroth 
and Herbert, the arranged and unhappy marriage to Robert Wroth, 
and finally the resumption of love between the cousins after Robert 
Wroth’s death in 1616. Even a double-level of associations exists 
with Musella as Stella/Penelope Rich and Philisses as Astrophil/ 
Philip Sidney. The death recovery sequence may be seen, through 
the familial allegory, to represent the “death” of Wroth and 
William Herbert’s love at the point of her unhappy marriage and 
the resurrection of that desire when Robert Wroth’s death enabled 
the cousins to consummate their passion. The illegitimacy of their 
liaison (and of their two children) might explain the liminal state of 
Musella who must, through her representation of Wroth, both be 
desired by Herbert and repudiated by society. Any account of the 
play that refers to an autobiographical reading should be 
considered alongside Wroth’s other evocation of herself and 
Herbert as Pamphilia and Amphilanthus in Urania where, of 
course, Pamphilia does not die, choosing the material alternative of 
living as a nun, although she later returns to court. It would be 
possible to explain the distinction between the two female 
characters by pointing out that the play is an earlier text probably 
composed while Wroth’s affair with Herbert was ongoing, while 
the prose romance reflects the later distance between the two 
cousins. There can be no question that the death recovery sequence 
described above does engage with the play’s evocation of familial 
allegory; however, I would argue that the links in themselves do 
not provide sufficient evidence for Wroth’s radical departure from 
the use of false deaths in other pastoral tragicomedies and in her 
own work. 
 While early scholarship on Wroth tended to identify 
autobiographical and familial discourses, her use of political 
material has become increasingly evident. Josephine Roberts’ 
identification of characters and events in her edition of the first 
book of Urania has proved invaluable for interpreting further 
material in the prose work and in Wroth’s other writings.20 This 
immersion in public discourse certainly informs Browne’s 
 
19 Gary Waller, Sidney Family Romance. Mary Wroth, William Herbert, and the 
Early Modern Construction of Gender (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1993). 
20 Josephine Roberts, “Introduction,” Mary Wroth’s Urania, I, lxix-xcviii. For a 
more recent account of the politicised nature of the play see Akiko Kusunoki, 
“Love’s Victory as a response to Shakespeare: A Configuration of Gender 
Distinctions,” Essays and Studies 54 (2008): 1-18.  
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representation of Wroth in the Vale of Woe and links her to the 
cult of Elizabethan nostalgia, mourning for Prince Henry, militant 
English Protestantism and, as a consequence of all these, Elizabeth 
of Bohemia and the Thirty Years War. Indeed, the figure of 
Aletheia, who languishes alongside Wroth in the Vale, has been 
identified as representing, in typical Browne style, a combination 
of moral symbol (truth), political allegory (England) and 
contemporary history (Princess Elizabeth).21 Wroth would have 
had both a personal and political interest in the events surrounding 
Elizabeth’s life, given that Robert Sidney had accompanied the 
young Queen to her new home in 1613 and also given that support 
for her husband Frederick, Elector Palatine was provided by 
William Herbert and his faction at court and in Parliament. The last 
two songs of the 1616 edition of Britannia’s Pastorals, which was 
dedicated to Herbert, contain a stringent attack on James for 
refusing to initiate action against Spain and, therefore, 
Catholicism. The Urania presents a more complex version of 
European politics than Browne’s strident Anglo Protestantism, 
with Amphilanthus offering an image of Frederick that is both 
worthy and morally flawed. As Roberts points out, “At the height 
of the Bohemian disaster, Wroth constructed a counter-myth 
within the Urania of a young man who brilliantly succeeds in 
creating an international coalition” (I,xlii). But, at the same time, 
Amphilanthus cannot be trusted by Pamphilia. His characterisation 
as a lover suggests a lack of stability that contrasts sharply with his 
militaristic success. Given the doubling of personal and political 
allegory, layers of identifications may be constructed by 
comparing the prose romance and the play, so that just as 
Amphilanthus may be linked to William Herbert and Frederick in 
Urania, so Philisses can be associated with William Herbert and 
Frederick in Love’s Victory, which, in turn, predicates a parallel 
pattern of Pamphilia/Musella coupled with Wroth and Elizabeth of 
Bohemia. As the earlier text, Love’s Victory traces the successful 
marriage and pre-war harmony of Frederick and Elizabeth, just as 
it might shadow the consummated desire of Wroth and Herbert 
after Robert Wroth’s death. The engagement of pastoral 
tragicomedy with political events is now a critical commonplace, 
and the foregrounding of Elizabeth of Bohemia in this context was 
particularly popular, as is evidenced by Britannia’s Pastorals and 
 
21 Michelle O’Callaghan, The ‘shepheards nation.’ Jacobean Spenserians and Early 
Stuart Political Culture, 1612-1625 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 88-96. Her 
name might suggest a link with Aletheia Talbot Howard, Countess of Arundel, 
although given the Arundels’ determined Catholicism, this might be unlikely.  
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The Winter’s Tale as well as in Love’s Victory. In terms of political 
allegory, therefore, the death recovery sequence may be interpreted 
as a phase of mourning for Anglo Protestantism following the 
death of Prince Henry, then followed by the resurrection of the 
English Protestant cause through the union of Elizabeth with 
Frederick. And, of course, before 1619 when Frederick rashly 
accepted the Bohemian throne, their success in Europe looked as 
hopeful as Musella’s and Phillises’ marriage in the play.  
 By combining familial and political allegory it is possible 
to posit a certain justification for the liminal woman, a woman who 
must, like Musella, be both alive and dead, who, like Wroth, is 
marginalised by an adulterous relationship or who, like Elizabeth 
of Bohemia, might be trapped between nostalgia for the prowess of 
the Elizabethan age and James’ determination to value peace 
before English Protestantism. There is, however, a further factor 
permeating these fictional, personal and public selves that is 
identified, most recently, by Paul Salzman in his perceptive 
analysis of Wroth’s work and in particular her engagement with 
political concerns: “Wroth’s interest in the possibilities of female 
power … may be seen as engaging in the Protestant faction’s 
nostalgia for Elizabeth I.”22 Salzman’s identification of “female 
power” as a central tenet in Wroth’s writing shifts the 
interpretation of the liminal woman away from the specifics of 
familial and political allegory towards a wider investment in 
exploring how early modern women functioned in a sphere where 
power is simultaneously offered and prohibited. 
 
IV 
A number of critics working on Love’s Victory have examined the 
female politics of the play. Lewalski, in particular, argues that 
Wroth changed the traditional elements of the pastoral tragicomedy 
in order “to develop an implicit feminist politics which emphasizes 
a non-hierarchical community, female and cross-gender 
friendships. And especially female agency in the roles of Venus, 
Silvesta, Musella, and even Dalina.”23 The friendship between the 
female characters is foregrounded throughout the play and, 
interestingly, features as a central element in the death recovery 
sequence, since it is Silvesta who gives the two lovers the poison 
to drink and who, consequently, must be executed. Roberts points 
out that in changing the conventional ending of the pastoral where 
 
22 Paul Salzman, Reading Early Modern Women’s Writing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 75. 
23 Lewalski, “Mary Wroth’s,” 104-5. 
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the deaths are fake, Wroth drew upon Shakespeare’s Romeo and 
Juliet but “instead of a fearful, bumbling friar, Wroth supplies the 
courageous figure of Silvesta.”24 And as Carolyn Ruth Swift goes 
on to argue, “Wroth creates a situation that may be unique in early 
English drama: a female friend is willing to sacrifice her own life 
for another woman who is not her relative or mistress.”25 Roberts 
and Swift’s joint interpretation of the serious threat to Silvesta’s 
life as a real possibility reinforces Wroth’s radical reworking of the 
false death sequence into a statement of mortality and miraculous 
recovery. The powerful bond between women at the end of the 
play is further confirmed by Naomi J. Miller who notes that there 
is, “a triumph … [of] the enduring relations between women.”26 
 By returning to the false-death sequence and looking at it 
in more detail, the importance of female power in specific relation 
to the liminal woman becomes apparent. Initially, the “lawful” 
realistic elements of death predominate: Philisses talks about his 
“grave”; Musella refers to “earth [and]…decay;” Simeana 
comments on the lovers’ “tomb;” and Silvesta, most tellingly, 
describes their bodies as “clayey cages” and their graves as “biding 
clay.” The vocabulary has more in common with sermons than 
with the light depictions of curable wounds in the pastoral tragi-
comedies. This may partly be explained through Wroth’s 
engagement with the conventional ellipsis between spiritual and 
secular love, so that Musella’s and Philisses’ romantic attachment 
is elevated via the Christianisation of the words used to describe 
their union. At the same time, those “clayey cages” remain within 
the imaginative frame. Even more disconcerting, however, is the 
fact that Musella contradicts the representation of the bodies as 
mortal, claiming instead that they have “lasting youth” and that 
their “’during state” prohibits “decay.” The lovers’ bodies must 
encode, therefore, both endurance/youth and mortality/decay; they 
are on a cusp between life and death and, as such, adopt a liminal 
space.  
 
24 Josephine A. Roberts, “Deciphering Women’s Pastoral. Coded Language in 
Wroth’s Love’s Victory” in Representing Women in Renaissance England, ed. 
Claude J. Summers and Ted Larry-Pebworth (London: University of Missouri 
Press, 1997), 170. See also Sheila T Cavanagh, “Romancing the Epic: Lady Mary 
Wroth’s Urania and Literary Traditions,” in Approaches to the Anglo and American 
Female Epic, 1621-1982 ed. Bernard Schweizer  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 19-36. 
25 Carolyn Ruth Swift, “Feminine Self-Definition in Lady Mary Wroth’s Love’s 
Victorie (c.1621),” English Literary Renaissance 10 (1989): 179.  
26 Naomi J. Miller, Changing the Subject. Mary Wroth and Figurations of Gender 
in Early Modern England (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 215. 
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 Elizabeth Bronfen analyses the concept of liminality in 
relation to the fictional and artistic representations of dead women. 
She concludes that death must be “resolved” in order for the 
“deceased and her story [to] …receive a stable meaning.” Thus for 
female characters who have in “life” been ambivalent in terms of 
actions or role, death offers a solution, a recognised and acceptable 
meaning, so that “her dying body is in fact transmitted as its 
incarnated emblem, the martyred saint whose death speaks her 
truth and thus truth per se.”27 There are consanguinities between 
Bronfen’s theoretical analysis and Wroth’s play. In Love’s Victory 
Musella’s rejection of the arranged marriage and her failure to 
acquiesce to her parents’ authority destabilises early modern social 
codes by placing personal desire before filial duty, and female 
independence over patriarchal rule. By dying, however, Musella 
allows both mother and betrothed to condone such rebellion 
precisely because it has been contained—literally, within the tomb. 
Musella can be elevated as a martyr or saint because her attempt to 
assert personal choice and independent subjectivity is negated by 
the supposed “decay” of her “clayey cage.” Musella will, of 
course, be restored—thereby vindicating her questioning of social 
rules—but her rebellion will also be contained by Rustic’s freeing 
her from the marriage contract and her mother’s forgiveness. 
Within the traditional formulations of pastoral tragicomedy, 
misrule is offered but always contained.  
What I would like to suggest, however, is that prior to the 
neat form of rebellion/restraint, Musella’s body has offered a much 
more disconcerting challenge to conventional expectations. For 
order to be restored, the destabilising forces—whether of character 
or discourse—must be seen to be negated by death, but this 
required “death” is questioned because Musella has previously 
asserted that she will not decay, will not be negated, will not be 
contained by the tomb, death, fate, or any social conventions. She 
is what Bronfen defines neatly—“a bad corpse.”28 In this 
intriguing distinction Bronfen characterises those bodies that decay 
with their souls departing appropriately for heaven as “good 
corpses,” while those who persist on earth resisting “natural” decay 
as “bad corpses”—the most obvious being vampires and ghosts. 
What I should like to argue is that Musella, unlike her pastoral 
tragicomedy antecedents, is a bad corpse, accessing a liminal state 
that disrupts fixed meanings and social codes. By asserting that 
 
27 Elizabeth Bronfen, Over Her Dead Body (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1992), 292-3. 
28 Bronfen, Over Her Dead Body, 296. 
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“Earth” (that is, the grave) is “too mean” for the truth of love, and 
that she and Philisses will have “lasting youth,” Musella posits an 
imaginative body that might be entombed, still and silent, but is 
also alive, without signs of decay or time. The play’s action 
requires that the body is dead, but the words demand that such 
finality is questioned, resulting in Musella’s representation as 
liminal: she is both dead and alive, a mortal body that refuses to be 
bound within the “biding clay” of the tomb or the “[mean] earth.” 
On the imagined stage Simeana and Silvesta are party to this 
disruption of stability, echoing the audience/reader interpretation 
that is accessible only from the words spoken by these three 
women. For the other shepherds and shepherdesses the two lovers 
are dead, are contained and will be buried, as their mutual song at 
the beginning of the final scene indicates. This gendered focus and 
its consequent understanding is reinforced through the projected 
execution of Silvesta who must be burned martyr-like for 
administering the poison to the lovers. The Amazonian 
shepherdess is presented from the start of the play as challenging 
conventional norms by the way she dresses and by her rejection of 
love. Although it must be recognised that cross-dressed 
shepherdesses, nymphs and maidens are a commonplace of early 
modern pastoral, nevertheless her unconventionality is underlined 
by the fact that she does not participate in the concluding unions at 
the end of the play. She offers only “chaste love” to the Forester 
who loves her and would have died in her place on the pyre; he 
resigns himself perforce to accept this limited affection, declaring 
he “now shall go contented to [his] grave” (V.vii.103). Like 
Musella, whose claim for independence threatens to destabilise the 
arranged marriages of early modern society and its allegorical 
representation in the pastoral world, Silvesta challenges 
conventional female roles and, as such, must be similarly 
contained.  
It is significant that Philisses never claims that his body 
will remain untouched by decay, instead welcoming the tomb 
because he will be “crown’d with fame’s eternity” and his “grave” 
will offer him “glory.” If Musella is a bad corpse, Philisses is a 
decidedly good one: he acquiesces to death, seeing his future 
identity in terms of “fame” (that is, what will be said about him), 
rather than in the presence of his body as a constant reminder of 
destabilisation. Another telling line that resonates with ambiguity 
comes from Musella’s other “swain” Rustic who, when 
relinquishing his claim on Musella, notes, “Were she alive, she 
were her own to choose” (V.vii.61), an ambivalent questioning of 
mortality that prefigures Musella’s resurrection, when the 
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shepherdess does re-emerge as an independent woman who is free 
to choose for herself. And this, I think, is the key point: Musella 
threatens social stability by desiring independent female 
subjectivity—the right to choose for herself—but unlike Philisses, 
she will not be contained, demanding instead the right to occupy a 
liminal state in which her threat becomes, through the processes of 
the uncanny, even more disruptive. Even lying on the altar, on the 
threshold of mortality Musella must be seen to have the right “to 
choose,” a possible disturbance that is affirmed by Rustic’s odd 
sentence structure, “were she alive.” By bringing Musella back to 
life Venus simply formalises a process that Musella herself has 
initiated through her role as a bad corpse, transforming the 
miraculous conclusion into a dissatisfying question about how far 
ideal harmony may ever be attained. And, of course, this is exactly 
how the play ends—not with the happy love and marriages of 
pastoral tragicomedy, but with the convenient union of Rustic and 
Dalina; the continued lack of consummation between Silvesta and 
Forester; and, finally, the exile of Arcas, a scheming and 
manipulative Autolycus-like figure who has tried to thwart love. It 
is important to remember that Love’s Victory commences with 
Venus and Cupid promising “sorrow” and concludes with 
“shame,” shifting the play’s tone towards a darker and more 
complex interpretation than is usual in pastoral tragicomedy.  
Mary Wroth’s adoption of various generic discourses is 
never simple or one-dimensional, and her reworking of pastoral 
tragicomedy is no exception.29 To begin, she takes the classic false 
death sequence and, instead of merely debunking the 
supernatural—as she was certainly able to do given the evidence 
from Urania—she challenges convention by allowing her lovers to 
remain represented as corpses until the end of the play when they 
are miraculously recovered. While at odds with the generic 
tradition, the foregrounding of a material and “lawful” plot allows 
for a strong presentation of the Sidney/Herbert familial allegory 
and its close ties to the political investments of the English 
Protestant cause. Yet Love’s Victory moves beyond a simple 
transference from false death to death recovery, instead engaging 
with notions of female power through the evocation of the liminal 
woman. Musella might be represented as a corpse, but her words 
 
29 Here I should specifically like to thank my colleague at the University of Dundee, 
Victor Skretkowicz, for his perceptive comments on my reading of Love’s Victory 
when he pointed out that if Wroth reworked romance in a radical fashion then I 
should be looking for a more complex interplay of interpretations than those offered 
by familial allegory alone.  
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demand that she is simultaneously perceived as “uncanny,” and 
therefore as a threat to the stability of the patriarchal discourses of 
“lawful” containment. In generic terms Wroth adopted, reworked, 
and radicalised pastoral tragicomedy in order to engage with 
questions about the self, politics, and female subjectivity. No other 
early modern play within this genre interrogates the repression of 
women so perceptively, nor do any conclude with the harmony of 
love so deeply undercut by the realities of married life, of sorrow 
and of shame. 
 The death recovery sequence only occurs, however, in the 
Penshurst Manuscript, whereas the Huntington version breaks off 
before any questions of liminality may be posed. Salzman offers an 
intriguing perspective on the two manuscripts suggesting that the 
Huntington “Love’s Victory ends with Philisses and Musella intent 
upon suicide … a radically and, dare I suggest, consciously 
unfinished text.”30 Reading the two versions of the play in the 
context of the liminal woman and the death recovery sequence, I 
find Salzman’s interpretation of a “radically” and “consciously 
unfinished text” very persuasive. If we accept the Huntington to be 
a copy of the complete Penshurst that was broken off as a 
conscious and radical act, then the material circumstances of that 
text’s production need to be excavated. This essay, through its 
interrogation of pastoral tragicomedy, indicates that such 
circumstance might be located in Wroth’s rewriting of her own 
play’s focus on female power in order to move away from an 
uncertain, yet liberating, liminality, towards “lawful” containment 
within a Vale of Woe. 
 
 
30 Salzman, Reading, 84.  
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As everyone who encounters the text soon realizes, characters in 
The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania talk. There are innumerable 
characters and what often seems like interminable talking, with 
many of the conversations revolving around love.  Love in this text 
is sometimes good, generally mixed or bad, and always a subject 
of major interest.  Just as in life, however, where people often tire 
of hearing all the painful and painfully repetitive details of 
another’s tumultuous love life, readers undoubtedly weary of the 
countless stories of love gone wrong that are recounted during 
Wroth’s lengthy narrative. However personal and individual a 
failing or conflicted love affair may feel to those involved, they 
tend to merge for those not directly participating in the romance.  
At times, moreover, even the most patient friend needs to tell a 
moaning lover to snap out of it.  In this text, that job often falls to 
Urania, who gently, but pointedly, urges Pamphilia to remember 
herself: “Where is that judgment, and discreet govern’d spirit, for 
which this and all other places that have beene happy with the 
knowledge of your name, hath made you famous?” 1 
 As Urania implies, while romantic drama may be 
endlessly fascinating when it involves oneself, it enjoys a more 
limited shelf life for external audiences. The tales of love 
pervading the Urania serve a more significant purpose than 
enabling Lady Mary Wroth to experiment with ways of telling love 
stories or to vent her own romantic frustrations through literature, 
however. Though they are admittedly often repetitive, they 
 
1 Mary Wroth, First Part of The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania, ed. Josephine 
A. Roberts. Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 140 (Binghamton, N.Y.: 
Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1995), 468. All further 
citations to this work will be inserted parenthetically in the text, with I indicating 
this text as First Part.    
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represent one of the many interlocking techniques that Wroth 
employs in order to craft and sustain the ambitious project known 
as the Urania. As numerous critics have noted, the Urania 
combines elements from the romance and roman à clef traditions 
into her massive literary creation that also openly reflects its—and 
her—Sidneian origins.  In addition, the work draws some of its 
inspiration from its epic predecessors and displays its author’s 
eclectic erudition at the same time that it demonstrates her 
commitment to literary experimentation.  In many respects, the text 
underscores Margaret Doody’s contention that “the concept of 
‘Romance’ as distinct from ‘Novel’ has outworn its usefulness, and 
that at its most useful it created limitations and encouraged blind 
spots.”2 Wroth’s narrative style does not fit neatly into any one 
generic category. Barbara Fuchs rightly notes that “romance is a 
notoriously slippery category,”3 but even that admission does not 
account for the stylistic abundance found in the Urania. As Doody 
suggests, trying to label any text simply as a “romance” 
undermines critical access to its complicated narrative structure. In 
her terms: “Romance and the Novel are one. The separation 
between them is part of a problem, not part of a solution.”4 The 
Urania clearly illustrates the stylistic characteristics underlying 
Doody’s proposed generic reformulation. 
Other critical discussions of narrative further exemplify 
the Urania’s refusal to conform to traditional generic categories. 
Bakhtin, for example, whose work preceded Doody’s complication 
of these labels, provides a formulation that could designate the 
Urania as a novel: “The fundamental condition, that which makes 
a novel a novel, that which is responsible for its stylistic 
uniqueness, is the speaking person and his [sic] discourse.”5 
According to this model, the abundance of talking (Bakhtin does 
not discuss singing and versification) presented by Wroth places 
her text in the generic category Bakhtin and others consider a 
novel.  Similarly, Bruce R. Smith notes the importance of this kind 
of speech as a marker of verisimilitude, another quality frequently 
associated with novels: “Oral performances of stories, poems, and 
plays—oral performances of art made out of words—is only a 
ritualized instance of the identity marking and group affirmation 
 
2 Margaret Anne Doody, The True Story of the Novel (Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1996), xvii. 
3 Barbara Fuchs, Romance (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1. 
4 Doody, True Story, 15. 
5 M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 332. 
Sidney Journal  26.2 (2008) 85
 
                               
that go on in everyday exchanges of speech.”6 At the same time, 
however, Jennifer Lee Carrell rightly notes that Wroth’s “fictions 
are quite often quasifactual, so that her readers find it impossible to 
distinguish which episodes and characters belong to which 
category.”7 She also comments upon the pleasure Wroth and her 
readers apparently found in “that very liminality, the neither-flesh-
nor-fowl character of fictional fact/factual fiction.”8 Whatever 
generic label is placed upon the Urania, therefore, the work can 
only be categorized simply by those who do not know it well 
enough to recognize the richness and complexity of its literary 
style. The Urania cannot rightly be labeled as an Arcadian knock-
off; neither does it fit neatly into many of the other literary 
categories into which one might initially seek to place it. Instead, 
this work continually borrows from and realigns literary 
conventions from a variety of sources and prefigures later prose 
fiction.  
Much of the creative tension displayed throughout the 
Urania can be located in the continual interplay between 
characteristics associated with the interrelated literary genres of 
“roman” and “romance.” These terms are often treated as 
interchangeable although, as Doody notes, “‘romance’ is a 
dismissive term, especially in English usage; other European 
languages have admitted the unity of Romance and Novel: a novel 
is le roman, der Roman, il romanzo.”9 Doody rightly questions 
evaluative distinctions between the categories and others might 
deem them synonymous; nevertheless, the terms can be usefully 
separated in order to describe important facets of Wroth’s literary 
technique.  From this perspective, her narrative style can be said to 
draw aspects from these associated realms in order to craft what 
can be conceptualized as the “wave and particle” characteristics of 
her text. In other words, many of the tales, most often the inset 
stories, can be seen as individual narrative entities that can be 
separated from the rest of the text, but that can simultaneously be 
read according to how they keep the narrative action moving 
forward. Like waves and particles, however, these distinctive states 
cannot be viewed simultaneously. In this regard, the narrative 
behaves similarly to the geographical components described in its 
 
6 Bruce R. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 24-5. 
7 Jennifer Lee Carrell, “A Pack of Lies in a Looking Glass: Lady Mary Wroth’s 
Urania and the Magic Mirror of Romance,” SEL 34 (1994): 80.  
8 Carrell, “Pack of Lies,” 89.  
9 Doody, True Story, 15.  
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pages. Like the water that keeps so many of its characters in 
motion, the narrative flows in individual streams toward a common 
destination that leads toward a supposed conclusion. At the same 
time, it shifts its course and is sidetracked by various narrative 
“eddies” or other metaphoric stopping points where it gathers new 
material, leaves behind detritus from prior encounters, and realigns 
itself for continuing its journey. This metaphoric flow underlies the 
whole of the Urania and offers a symbolic parallel between the 
movement of the narrative and that of the text’s characters. It also 
illuminates some of the rationale for the narrative’s length and 
circuitous, often meandering, style. Like a river, the narrative 
flows onward, sometimes in ways that resemble prior movements, 
but never quite the same as it was farther upstream.  Just as a river 
or, to add an even more germane parallel—a human life—moves 
beyond, but does not erase its prior movements, the Urania keeps 
heading forward without untoward regard for what has come 
before. While Wroth sometimes returns to issues discussed much 
earlier in the work (Parselius’ betrayal of Urania, for instance), this 
is not her dominant concern as a writer. Instead, she fashions her 
text in a manner resembling the movement of a river or a life that 
stalls periodically, alternately slows or speeds up, occasionally 
changing course, but generally moving forward into new, albeit 
often familiar, spaces. 
While the distinction between “roman” and “romance” 
proposed here may not accord precisely with traditional 
interpretations of the terms, it usefully describes parts of Wroth’s 
complicated narrative technique. The “roman” facets of her text 
are identified here as those many episodes of storytelling that 
pause the action, while simultaneously propelling it forward.  
These interludes sometimes emanate from encounters with 
strangers; at other times, they involve characters with significant 
roles throughout the narrative. They typically, though not 
exclusively, contain tales of love and marriage, while they provoke 
the main characters’ next actions or ruminations. They also 
establish important social parameters, similar to those created by 
the Kenilworth revelers in Bruce Smith’s formulation: 
 
Nobility, citizens, laborers and artisans: in their day-to-
day lives the contributors to the Kenilworth revels 
functioned not as representatives of abstract “ranks” or 
“sorts” or “orders” but as members of communities, as 
people who day by day saw each other in the same 
places and talked to each other in forms of speech that 
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they recognized as their own and interpreted according 
to an implicitly understood set of rules.10  
 
These encounters also parallel what Erving Goffman terms “face-
work”: 
  
Every person lives in a world of social encounters, 
involving him either in face-to face or mediated contact 
with other participants. In each of these contacts, he 
tends to act out what is sometimes called a line—that is, 
a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he 
expresses his view of the situation and through this his 
evaluation of the participants, especially himself.11 
 
These patterns of discursive and social positioning begin at the 
opening of the narrative, where Urania, echoing her Arcadian 
literary predecessors, announces her life circumstances to the 
readers while addressing the wind:   
 
‘Alas, Urania,’ said she, ‘(the true servant to 
misfortune); of any miserie that can befall woman, is 
not this the most and greatest which thou art falne into? 
Can there be any neare the unhappinesse of being 
ignorant, and that in the highest kind, not being certaine 
of mine owne estate or birth?  Why was I not stil 
continued in the beleefe I was, as I appeare, a 
Shepherdes, and Daughter to a Shepherd? My ambition 
then went no higher then this estate, now flies it to a 
knowledge; then was I contented, now perplexed. O 
ignorance, can thy dulnesse yet procure so sharpe a 
pain? and that such a thought as makes me now aspire 
unto knowledge? How did I joy in this poore life being 
quiet?  blest in the love of those I tooke for parents, but 
now by them I know the contrary, and by that 
knowledge, not to know my selfe. Miserable Urania, 
worse art thou now then these thy Lambs; for they 
know their dams, while thou dost live unknowne of 
any.’  (I.1) 
 
10 Smith, Acoustic World, 37.  
11 Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1967), 5.  
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Her pastoral companions return to the mead toward the conclusion 
of this speech, but Urania “esteeming her sorrowing thoughts her 
best, and choycest companie, left that place” (I.1), taking instead 
the path that leads her back to her lost family and her destiny.   
 This opening is, of course, conventional, and by placing it 
at the start of her narrative, Wroth misleadingly signals her 
audience about the kind of story they can expect to read or hear.  
As I have discussed elsewhere, numerous critics of the Urania who 
encountered it before its republication were fooled by this pastoral 
opening.12 They read it, for example, as a sign that the text was 
nothing more than a modestly-altered variation on Philip Sidney’s 
Arcadia or decided that the entire text could be discerned and 
assessed from these opening passages. The Urania exceeds this 
characterization, however, even at its outset, and encompasses far 
more narrative territory than its pastoral beginning suggests. In 
addition to invoking Wroth’s uncle, for instance, Urania’s lament 
sets off a series of “call and response” type narratives that provide 
each speaker with a platform for his or her tale, then sets the stage 
for another character or group to step in and take the larger 
narrative forward. While pastoral figures within this pattern at 
times, this technique helps mark Wroth’s stylistic departure from 
many Arcadian norms.  
When Urania carries her sad tale away from the gathering 
of shepherds, for example, she crosses a physical and imaginative 
space that takes her into the realm from which she was kidnapped 
as a child. Although she first mistakes the hermitage she finds as 
the place she is meant to “spend thy daies” (I,3), she soon 
overhears another tale of woe that captures her attention and moves 
her forward both geographically and emotionally:   
 
 Miserable Perissus, canst thou thus live, knowing she 
 that gave thee life is gone? Gone, O me! and with her 
all my joy departed. Wilt thou (unblessed creature) 
lie here complaining for her death, and know she died 
for thee? Let truth and shame make thee doe 
something worthy of such a Love, ending thy daies 
like thy selfe, and one fit to be her Servant. (I.3) 
  
When Perissus concludes his sorrowful lament, “he fell from 
complaining into such a passion, as weeping and crying were never 
 
12 Sheila T. Cavanagh, Cherished Torment: The Emotional Geography of Lady  
 Mary Wroth’s ‘Urania’ (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 3.  
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in so wofull a perfection, as now in him” (I.4) that draws Urania’s 
compassion. Subsequently, by joining Perissus on his journey 
toward his besieged love Limena, she helps launch him back into 
the world of chivalry, and starts on the road that leads her to rejoin 
the family she lost shortly after birth. This focus on individual 
needs illustrates what Sue P. Starke notes as a shift from Philip 
Sidney’s “emphasis on place” to Mary Wroth’s “emphasis on 
person.” In Starke’s terms, moreover, for Sidney “pastoral is one 
half of a constitutive dichotomy between Arcadia and everywhere 
else,” but for Wroth, “the pastoral realm is just one of many 
different locations where her emotional drama of female constancy 
and male perfidy is played out.”13 As Starke suggests, emotion 
trumps place at every juncture.  
 Given all the stories that fill the pages of the Urania, it 
would be easy to miss the links between them that often propel the 
characters into their next destinations or decisions. Mary Ellen 
Lamb argues, for example, that the narrator leaves out transitions 
between episodes.14 Nevertheless, many of these apparently 
disparate tales create pathways to subsequent actions.  The story of 
Urania and Perissus, for instance, obviously takes Urania away 
from her familiar physical environs and leads her to a place where 
she can find family members and others from her native 
environment, but it also creates the emotional space she needs in 
order to participate in the next stage of her life. Thus, when she 
meets Parselius, who will attract her love and discover her true 
identity, the text emphasizes the importance of her encounter with 
Perissus in creating her subsequent bond with Parselius: 
 
 She who poore soule had with the sight of Perissus, 
 given leave for love to make a breach into her heart, 
 the more easily after to come in and conquer, was in 
 so great a passion, as they seem’d like two Master-
 pieces, fram’d to demonstrate the best, and choisest 
 skill of art. (I.21) 
  
Urania does not carry on a lengthy relationship with Perissus, nor 
does she remain in love with Parselius (although she has to be 
released from this passion through magical intervention); 
 
13 Sue P. Starke, The Heroines of English Pastoral Romance (London: D.S. Brewer, 
2007), 107-8.  
14 Mary Ellen Lamb, “The Biopolitics of Lineage in Mary Wroth’s The Countess of 
Montgomery’s Urania: Proliferating Plots and Anti-Narratives,” English Literary 
Renaissance 31.1 (2001): 118.  
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nevertheless, these episodes of intersecting “roman” or call and 
response tales illustrate a predominant narrative technique that 
operates throughout the Urania. As this small set of stories 
demonstrates, each tale that is told provides those who speak and 
those who listen with the information, the courage, or the despair 
that takes them to the next stage of their life’s journey within the 
text. While characters and readers often misinterpret the 
significance of a specific tale within the life of a particular 
individual, the stories regularly offer something critical to the 
movement of the overall narrative.  
 The tale of Alarina, for example, helps prepare Pamphilia 
and her companions for the cleansing leap from a rock that frees 
several of them from ill-fated passions. The forlorn shepherdess 
has left her “former happy (because contented) life” in order to 
pursue her beloved, who, in response, “strove by all plaine waies, 
and craftie slights, and all to make me see, how I was cast away, 
and left by him” (I.217). Through the course of Alarina’s lengthy 
lament, she tells of her ultimate decision to renounce her beloved, 
even when there appears to be renewed hope for their relationship.  
Changing her name to Silviana, she chooses “habits [that] keepe 
me from discourse with men” and pronounces herself “free from 
love” (I.224). Pamphilia initially doubts Silviana’s resolve, “‘I 
cannot yet believe,’ said Pamphilia, ‘but you love him still, for all 
this liberall and excellent discourse’” (I.224). Nevertheless, she 
urges herself to draw courage from this transformation: 
“‘Pamphilia,’ said she, ‘can thy great spirit permit thee to bee 
bound, when such as Alarina can have strength to master, and 
command even love it selfe?’” (I.225). Pamphilia accompanies her 
friends and cousins to the precipice at St. Maura, where many of 
those gathered are freed from doomed love affairs, as Alarina’s 
example helped make possible (I.230-2). Once cleared of these 
amorous burdens, the group reunites Urania with her birth family, 
as they are now ready for the fresh starts enabled by this return of 
“the Princesse of true worth and admiration” (I.231). 
 This pattern of entrelacement appears in many of the 
Urania’s precursor texts, but its function within Wroth’s narrative 
still emphasizes the experimental nature of her fiction. The magical 
cleansing, for example, incorporates the kind of fantastical element 
that often identifies romance, but Wroth is also presenting a model 
of emotionally realistic fiction whose shape resembles, as I have 
suggested, that of a human life. As a consequence, the Urania is 
not presented as a neat, straightforward story. Instead, it often 
appears to be a fairly sloppy text, filled with false starts, 
contradictions, overlapping stories, and an abundance of confusing 
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pronouns that often confound the most attentive reader. As Lamb 
rightly notes, “narratives of constant love do not lend themselves 
to linear plots of purposive action.”15 A modern copy editor would 
probably pare and shape the Urania into something barely 
resembling the seventeenth-century narrative. The resulting 
manuscript would presumably provide more order and get to the 
point more quickly, but it is likely that the Urania would also lose 
those places where it attempts affective verisimilitude. Powerful 
emotions make for effusive text, after all. In Wroth’s presentation 
of the narrative, this abundance of words and strong feelings 
verbally recreates the kind of magnified emotional reactions that 
make up her stories.  
As Bakhtin notes, moreover, “the speaking person and his 
[sic] discourse is … what makes a novel a novel, the thing 
responsible for the uniqueness of the genre.”16  Furthermore, like 
the call and response parallel invoked here, however a-historically, 
Wroth uses emotional exuberance to engage her audience as she 
keeps her characters moving onward in their complex lives.  While 
neither her characters nor her readers may shout “Amen! 
Hallelujah!” at critical junctures in the narrative, they are still 
prompted to join in with the emotional whirlwinds they encounter, 
however melodramatic these episodes may become. Urania is able 
to love Parselius because she opened her compassionate heart to 
Perissus and can later marry Steriamus because she gained further 
knowledge about love from her passion for Parselius. Characters 
and readers similarly learn how to respond to key events and 
people in the text because of those they have previously 
encountered. Ultimately, therefore, the Urania often directs the 
reactions of its readers and its characters, although its narrative 
control is not always evident to those who encounter it. The 
technique here termed “roman,” with an emphasis on its aspect of 
storytelling, is the primary shaping force in this narrative 
maneuver. The stories told are not always complete, of course, as 
the narrative reminds us through Polarchos in the manuscript 
Urania when he tells Amphilanthus “the whole story (as much, I 
meane, as hee knew of itt).”17 Even such incomplete storytelling 
 
15 Lamb, “Biopolitics,” 117.  
16 Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, 333.  
17 Mary Wroth, The Second Part of the Countess of Montgomery’s Urania, edited 
Josephine A. Roberts and completed by Suzanne Gossett and Janel Mueller. 
Medieval and Renaissance Texts & Studies, 211 (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona Center 
for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1999), 296. All further citations to this work 
will be inserted parenthetically in the text, with II indicating Second Part.   
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reflects the narrative’s forays into realism, however, since human 
stories are always subject to the vagaries of memory, omission, and 
reconstruction.  
 At the same time, however, the long and repetitive tales of 
woe do not escape the narrator’s signature irony, despite how 
seriously they are offered and how critical they are in determining 
the direction of the narrative. Floristello, for example, son of 
Urania and Steriamus, utters a long, impassioned lament over his 
inability to reach his unknown lover. He is not named in this 
passage, however, and the reader knows only that one of the 
princes of Albania is speaking as he mourns his situation: 
 
‘O miserable creature,’ sayd hee, ‘what see I here 
butt as miserable a wante as my most miserable 
misfortunes have plung’d mee into? Wher, O wher, is 
my deerer self? Unlucky plaines, thus to bee made 
baren of the whole earthes hapines, in beeing without 
you. You, O you, the darling of the worlde, the 
ornament of Nature, the glory and onely miroir of her 
sex.’ (II.332)  
 
As one might expect, Floristello’s tormented cries continue for 
some time, and this passage represents only a portion of his 
sorrowful utterances.  However critical such outpourings are in the 
Urania, however, a mysterious unidentified “Voice” soon forbids 
further outbursts of this kind.  Denying Floristello the opportunity 
to talk directly with his unknown beloved, telling him that 
“charmes admitt noe discourse” (II.334), he is allowed to look at 
the lady, but then is sent on his way with a warning that romantic 
bliss is not imminent: “This adventure is reserved for you, and you 
shall have this lady you soe much covett, butt you must follow 
other, and pass many other adventures first” (II.333). Here, the 
narrative voice, speaking through the “Voice,” reminds readers that 
the emotional excess of the text should not be taken too seriously.  
Thus, the chastened Floristello, who never questions the source or 
veracity of the unusual voice that speaks to him, goes sadly on his 
way: 
 This was though a hopefull, yett a cruell dampe to the  
 Allbanian. Yett hee knew fate must be observ’d, soe 
 with most sad butt affectionate lookes hee departed, 
 keeping his eyes on her, and after on the place, as 
 longe as any glimmering sight of either cowld bee 
 disern’d. And soe in as much haste as men make 
 from the most poysenous infections, hee posted, 
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 leaving Countrye, Parents, and all, to seek novellties, 
 since destined soe, and yett leave his hart and best 
 delights beehinde him. (II.334) 
 
As he rides off, the narrator declares that Floristello is “fettered in 
the strongest bonds of cruell slavery to the cruellest destinie of 
loving” (II.334), but immediately turns to another character and 
another story. By not allowing him access to “discourse,” any 
Uranian character’s most powerful weapon in love and in life, the 
narrator brings an ironic halt to his role in the text at this juncture.  
Without discourse, the characters cannot participate in the action at 
hand. Since the narrative refers to Floristello only by his role in the 
world—the Albanian Prince—it alerts the reader to the mysterious 
voice’s implicit admonition that he should “shut up and go make a 
name for yourself before seeking love.” As Lamb comments, the 
narrator is quite sympathetic towards long laments of thwarted 
love: “Like those who hear her story, the narrator herself is 
commanded by love, her writing is love, and love itself has 
become a narrative principle.”18 Still, the narrative also regularly 
reminds its characters that there are limits to its indulgence in this 
regard. Personal stories may move the action, but nothing concrete 
can happen while characters are busy emoting. Emotional venting 
also generally fails to produce positive romantic outcomes.   
 Nevertheless, tales of love predominate in this text that 
can aptly, though not definitively, be named a romance.  While this 
genre encompasses many aspects that have nothing to do with 
amorous interchange, in the Urania such relationships, whether 
fruitful or painful, take center stage despite the powerful political 
positions held by most of the main characters. While both male and 
female figures contend with war, religious strife, and other 
assorted conflicts throughout the Urania, nothing takes precedence 
over their exploits in love. In fact, since most of the central figures 
are monarchs who marry other monarchs, their romantic 
adventures generally intersect with their political endeavors.  
Falling in love typically carries governmental implications of some 
kind in addition to the standard emotional and familial 
consequences. 
 Given the repetitive nature of these woeful tales of love 
gone wrong and the relative stasis of the relationship between 
Pamphilia and Amphilanthus, these stories have to move the 
overall narrative forward in order to counterbalance the inertia they 
 
18 Lamb, “Biopolitics,” 118.  
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so often represent. While a great many things happen to the various 
lovers in the Urania, their basic situations remain remarkably 
similar and stable. In the case of Pamphilia and Amphilanthus, 
moreover, nothing ever really changes. Despite marrying each 
other and then wedding other people, the partners in this couple 
remain painfully enraptured with each other, with no hope of any 
resolution to their romantically unsatisfying circumstances. 
However significant marriage to each other and then to others 
might appear to be, therefore, even these seemingly definitive 
events do not change the heartfelt but ill-fated passion this pair 
feels for each other; nor do they materially alter their situations. A 
blissful end to their story would not be practical within the 
parameters of this narrative and would counter the underlying 
pessimism that imbues it. It would also undermine the diffusion 
that characterizes people’s lives as reflected in the Urania and 
which prompts Lamb to call the text “the ‘most diffuse’ romance 
in [the] genre.”19 
 Typically, the Urania offers stories that repeat, with 
variations, rather than stories than reach closure. The only absolute 
closure that humans may reach is death, and in a tale drawing from 
both Christianity and the occult, even the finality of that event 
remains ambiguous. In addition, as Lamb argues, Wroth’s decision 
to end her tale in mid-stream “signifies a shift of focus from the 
events of her own life and the society of her peers to a life-
affirming absorption in the never-ending events of the lives of the 
next generation.”20 The unfulfilled romance, moreover, provides 
endless narrative fodder. Even though the basic tale is spread 
among numerous different figures in order to minimize the 
seemingly endless repetition of these narratives, the contours of the 
basic story remain the same. Often contributing to the roman à clef 
aspects of the Urania, the continuous tales of sorrow share enough 
similarities that readers who do not pay close attention will still 
grasp the function of such stories.21   
 
19 Lamb, “Biopolitics,” 107.  
20 Mary Ellen Lamb, Gender and Authorship in the Sidney Circle (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 148.  
21 I was fortunate to have generous and astute anonymous readers for this essay and 
I am grateful for their suggestions.  One reader understandably expressed concern 
over the implication that readers do not need to pay close attention to the text. In 
response, I suggest that such a multi-dimensioned text provokes numerous reading 
strategies, reflecting its “wave and particle” aspects. Readers gain certain forms of 
understanding when they read closely, but also acquire a different, yet still 
“legitimate” reading when they get lost in the text. 
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 Even fairly late in the printed Urania, for example, 
Pamphilia is found grieving over her lack of news from 
Amphilanthus, who “had forgot to write” (I.462). In order to 
distract her from this sorrow, Meriana decides to recount love 
stories to the Queen: “Meriana likewise to make her discourse, and 
passe away the time, would often tell her stories she had knowne 
of his affection” (I.462). This plan backfires, however, as 
Pamphilia vows silence, that is, a break from discourse, rather than 
speaking or hearing anything that could discredit her neglectful 
love who is about to be crowned emperor: 
 
Sweet Meriana, those dayes now are pass’d of my 
best delights, be not you an increaser of my woe, but 
curst remembrance, for no new act of his in this 
change presents it selfe, but gives a deaths blow to 
our ancient loves.  I could almost be brought to tell it 
her my selfe, and would, were it not to discover his 
forgetfulnes and cruelty; but rather then my lips shall 
give the least way to discover any fault in him, I wil 
conceale all though they breake my heart; and if I 
only could be saved by accusing him, I sooner would 
be secret and so dye: no, my love will not let me use 
thee ill; then be it as it is, Ile live forsaken and 
forlorne, yet silently I will indure this wrong.  
(I.462-3) 
 
The storytelling here fails to calm Pamphilia’s pain, but it still 
fulfills its narrative function of enabling the story to move toward 
Frankfort and the coronation without concerns that Pamphilia’s 
sorrow will intrude on that celebration. Notably, however, it is 
Pamphilia’s discourse about silence, not actual silence, which she 
contributes to the text at this point.  Still, her vow to keep her woe 
private facilitates the immediate change in tone to “greatest 
applause and content” in Frankfort (I.463).  
 At the same time, a reader needs to remain alert through 
Wroth’s dense prose in order to ensure that it is Pamphilia who is 
tormented here, not one of the many other women who suffer 
similar fates in the Urania. As Lamb indicates, this is not a text 
that can be followed easily: “Because it is virtually impossible to 
remember all the characters and plots, the Urania demands of its 
readers that they relinquish this form of mastery to abandon 
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themselves to the flow of the text.”22 Without the modern 
apparatus valiantly compiled by its editors with the assistance of 
Micheline White, many modern readers would undoubtedly be 
continually confused as they worked their way through the 
vagaries of the narrative. This text is not easy to read, even for its 
most attentive audience, and Lamb is right to suggest that this 
circumlocution is not accidental.  Presumably even a seventeenth-
century listener would have had similar difficulties in keeping it 
straight, no matter how attuned to oral transmission. In short, this 
is a confusing text that seems to demand that its audience attend to 
missing pronouns and misleading locution, meandering storylines, 
and contradictory narratives. At the same time, as Lamb suggests, 
readers often impose an “artificial coherence” upon the text that 
“distorts a central feature of the Urania: a refusal to cohere.”23 
Traditional close reading, in other words, may be something that 
the text actively resists. Once again, however, this confusing 
literary style enables Wroth to represent the complexities and 
inconsistencies of a human life.   
 Although she is certainly not attempting strict realism, 
Wroth does offer a document that more closely follows the 
contours of an actual life than many more tightly fashioned literary 
texts achieve. Someone who actually knew a woman like 
Pamphilia, for example, would probably get as confused by the 
twists and turns comprising her life as any of Wroth’s readers do.  
Like the reader, moreover, this fictive friend would probably not 
need to attend to every word uttered by the forlorn lover or by 
those who share her fate in the narrative. The gist of the message is 
often sufficient in these instances: a lover or husband has 
mistreated the lady in question or her father has forced her into an 
unacceptable marriage instead of letting her remain with the man 
she truly loves. These scenarios occur frequently enough that every 
auditor or reader can grasp what is going on with the sparest of 
details. They can readily fill in the rest.  Although closer readings 
generally offer insight into the interconnected aspects of the 
Urania and its broader goals, the stories of thwarted love are still 
similar enough to be largely interchangeable, as this familiar-
sounding excerpt indicates:   
 
Woe is mee, I lost all my comfort, all my joy by that; 
but at last a greater ill tooke mee, for another got him 
 
22 Lamb, “Biopolitics,” 107-108.  
23 Lamb, “Biopolitics,” 107.  
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from us both, who had long sought it, but while he 
held fast to me, she could not gaine him, beauty was 
the untying of my blisse, and wit her losse, yet I had 
the fairer share in loosing that, a faire creature was 
my undoer, like the fortune of Paris, she a terrible 
harme to have her joy, and hopes bereft her by a witt, 
which gaining discover’d her want. (I.531) 
 
While a small number of readers may know the Urania well 
enough that they will immediately cry, “Why, that’s the story of 
Pelarina, who else?” more typical readers would be unable to 
identify this story so readily—particularly since the story is told to 
an audience including the similarly-named Perselina.24 There is not 
enough that is unique about the lovelorn Pelarina to keep her fresh 
in the minds of readers or listeners unless they have unusually 
strong memories or latch on to something in the story that most 
readers will overlook. While Pelarina’s tale of romantic woe might  
(or might not) resonate while it is being told, once the lady has 
shared the story of her repentant journey to Jerusalem, it seems 
unlikely to have a significant impact on anyone who has heard or 
read it. In the Urania, the tale seems to be told primarily for the 
sake of Perselina, who initially appears not to have learned the 
intended lessons:  
 
Perselina found in her selfe she should never come to 
that excellency of constancy; wherfore she admired, 
though scarce commended her richnes, in that plenty, 
and fulnesse, and being call’d by Rosindy, left the 
constant Lady to her vertuous vowes and religious 
truth, who lived the rest as she had begun her dayes   
in fervent zeale and affection.  (I.534) 
 
In typical Uranian fashion, however, Perselina then almost 
immediately marries, despite her doubts about constancy, 
suggesting that the story has changed her views, regardless of her 
prior resistance.  The readers receive the last word of her that they 
will hear in the text just a few lines later:   
 
[T]he young Princesse soone after tooke her minde 
and former resolution, marrying her selfe with her 
 
24 Jennifer Lee Carrell also includes this tale in her analysis of the Urania, so 
readers who have recently read her essay are likely to remember it.  
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chosen  love: some busines there was before it could 
bee effected; but the effect came happily to their 
owne resolutions conclusion, and peace, the Nurse of 
love was among them. (I.534) 
 
Thus, Perselina and Pelarina are both quickly dispatched within a 
few lines of each other and neither reappears again. They have 
served their purpose from the perspectives of both roman and 
romance, however. While Persalina’s decision to marry is 
presented fairly abruptly, it demonstrates the kind of cause and 
effect action that these call and response stories often elicit. 
Pelarina’s life does not change as a result of sharing her tale, but 
Perselina’s is altered significantly. 
  At this point, the narrative turns to Philarchos and Orilena 
on the way to Mytelin, where another call and response dyad is 
established.  As they journey, they encounter an unnamed “Lady of 
Nycaria” whose familiar story of an unhappy fate in love leaves 
her:  
weeping and wringing her hands, all in mourning, 
and more sorrowfull yet in her illustrious expression 
then the mourning could shew mournfull, and 
therefore shee more then their habits mourn’d. Shee 
onely look’d up, and cast her eyes downe againe, and 
her face  against the ground, crying. (I.535) 
 
While this lady also only exists for a few pages, the readers learn 
the full story of the rest of her life, after Philarchos and Orilena 
“left her on a Rock in a little Iland with an old religious father”: 
 
[T]here shee remained, and spent the rest of her 
dayes in prayer, her Dog still garding her, which at 
her death brought her (who out-lived the old man) to 
have a Christian buriall by his howling and crying, 
calling passengers in, and buried her, but could not 
win the Dog from the grave, but there he died.  
(I.540-1)  
 
Although the woman’s death appears to end her story, once again it 
provides a segue into what transpires next, in this case, the 
foreshadowing of Philarchos’ and Orilena’s deaths:  
 
 Philarchos and his deare held on their way for 
 Mytelin, where with joy, and feasts they were 
 welcomed, and lived ever, till their ends happily, but 
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 Philarchos thought his end the crueller, because faire 
 Orilena was taken from him, desiring to die  together.
 (I.541) 
 
While the pair appears several times in the second part of the 
Urania, the readers are reminded fairly early in their story that they 
will eventually die, but without the marital traumas undergone by 
the Lady of Nycaria. The vision of Philarchos’ and Orilena’s 
deaths, therefore, becomes the end toward which these prior stories 
have pointed. Although their actual (however fictive) lives will not 
end for quite some time, the readers are being reminded that such 
mortality is always part of the narrative fabric being presented.  
Once again, resembling a human life, the Urania and its characters 
are shown in a context that contains hints of their ending just as the 
heart of their stories are being told. 
  Like many of its predecessors, the Urania is lengthy and 
unfinished. While its abrupt Arcadian ending could suggest that the 
text’s inconclusiveness reflects a note of homage to Philip Sidney 
(and in some ways, of course it does), it also highlights the way 
this particular narrative is organized around the human life.  Unlike 
The Faerie Queene, which ends before considering all of the 
public and private virtues, or The Canterbury Tales, which fails to 
bring all the pilgrims to their ultimate destination, the Urania 
reaches its conclusion while its central couple is still alive, and 
before the Knight of the Faire Design’s prophesied victory makes 
manifest Amphilanthus’s failure to achieve lasting peace for his 
empire. By the time that “Amphilanthus wa[s] extreamly” (II.418) 
“whatever,” he and Pamphilia have already begun to lose members 
of their own and later generations through causes unrelated to 
combat or childbirth. Mortality is no longer a concept applicable to 
others; it has entered their inner circle. Just as Philarchos and 
Orilena must die, so must all of the human figures who populate 
the text. 
 It appears, however, that Wroth was not prepared to 
contend with finality on behalf of her main characters—that is, 
Pamphilia, Amphilanthus, and Urania. Instead, she chooses to 
conclude her narrative, however, inconclusively, with a very 
familiar scene, whereby her thwarted lovers seem to be in the 
living company of Pamphilia’s recently deceased husband as they 
stop to hear a tale from the “Island of Love,” this time told by 
Andromarko: 
 
 I ame in doubt whether I can bee soe happy as to see 
 your selves, butt that, as this is the Island of love, soe  
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 for loves sweet sake, Phantasmes rise in the shapes of 
 them I most honor and Love. For, my deerest Lord, 
 how cowld I hope or immaginn you would honor this 
 poore place with your happy presence? (II.418) 
 
Notably, however, this story refers to the possibility of 
Amphilanthus’s death and the impact it would have on the course 
of Faire Designe’s foretold triumph: 
 
 And Sir, your Faire Designe hath now left all things 
 (being certainly informed by severall wisards, 
 especially the sage Melissea), that the great 
 Inchantment will nott bee concluded thes many 
 yeeres; nay nev [er], if you live nott to assiste in the 
 concluding. (II.418) 
 
The book then ends, just as Amphilanthus is identified as the 
critical but supporting player in a grand finale that will be 
engineered at some distant date by the Knight of the Faire Designe, 
who may—or may not—be his son. The stage is set for the passing 
of his role and influence, but the narrative stops as soon as this 
eventuality is uttered. The author/narrator may know that 
Amphilanthus, like all of us, will die and leave behind whatever 
legacy he has established at the point of this demise, but she is not 
prepared to take this story down that road. As Lamb notes, 
Andromarko’s speech describes “its own final deferral and the 
deferral of the Urania itself.”25 Here, of course, Wroth draws from 
what Patricia Parker describes as the major tenet of a “romance” 
which is “characterized primarily as a form which simultaneously 
quests for and postpones a particular end.”26 The Countess of 
Montgomery’s Urania concludes romantically, therefore, but also 
similarly to its beginning, with a tale that will lead to a few years 
of additional adventures, whether or not these further events ever 
get reported. While the Urania defies closure, therefore, it still 
stylistically circles back and ends as it starts, with a story designed 
to move the action forward into  its  next  cycle,  even  though  that  
cycle never materializes.27 
 
25 Lamb, “Biopolitics,” 129.  
26 Patricia A. Parker, Inescapable Romance: Studies in the Poetics of a Mode 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 4.  
27 I am grateful to Emory University’s International office (ICIS) for providing the 
funding that enabled me to present a version of this essay at the Romance 
conference in honor of Victor Skretkowicz at the University of Dundee in 2007. 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
Spenser’s Romances:  From “Lying Shepherd’s 
Tongues” to Wedded Love 
 
JEAN R. BRINK 
Huntington Library 
 
There is always some challenge in differentiating between the 
fictional narrative that a poet constructs about himself and the 
literal facts of his life.  Documenting Spenser's life is particularly 
challenging because his poems are ostensibly autobiographical, 
and this autobiographical suggestiveness invites us to conflate the 
author with his narrator, Colin Clout. If we examine the facts of 
Spenser’s life and juxtapose them with his fictional self-
presentations, we recognize this fictional autobiography can be 
misleading. Spenser made fiction of three romances. His best-
known occurred in 1594 when he married his second wife, 
Elizabeth Boyle, and celebrated the event in the Epithalamion.  He 
also fictionalized two romances in 1579, one with a man, 
Hobbinol, and one with a woman, Rosalind.  I will demonstrate 
that these fictions are undercut by the facts of his first marriage and 
conclude by making suggestions regarding the impact of his first 
marriage on his career. 
 Determining how, or even if, Colin Clout and Edmund 
Spenser intersect is complicated by the insistence of early 
commentators on accepting autobiographical statements as literal 
fact.  Nineteenth and early twentieth scholars expected fiction to be 
grounded in real life and, in the case of sixteenth-century love 
poetry, the real life of the author.  Poets were expected to be 
sincere, and so it became an important project for critics to identify 
Shakespeare’s dark lady, Sidney’s Stella, and Spenser’s Rosalind.    
 To these critics and commentators Edmund Spenser was a 
god-send. His love sonnets, the Amoretti, were followed by an 
Epithalamion, a wedding poem addressed to his bride, Elizabeth 
Boyle. Not only were Spenser’s sonnets addressed to a real 
woman, but in this instance the poet-lover was so sincere that he 
actually married his mistress!  In the Epithalamion, he adapts the 
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conventional blazon and pays tribute to her “goodly eyes lyke 
Saphyres,” her cheeks “lyke apples which the sun hath rudded,” 
and “her lips lyke cherryes, charming men to byte” (ll.171, 173-
4).1  Then, as her husband to be, he very chastely deals with her 
more private charms: “And all her body like a palace fayre, / 
Ascending uppe with many a stately stayre, / To honors seat and 
chastities sweet bowre” (ll.178-80).   
 Spenser’s Amoretti and Epithalamion were followed by 
his real-life marriage to Elizabeth Boyle in 1594. There is no 
extant documentary record of the wedding; the date has been 
calculated on the basis of numerological allusions.2 This 1594 
marriage culminating in a magnificent epithalamion was Spenser’s 
third literary romance. Fifteen years earlier in 1579 Spenser had 
published the Shepheardes Calender, and in this poem had 
described two courtships that were less attractive to critics than the 
romance with Elizabeth Boyle. In the Shepheardes Calender, in 
addition to an unhappy romance with a mysterious Rosalind, Colin 
Clout has a male lover. Until the 1990s the suggestion of a 
romantic connection between Hobbinol and Colin was so 
troublesome that most commentators preferred to ignore it.3  Colin 
describes the relationship as follows: 
 
 It is not Hobbinol, wherefore I plaine, 
 Albee my love he seeke with dayly suit: 
 His clownish gifts and curtsies I disdaine, 
 His kiddes, his cracknelles, and his early fruit. 
 Ah foolish Hobbinol, thy gyfts bene vayne: 
 Colin them gives to Rosalind againe.  (Januarye, ll.55-61) 
 
Hobbinol is enamored of Colin Clout, but Colin, who is securely 
heterosexual, gives the presents he receives from his male admirer 
to his hard-hearted Petrarchan mistress, Rosalind.   
 
1 Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems of Edmund Spenser, ed. William A. Oram, 
Einar Bjorvand, Ronald Bond, Thomas H. Cain, Alexander Dunlop, and Richard 
Schell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 669. All further references to 
Spenser’s shorter poems will be to this edition.  For verse line numbers will be cited 
parenthetically in the text; page numbers will be cited for the prose gloss. 
2 For the numerological analysis, see A. Kent Hieatt, Short Times Endless 
Monument (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960). 
3 For exceptions, see commentary on the homo-erotic elements in Colin’s 
relationship with Hobbinol by Jonathan Goldberg, “Colin to Hobbinol: Spenser’s 
Familiar Letters,” South Atlantic Quarterly 88 (1989): 107-26 and Sodometries: 
Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 
63-80. For background and context, see Bruce R. Smith, Homosexual Desire in 
Shakespeare’s England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 94-9.   
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 Hobbinol’s unrequited love for the male Colin Clout has a 
classical precedent in Vergil—just as Colin’s unrequited love for 
his mistress Rosalind has a precedent in Petrarch. Vergil’s second 
Eclogue was taught in every Elizabethan grammar school, and it 
relates the story of the rustic Corydon, who gives gifts to the city 
boy Alexis, but is scornfully rejected. Even though the gloss to 
Januarye teasingly suggests that the poem alludes to real people, 
early twentieth-century critics preferred to treat the romance 
between Hobbinol and Colin as an allusion to Vergil. In 
Shepheardes Calender, Hobbinol, the man in love with Colin, is 
identified as Spenser's real life friend, Gabriel Harvey. The gloss 
on “January,” l.59 tells us that Hobbinol “is a fained country name, 
whereby, it being so commune and usuall, seemeth to be hidden 
the person of some his very speciall and most familiar freend, 
whom he entirely and extraordinarily beloved, as peradventure 
shall be more largely declared hereafter” (33). 
 Because Harvey is identified as Hobbinol and the gloss 
extends the suggestion of a homo-erotic attachment on Harvey's 
part, I am persuaded that Harvey must have been involved in 
composing E. K.’s Glosse.4 It is one thing to say that Hobbinol 
gives Colin gifts and that Colin then gives them to Rosalind, but 
quite another to bring up pederasty in an exposition of this gift 
exchange:  “In thys place seemeth to be some sauour of disorderly 
loue, which the learned call paederestie” (33-4). E. K. expounds 
the grounds for legitimizing love between men and even elevating 
their affectionate bonds over love between a woman and a man: 
 
For who that hath red Plato his dialogue called 
Alcibiades, Xenophon and Maximus Tyrius  of 
Socrates opinions, may easily perceive, that such 
love is muche to be alowed and liked of, 
specially so meant, as Socrates used it: who 
sayth, that in deede he loued Alcybiades 
extremely, yet not Alcybiades person, but hys 
soule, which is Alcibiades owne selfe. (34)  
 
After associating pederasty with platonic love, E. K. then dismisses 
heterosexual love because he thinks that it easily degenerates into 
 
4 For a nuanced and important discussion of the collaboration between Harvey and 
Spenser, see Jon Quitslund, “Questionable Evidence in the Letters of 1580 between 
Gabriel Harvey and Edmund Spenser,” Spenser’s Life and the Subject of Biography, 
ed. Judith H. Anderson, Donald Cheney, David A. Richardson (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 81-98.  
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lust: “And so is paederastice much to be praeferred before 
gynerastice, that is the love whiche enflameth men with lust 
toward woman kind” (34). After linking platonic love and 
pederasty, Hobbinol elevates it over heterosexual love, but adds 
the qualification that he deplores “unlawful fleshlinesse”: “But yet 
let no man thinke, that herein I stand with Lucian or hys develish 
disciple  Unico Aretino, in defence of execrable and horrible 
sinnes of forbidden and unlawful fleshlinesse” (34). Gabriel 
Harvey was trying to establish himself at Cambridge as a means of 
gaining access to the court. The entire episode and the commentary 
on it are potentially humorous, but only if Harvey, who is a 
university don, is in on the joke.  Pederasty means “love of boys,” 
and even though some commentators on Plato may have 
allegorized pederasty as platonic love, E. K. is well aware that not 
everyone in his culture is sanguine about love between men and 
boys.  Not everyone, in fact, thought that Vergil was writing about 
platonic love. In De ratione studii (1511) Erasmus supplies 
detailed instructions on how to deal with the homosexual content 
in Eclogue Two. He says nothing about spiritual pederasty, but 
instead encourages the instructor to talk about the virtues of true 
amicitia between those who are similar and so to distract students 
from the homosexuality in the poem.5   
 Uneasiness with this romance between men led early 
twentieth-century critics to focus on Colin and Rosalind. E. K. 
hints that the mysterious Rosalind is a real person and that her 
name may be an anagram: 
 
Rosalinde) is … a feigned name, which being wel ordred, 
wil bewray the very name of hys loue and mistresse, 
whom by that name he coloureth. So as Ouid shadoweth 
hys loue under the name of Corynna, which of some is 
supposed to be Julia,  themperor Augustus his daughter, 
and wyfe to Agryppa. … And this generally hath bene a 
common custome of counterfeicting the names of secret 
Personages. (34-5) 
 
 
5 Erasmus’ De ratione studii (1512), ed. J.-C. Margolin; Erasmus, Opera Omnia 
(Amsterdam, 1971), I, pt. 2, 139-40; Erasmus’ commentary was widely reprinted in 
collections on educational theory. For discussion of Erasmus’ pedagogical approach 
to Greek and Roman homosexuality, see Anthony Grafton, Defenders of the Text: 
The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science: 1450-1800 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), 37-8, 256 and Anthony Grafton, Bring Out Your 
Dead: The Past as Revelation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
104, 242.  
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Rev. Alexander Grosart, Spenser's nineteenth-century biographer, 
decided that Rosalind, Colin’s fair mistress, lived in “north-east 
Lancashire.” He speculates that when Spenser left Cambridge in 
1574, he went into Lancashire to visit his extended family and 
became a victim of the charms of the fair Rosalind.6 
 The account of Spenser’s love affair with a northern 
beauty developed out of reading fictions in the Shepheardes 
Calender as facts and then trying to document them.  It is true that 
pastorals shadowed real people and events under the fictional 
rubric of characters who played pipes and tended sheep, and it is 
very true that the gloss of the Shepheardes Calender invites such a 
reading. E. K. repeatedly hints that Rosalind is an actual person.  
He tantalizes credulous readers when he claims that the name 
“Rosalinde,” if the letters are rearranged, will reveal the name of 
Colin's mistress (34). The name Rosalind is not a very plausible 
source for an anagram—far less so than Samuel Daniel’s Delia 
who easily metamorphoses into “ideal.” Nevertheless, scholars had 
some support from seventeenth-century commentators. On the 
second-hand authority of John Dryden, who was not born until 
after Spenser's death, John Aubrey claimed that Spenser “was an 
acquaintance and frequenter of Sir Erasmus Dreyden” and that 
Rosalinde was “a kinswoman of Sir Erasmus’s Lady.”7 Aubrey 
loved gossip, but he is not always reliable. His carelessness about 
facts even led him to accept 1510 as the date of Spenser’s birth 
even though Spenser was not born until the 1550s.  
 Various scholars have attempted to identify Rosalinde and 
have suggested Rose or Rosa Lynde (Church), Rose Daniel 
(Halpin), Rose Dinle or Dinley (Fleay), Rose Dineley of 
Downham, Lancashire (Grosart), Elizabeth North (Long).8  In an 
important challenge to Grosart, Percy Long corrects Grosart’s 
misreading of locations mentioned in Harvey’s manuscript Letter-
Book and argues that Rosalinde lived in or near Cambridge, 
pointing out that Cambridge could be considered north of London 
and of Kent.9  Grosart, however, seems to have carried the day on 
this issue, influencing the biography still repeated in standard 
 
6 Rev. Alexander Grosart, ed., Complete Works in Verse and Prose of Edmund.  10 
vols. (London: Hazell, Watson, and Viney, 1882-8), 1:43-61.  
7 For an overview and convenient summary of early scholarship, see Spenser 
Variorum, Minor Poems, ed. Edwin Greenlaw, et al. (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press, 1943), 1, Appendix 4, pp. 651-5, esp. 652 (Aubrey).   
8 Spenser Variorum, 1: 652-5. 
9 Percy Long, “Spenser’s Visit to the North of England,” Modern Language Notes, 
21 (1917): 58-9.  For a judicious summary of the evidence for a real Rosalind, see 
Percy Long, “Spenser’s Rosalind,” Anglia 31 (1908): 72-104. 
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reference works. He contended that Spenser’s family had 
originated from Lancashire and that Rosalinde lived literally in the 
north of England. Once Grosart persuaded himself that Spenser’s 
extended family resided in Lancashire rather than London, he was 
in a position to amass archival detail because he himself resided in 
Lancashire at St. George’s, Blackburn.     
Alexander Judson, author of the standard biography 
published with the Spenser Variorum, repeats Grosart’s 
biographical assertion that Spenser visited the north of England 
where he engaged in a love affair with the mysterious Rosalind.10  
There is no documentary evidence for this visit to northern 
England, and inserting it into an account of Spenser’s life makes 
him appear strangely indifferent to a future career. Attempts to 
identify and physically locate Rosalind are symptomatic of the 
tradition of approaching Spenser's work as personal autobiography; 
but in this instance, there is documentary evidence that Edmund 
Spenser cannot be equated with Colin Clout.  Between April 1579, 
when the dedicatory epistle was signed and dated, and the entry of   
the Shepheardes Calender into the Stationers’ Register on 27 
October 1579, Spenser married Machabyas Chylde at St. 
Margaret’s, Westminster.11 No one has found or is likely to find an 
anagram for Rosalind in Machabyas Chylde.   
Mark Eccles identified the church record for the 
wedding.12  The marriage is also confirmed by internal references 
in Spenser’s correspondence with Gabriel Harvey in Familiar 
Letters.13 Gabriel Harvey alludes to Spenser’s new wife and sends 
her his greetings, addressing her as “mea Domina Immerito, mea 
bellissima Collina Clouta” (G1r). Harvey plays on Spenser’s 
pseudonym “Colin Clout” when he calls Machabyas “Colina 
Clout.” He also calls her “Domina Immerito,” alluding to 
Spenser’s use of the epithet “Immerito” in the Induction to the 
Shepheardes Calender. The details of Spenser’s first marriage 
 
10 Alexander C. Judson, The Life of Edmund Spenser (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1945), published as Spenser Variorum, 8: 44-7.   
11 For a deductive argument that there must have been a first marriage, see Douglas 
Hamer, Review of English Studies, 7 (1931): 271-86. 
12 Mark Eccles, Times Literary Supplement  (December 31, 1931), 1053.  See also 
Eccles, “Elizabethan Edmund Spensers,” Modern Language Quarterly, 5 (1944): 
413-27. 
13 Three Proper, and Wittie, Familiar Letters: lately passed between two Universitie 
men (London: H. Bynneman, 1580). Signatures will be cited parenthetically in the 
text. Because there are five letters—not three—and Harvey later published Foure 
Letters, I will allude to the Harvey-Spenser correspondence as Familiar Letters.  
Henry Bynneman printed these letters after Spenser had left for Ireland.   
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were further documented in the mid-twentieth century by Douglas 
Hamer and W. Welply working independently, but this 
documentation has had virtually no impact on Spenser's 
biography.14 His second marriage to Elizabeth Boyle in 1594 
inscribed in the Amoretti and the Epithalamion has remained 
central to critical and biographical discussion of Spenser’s 
romances.   
Spenser created the fiction of Colin’s unrequited love for 
Rosalind and embedded it in the Shepheardes Calender, but his 
real life romance with Machabyas Chylde ended in marriage.  
Underestimating the importance of this marriage has distorted our 
understanding of Spenser’s career track. References to Spenser 
cease to appear in the account books of Pembroke College in the 
summer of 1574 when he was twenty years old.15  His birth date is 
less uncertain than has been reported.  We can be fairly certain that 
he was born in 1554 as stated in Amoretti LX.16 He matriculated at 
Cambridge in 1569; the usual age of admission was fourteen or 
fifteen—not sixteen.17 The manufactured fiction that Spenser left 
Cambridge in 1574 to visit relatives, met Rosalind, and stayed in 
 
14 Douglas Hamer, “Edmund Spenser: Some Further Notes,” Notes and Queries 162 
(1932): 380-4 and “Some Spenser Problems,” Notes and Queries 180 (1941): 165-
7, 183-4, 206-9, 220-4, 238-41. W. H. Welply, “The Family and Descendants of 
Edmund Spenser,” Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Society, 28 
(1922): 22-34, 49-62. For a listing of Welply’s numerous articles in Notes and 
Queries from 1924-1944, see Anderson, et al, Spenser’s Life, 215.  
15 Aubrey Attwater, Pembroke College, Cambridge: A Short History, ed. S. C. 
Roberts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), 49. The Pembroke 
College Account Books list no entries for Spenser after 1574.   
16 See the influential commentary on this passage in the Spenser Variorum, Minor 
Poems, 2: 421, 439-40. Grosart argues from the wedding date of June 11, 1594 and 
the date of entry in the Stationers’ Register, November 19, 1594, with the statement 
“written not long since” as evidence that Amoretti, or at least the sonnets addressed 
to Elizabeth Boyle, were written in 1593 or 1594, but the arithmetic becomes 
confused:  “If, as the poet says, he was then forty-one, he was born in 1552 or 1553.  
But ‘fourty yeares’ may be a round number, and the possibilities may include 1550 
or 1551” (440). These estimates ignore the evidence of his age at matriculation at 
Cambridge.   
17 M. B. Hackett, The Original Statutes of Cambridge University: The Text and Its 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 167. See also J. A. 
Weisheipl, “The   Structure of the Arts Faculty in the Medieval University,” British 
Journal of Educational Studies 19.3 (1971): 266 and S. E. Morrison, The Founding 
of Harvard College (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 32.  
Spenser, who was academically precocious, is more likely to have matriculated at 
fourteen (born 1555) than sixteen (1553).  The allusion to his fortieth birthday in 
Amoretti (1594) confirms fifteen. See Damian Riehl Leader, A History of the 
University of Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1: 36: 
“The normal age for a boy to enter university would be fifteen or sixteen, with 
exceptional boys starting earlier, and some rather later.” 
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the north until 1578 has always made the next documented event in 
Spenser’s career improbable. We know that Spenser served as a 
secretary to John Young when he became Bishop of Rochester in 
1578.18 It is unlikely that, after spending nearly four years in the 
north of England, Spenser would be summoned back to London in 
the spring of 1578 to become the secretary of Bishop John Young.   
It is more reasonable to assume that when Spenser left Cambridge 
in the summer of 1574, he went immediately to London where he 
found employment in the service of John Young and that he 
became sufficiently valuable as an employee so that Young made 
him his secretary upon being created a bishop. 
Young, who had been Master of Pembroke College prior 
to Spenser’s matriculation, served as Master for a total of eleven 
years. Throughout this period from 1567 to 1578 he resided 
principally in London where he held a number of ecclesiastical 
livings.19 He held a prebend under Alexander Nowell, Dean of St. 
Paul’s, for over fifteen years, not resigning it until a year after he 
became bishop.  He was installed as prebendary of Westminster on 
26 April 1571, a position he retained until his death. Young needed 
assistance in managing these many obligations, and it is almost 
certain that he employed Spenser before 1578 when he was 
appointed Bishop of Rochester. 
The romantic fiction of Rosalind has also led us to 
underestimate the significance of Spenser’s decision to marry 
Machabyas Chylde and the impact this marriage may have had on 
his career decisions. The author of the Faerie Queene did not 
endorse celibacy:  
 
 The loue of women not to entertaine; 
 A lesson too too hard for liuing clay.20 
 
He was interested in and attracted to women. Universities, 
however, did not encourage men who were serious about their 
academic careers to “entertain” the “loue of women.” The celibacy 
of fellows at Oxford and Cambridge was conventional in all 
colleges until the latter half of the nineteenth century. Like 
clergymen who wished to progress in the church hierarchy, 
scholars were supposed to be single in order to devote themselves 
 
18 For a summary of Young’s career, see Judson, Life, 48-9. 
19 For Young’s non-residence, see Attwater, Pembroke College, 44. 
20 The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton.  Text edited by Hiroshi Yamashita and 
Toshiyuki Suzuki. Longman Annotated Poets (London and Edinburgh: Pearson, 
2001), III. iv.26. All further references will be to this edition.  
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to their studies. This convention was so accepted that there were no 
statutes forbidding marriage in the charters of colleges that were 
founded before the Reformation.   
 Since Protestantism, in contrast to Roman Catholicism, 
favored the idea of a married clergy, colleges founded after the 
Reformation faced a dilemma. In 1585 when the strict Protestant 
Sir Walter Mildmay framed the statutes for Emmanuel College, 
like a solid Protestant, he disparaged celibacy and praised 
marriage, but then inconsistently but very explicitly prohibited any 
member of Emmanuel from marrying:   
 
 Although we willingly concede to marriage that 
honour which is accorded to it by the Holy Spirit in 
Holy Writ, and reject the opinion of those who have 
held that matrimony ought to be forbidden to a 
certain order of men, yet there are many and grave 
causes why we should suffer no one of those who 
shall be numbered among the members of our 
College to be married. We therefore desire and 
decree that if anyone hereafter who has a wife shall 
be elected in the College aforesaid, his election shall 
be held void, as of one unable to have any rights in 
the College aforesaid; and if he shall take a wife after 
his election, he shall forever lose all rights he may 
have obtained by such election.21  
 
Technically, the Master of a College was allowed to marry. The 
queen, however, opposed the marriage of senior fellows and 
masters. In 1561 she observed that cathedral churches and colleges 
were founded to house societies of “learned Men professing Study 
and Prayer for the Edification of the Church of God, & so 
consequently to serve the Commonwealth.”22 She had learned that 
“Prebendaries, Students, and Members” as well as “cheif 
Governors” kept wives, children, and nurses. So she decreed that 
no one, who was either the head or a member of a college or 
cathedral church, might house a wife and family within its 
precincts or even have a woman dwelling there. Anyone violating 
 
21 The Statutes of Sir Walter Mildmay, Kt Chancellor of the Exchequer and one of 
Her Majesty’s Privy Councillors; authorised by him for the government of 
Emmanuel College founded by him, trans. Frank Stubbings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 89. 
22 George Dyer, The Privileges of the University of Cambridge. 2 vols. (London: 
Longman, 1824), 1: 131-2. 
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this order would by her express order “forfeit all ecclesiasticall 
Promotions in any Cathedrall or Collegiate Church or College 
within this realm.” Spenser’s mentor, John Young, Master of 
Pembroke, married Grace Watts, widow of Thomas Watts, the 
Archdeacon of Middlesex; he did not forfeit his position, but he 
was not further promoted   
 Spenser’s academic prowess suggests that he could have 
remained at Cambridge on a fellowship after receiving the M.A.    
When Spenser’s B.A. was awarded in 1573, four of his classmates 
were elected to fellowships, and of these, three had ranked below 
him in the graduation list. According to John Venn, of the men 
proceeding to the M. A. at Cambridge, nine out of ten eventually 
took holy orders.23 Spenser, who received an M.A., must have 
been considering a career in the church when he served as 
secretary to Bishop Young in 1578. Young is unlikely to have 
appointed a secretary who had no interest in the church.  
Traditionally, a man without fortune or property had the choice of 
a career in the church or the military; marriage, as we have noted 
above, might further affect his career choices. Spenser’s marriage 
to Machabyas Chylde in 1579 may have been a watershed event in 
his life. This marriage meant that Spenser would experience 
obstacles in making his way in the university and in the church.  
Less than a year after marrying Machabyas, Spenser accepted a 
position with a military leader. He became the secretary of the new 
Lord Deputy of Ireland, Arthur Lord Grey of Wilton. This 
appointment would enable the young poet to see at first hand the 
wars that he wanted to write about. Colin Clout would be able to 
draw upon his own military experiences in writing his epic.  
Spenser may also have shifted his career path to accommodate  his  
position as the husband of Machabyas Chylde.  
 
23 Alumni Cantabrigienses: A Biographical List of All Known Students, Graduates 
and Holders of Office at the University of Cambridge from the Earliest Times to 
1900, compiled by John Venn and J. A. Venn (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1922), 1: xi. 
 
 
                                
 
 
 
European Erotic Romance:  Introduction 
 
VICTOR SKRETKOWICZ 
University of Dundee 
 
The ancient “love-and-adventure”—or “ideal”—prose romances 
that inspire the erotic romances of Sir Philip Sidney, William 
Shakespeare and Lady Mary Sidney Wroth were written in Greek 
between the first and fourth centuries A.D.1 While modern 
scholars know of “over twenty” novels of this type, no more than 
five survive complete. Of these, only the three by Longus, Achilles 
Tatius, and Heliodorus received wide circulation during the 
Renaissance. Relatively late manifestations of the European 
philhellene (“lovers of ancient Greece”) revival of Greco-Roman 
letters, they were published and translated during the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth-centuries. These works gave readers their first 
experience of the long-forgotten art of writing rhetorically 
complex, extended prose fiction in which the trials of love, 
resolved in the dénouement, mask an implicit moral and political 
allegory. 
Inevitably, coming during the Reformation, Counter-
Reformation and the Catholic Reformation, this cultural 
phenomenon was not without its religious and political 
dimensions. If “France in the sixteenth century displaced Italy as 
the pre-eminent centre of Hellenic studies in western Europe,”2 
rivalling, among others, Rome and the Vatican, Florence, Venice 
and Padua, its hegemony was challenged by French Protestant 
scholars in Geneva and elsewhere.3 Opposed to the Church of 
Rome and what they interpreted as its tyranny and its support for 
tyrannical monarchy, these Calvinist religious exiles regarded 
themselves as true Christians. Of republican orientation, they were 
 
1 B. P. Reardon, “Introduction,” in Collected Ancient Greek Novels, ed. by B. P. 
Reardon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 2-3. Unless otherwise 
noted, quotations from Longus, Achilles Tatius, and Heliodorus are from this 
edition, cited as “Reardon.” 
2 G. N. Sandy, “Resources for the Study of Ancient Greek in France,” in The 
Classical Heritage in France, ed. by G. N. Sandy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002), 48. 
3 P. Conner, Huguenot Heartland: Montauban and Southern French Calvinism 
during the Wars of Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). 
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determined to demonstrate that they were intellectually, morally, 
ethically, spiritually and politically superior to those of Roman 
persuasion. 
Erotic romance played its part in this complicated drama. 
Heliodorus first appeared from Protestant presses in Basel: 1534 in 
Greek; 1552 in Latin. The earliest complete Latin text of Achilles 
Tatius came out of Basel in 1554; the Greek in 1601 from 
Heidelberg. These editions both precede, and overlap with, Bishop 
Jacques Amyot’s French translations of Heliodorus (1547 [i.e., 
1548]; corrected 1559), Longus (1559), his monumental Plutarch’s 
Lives (1559), and François de Belleforest’s translation of Achilles 
Tatius (1568). 
On the Continent, both sides of the religious and political 
divide use prefatory dedications and addresses to the reader to 
politicise their publications. More subtly, Calvinist inspired 
translators painstakingly distinguish their work from fashionable 
courtly expansions, like Amyot’s and Belleforest’s, by making a 
concerted effort to represent their authors without textual 
embellishment or rhetorical ornamentation. Associating scholarly 
integrity with political and religious propaganda, they use the 
medium of print to create intellectual and spiritual bonds among 
disparate Protestant communities of quasi-republican inclination.  
The cumulative effects on content and style of these 
varying approaches to translation manifest themselves through 
detailed comparison of passages. How translation theory and 
practice affect the representation of the text, and attempt to guide 
reader response, is the thrust of these chapters on Longus, Achilles 
Tatius and Heliodorus.  
The three principal English exponents of rhetorically 
conscious Greco-Roman erotic romance were all witnesses to, and 
participants in, this war of rhetorical styles. It had been engendered 
by the preceding generation, and they were fully aware of its 
political and religious overtones. All three were born during the 
reign of Elizabeth I, when the bulk of literary output was 
patronised by first and second-generation Protestants of more or 
less Anglican or Calvinist disposition. Neither Sidney, 
Shakespeare nor Sidney Wroth, working in cadenced prose and 
dramatic verse, schematically shuns extremes of plainness and 
ornament. Rather, each studiously engages with the Renaissance 
politicisation of Greco-Roman models through negative portrayal  
of national and domestic tyranny, at times associating rhetorical 
with political style.  
Amyot’s translations and prefatory remarks may have 
established a precedent for French writers to address their readers, 
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emphasising the eloquence, morality and instruction contained in 
their fiction.4 The fashion was emulated in England, especially 
following the ascendancy in 1625 of Charles I and the French 
Henriette-Marie. Nonetheless, the earlier politicisation of stylised 
erotic romance by Sidney, Shakespeare and Sidney Wroth 
challenges the notion that “the idea of an aesthetic vocation of the 
genre has no impact before the translation of French heroic 
novels.”5 
The Calvinist emphasis on style as an identifier of 
political sympathies contrasts with the focus on “rhetoric” as 
encoded diction, particularly when used in meaningful clusters. 
Blair Worden traces this practice among the coterie of philhellene 
Protestants associated with the Sidney circle, whom he terms 
“forward Protestants.”6 Similarly David Norbrook notes how, from 
the second decade of the seventeenth century onwards, many 
writers of political polemic and its literary representations 
employed a hitherto undreamed of directness of expression.7  
In some measure both of these observations could apply 
to the potentially elitist, politically charged vocabulary used by 
Sidney, Shakespeare and Sidney Wroth. However, as these 
chapters illustrate, through consciously imitating and adapting the 
plots, structures, characters and literary styles of their Greco-
Roman literary precedents, these three demonstrate a potent 
rhetorical commitment to the evolving philhellene Protestant 
movement in England. In the larger social context, they politicise 
erotic romance by promoting tolerant pan-European Protestantism, 
destruction of tyrants, and the establishment of a notional English 
“republicanism” through elected, or chosen, consultative 
monarchy. On a deeply personal level, they portray selfless 
dedication to Christian stoicism, reverential respect for romantic 
love, and make a special effort to represent female dignity in the  
face of male tyranny.
 
4 L. Plazenet, L’ébahissement et la délectation. Réception comparée et poétiques du 
roman grec en France et en Angleterre aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles (Paris: Honoré 
Champion Éditeur, 1997), 679-80. 
5 Plazenet, L’ébahissement, 680: “L’idée d’une vocation esthétique du genre n’a pas 
d’impact avant la traduction des romans héroïques français.” 
6 Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and Elizabethan 
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 
7 David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 
1627-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
  
 
  
 
Professional Communications 
 
 
 
Tribute to Elizabeth Porges Watson, 1935- 2008 
 
We note with grief the recent death of our much-loved Elizabeth 
Porges Watson, whose paper on Anaxius and Amphialus delivered 
at Victor’s conference would have been included in this issue had 
not her passing prevented its reaching finished form. She is well 
known for her scholarship on folklore, published in such journals 
as Reinardus, Renaissance and Modern Studies, Spenser Studies, 
Explorations in Renaissance Culture, as well as in the Sidney 
Journal, where she advanced our knowledge of Sidney’s Arcadia 
with her essays on the allegorical significances of wild animals (SJ 
15.2 [1997]) and on Mopsa’s tale (SJ 16.2 [1998]). She edited the 
Everyman volume of Sidney’s shorter works, titled Defence of 
Poesie, Astrophil and Stella, and Other Writings (Everyman, 
1997), as well as  Spenser: Literature in Perspective (Evans, 
1967). Her versatility appears in her scholarly activity outside the 
sphere of early modern studies with her edition of Elizabeth 
Gaskell’s novel Cranford (Oxford University Press, 1972) 
reprinted as an Oxford World Classic in 1980 and 1998.  An active 
member of the Sidney Society, she regaled us with stories at the 
annual conference at Kalamazoo numerous times.  She will be very 
much missed.  Cards or other expressions of sympathy may be sent 
to her husband at 3 High Street, Waltham on the Wolds, Melton 
Mowbray, Leicestershire LE14 4AH, UK. 
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Upcoming Sidney Sessions, Spring 2009 
 
Renaissance Society of America, Los Angeles, 19-21 March 
1. Sidneys and the Psalms 
Chair: Robert Stillman, University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
Anne Lake Prescott, Barnard College 
              “Singing the Lord’s Songs in a Female Voice: Mary Sidney, 
Elizabeth Chéron, and Chiara Matraini” 
Susan Felch, Calvin College 
“Sculpting the Scriptures: Psalm Paraphrase in Holesome 
Hearbs and the Sidney Psalter” 
Elliott M. Simon, Haifa University 
“Sir Philip Sidney’s Prophetic Voice” 
Roger Kuin 
“A String of Pearls: Perrot’s Perle Elette and the Sidney 
Psalms” 
 
2. Sidneys and Material Culture 
Chair: Lisa Cevolsky, Suffolk University 
Respondent: Mary Ellen Lamb, Southern Illinois University 
Elizabeth B. Bearden, U of Maryland 
“Sidney Is Dead, Long Live Sidney: Funeral Materials for the 
Body Natural and Transmigration for the Body Poetic” 
Catherine L. Howey, History, Eastern Kentucky University 
“Critique or Compliment?: Lady Mary Sidney’s 1573 New 
Year’s Gift to Queen Elizabeth I” 
Susie West, Open University 
“Remembering Philip: heritage, memory and material culture” 
 
3. Lady Mary Wroth 
Chair: Margaret Hannay, Siena College 
Respondent: Katie Larson, University of Toronto 
Ilona Bell, Williams College 
“Mary Wroth’s Crowning Glory” 
Akiko Kusunoki, Tokyo Women’s Christian University 
“Mary Wroth's Representations of Elizabeth I in Urania” 
Mary Ellen Lamb, Southern Illinois University-Carbondale 
“Signifying through Clothing in Wroth’s Urania” 
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International Conference on Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 
 Kalamazoo May 8-11, 2008 
 
1. Images and Imagination 
Clare Kinney, University of Virginia 
 “Remodeling Sidneian Romance: Mrs. Stanley's Sir Philip 
Sidney's Arcadia Moderniz'd”  
Julie D. Campbell, Eastern Illinois University 
“Writing Renaissance Emblems: Flaming and Tortured Hearts 
in The First Part of the Countess of Montgomery’s Urania”  
Teemu Manninen 
“Fantastic Imitation: Enargetic Art as the Mirror of Imagined 
Nature” 
 
2. Sidneys, Dudleys and the Dutch  
Andrew Strycharski, University of Miami 
“Education, Gender, Literacy: Sources and Context for Henry 
and Mary Dudley Sidney's Autograph Verses in Grafton and 
Hall's Chronicle” 
Linda Shenk, Iowa State University  
“Sir Philip Sidney's The Lady of May and Anglo-Dutch 
Relations”  
Elizabeth Ghiselin Stein 
“’What is Due to His Authority’:  Obedience in Sir Philip 
Sidney's The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia” 
 
3. The Jan van Dorsten Lecture 
Chair: Mary Ellen Lamb, Southern Illinois University 
Margaret Hannay, Siena College 
“Mary, Widow: Wroth after Urania” 
 
 
 
  
 
Website for Sidney Journal  
The website for the Sidney Journal, located at 
www.sidneyjournal.org, allows payment for subscriptions by credit 
cards. This option is particularly convenient for non-US subscribers, 
because credit cards automatically convert currencies. If they prefer, 
subscribers may still use snail mail to send cheques ($14/year) to the 
Sidney Journal, c/o Mary Ellen Lamb, Department of English, 
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois 62901-4503. 
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